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Abstract 
Raymond Adu 
 “An Assessment of Monetary Integration in the West African Monetary Zone 
(WAMZ): Feasibility and Trade Implication” 
Keywords: WAMZ, optimum-currency-areas, shock asymmetry, gravity model of 
trade, intra-ECOWAS trade, real exchange rate, ECOWAS single currency.  
This thesis provides an assessment of monetary integration in the West African 
Monetary Zone (WAMZ) focusing upon its feasibility and trade implications, in 
order to inform policy about the group’s deep integration scheme. The first 
aspect of the original contribution of the thesis focuses on one of the main 
issues in the debate of the monetary union in the WAMZ, namely the degree of 
asymmetry in macroeconomic shocks. The study examines the real effective 
exchange rate (REER) behaviour among the prospective candidates to assess 
the degree of potential costs of giving up monetary policy autonomy. The 
evidence reported from VECM, impulse response and variance decomposition 
analysis points to heterogeneous economies. Therefore, idiosyncratic shocks 
imply the need for different policy responses to adjust to macroeconomic 
shocks. The findings strengthen the case for policy autonomy in the region. The 
second aspect of original contribution of the thesis evaluates the potential effect 
of a common currency on trade among WAMZ member countries. Using the 
existing currency union in ECOWAS, the CFA franc zone, the chapter estimates 
the effect of a common currency on bilateral trade over the period 1980-2016 
using the gravity model. The main conclusion reached is that membership of the 
CFA franc zone has promoted bilateral trade among members by 60%. The 
findings support the hypothesis that a common currency increases bilateral 
trade, which is a helpful guide for a WAMZ monetary union. In summary, the 
thesis demonstrates that in the long term, a common currency would promote 
intra-community trade, but at present, a monetary union is not feasible due to 
asymmetric macroeconomic shocks. Therefore WAMZ deep integration scheme 
would require members instituting adequate alternative adjustment mechanisms 
such as fiscal transfer schemes. 
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Chapter 1 Background and research motivation 
 
1.1 Introduction  
This thesis provides an empirical examination of the possible effects of 
monetary integration in the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ). Specifically, 
the study uses optimal currency area (OCA) theory to assess the disadvantages 
(costs) and benefits (trade creation) of the probable monetary integration in the 
region, a topic that is relatively unexplored in the literature. This chapter 
provides the background for the study. It also states the main findings of the 
research.  
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 1.2 provides the 
background of the study and an overview of the main literature. Section 1.3 
provides the importance of the study, research aim and research questions. 
Section 1.4 presents a brief overview of the main findings of the study. Finally, 
section 1.5 outline the structure of the rest of the thesis.  
 
1.2 Background  
Regional economic and monetary integration is a long-standing facet of policy 
and development strategy in West Africa (Masson and Pattillo 2005; Masson 
2008). The recent decade has seen considerable debate and policy discussions 
in the region about the gains from economic integration. More importantly, these 
developments focus on the means to which economic and political integration 
could spur macroeconomic integration, accelerate poverty reduction and 
achieve higher economic growth and development in the region (Cobham and 
Robson 1997; Debrun et al. 2005; Fielding and Shields 2005; Tsangarides and 
Qureshi 2008; Oshikoya 2010; Robson 2010; Ekpo and Udoh 2014).  
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was formed in 
May 1975 as a regional economic bloc, with a current membership of fifteen 
states. Namely, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast), 
The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Conakry, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, 
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Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. The ECOWAS intends to promote 
economic integration in all fields of economic activity. In particular, the bloc aims 
to promote co-operation and integration, leading to the formation of an 
economic union in the region, stipulated in Articles 2 and 3 of the 1975 and 
1993 treaties, respectively (Ogunkola 1998; Aryeetey 2001).  
An economic union would likely maintain and enhance economic stability as 
most of the economies are characterised by exchange rate instability, financial 
fragility, high inflation rates, and low intra-regional trade (Fielding and Shields 
2005). Further, it is a possible solution in generating opportunities to exploit 
economies of scale in production and trade, foster relations among member 
states, contribute to the progress and development of the region and guarantee 
the group’s influence in international negotiations (Oshikoya 2010). Besides, the 
gains from economic integration bound up with increased cross-border trade 
(Rose 2000) is essential here as the small economic size and market of most of 
these countries represent severe constraints on their autonomous development 
(Fielding and Shields 2005; Robson 2010). 
In 1990, ECOWAS adopted the Trade Liberalisation Scheme (TLS) becoming a 
Free Trade Area (FTA) (Kenen and Meade 2010). Sequentially, ECOWAS 
became a customs union in 2015 with a common external tariff (CET).1 
However, despite such efforts, ECOWAS is yet to see significant improvement 
in intra-regional trade, a key objective for its establishment (Debrun et al. 2005; 
Masson and Pattillo 2005; Cissokho et al. 2012). On average - overlooking 
informal trade - intra-ECOWAS trade as a percentage of total trade between 
1996 and 2016 has barely increased beyond 10%.2  
Among other non-tariff barriers such as poor transport infrastructure, weak trade 
institutions, less export diversification (i.e. dependence on export of primary 
commodities) one key challenge to intra-ECOWAS trade is the absence of 
regional currency convertibility and exchange rate stability (Lavergne 1997; 
Sachs and Warner 1997; Subramanian et al. 2004; Hulej et al. 2006; Yang and 
Gupta 2007; Alagidede et al. 2012; Cissokho et al. 2012; Turkson 2012). 
                                                             
1 For more details see http://www.ecowas.int/  
2 The data source is the UNCTAD Database 2018. The value of the total trade is constructed by taking the sum of the 
values of total exports and total imports of the group.  
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Robson (2010) reiterates that the basic requirement for effective market 
integration or customs union is the presence of currency convertibility within the 
group. In the ECOWAS, currency convertibility does not exist for most of the 
countries, except for and within the West African Economic and Monetary Union 
(WAEMU), an existing monetary union involving the eight former French 
colonies having a single currency (CFA franc) and a common central bank.3 Sy 
(2014) reports that about 50 per cent of intra-African trade financial settlements 
are conducted with banks outside the continent at extra cost due to exchange 
rate conversion. The incurring of high transaction costs serves as a disincentive 
for trade and investment, creating some rigidity in the sub-region (Masson and 
Pattillo 2005; Hulej et al. 2006). Therefore, one possible route to reduce 
currency conversion costs and promote trade integration in the West Africa sub-
region lies in achieving regional currency convertibility (Fielding and Shields 
2005).  
Today, ECOWAS is aiming to introduce a single currency for its fifteen-member 
states in 2020. The two-track strategy adopted requires harmonisation of 
economic policies to pave the way for a merger of the WAEMU and non-
WAEMU countries. Correspondingly, in 2000, the Heads of State of five West 
African countries (The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone) - all 
former British colonies except Guinea - established a second monetary zone, 
known as the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) in Accra, Ghana. Liberia 
acceded to the WAMZ Agreement in 2010 and became the sixth member of the 
WAMZ. As part of the fast-track approach to monetary integration in West 
Africa, the WAMZ established a convergence process toward launching a single 
currency, the ECO, in 2003.4 
However, the authorities postponed the launch to 2005, 2009, and 2015 
because the convergence criteria were not met by some countries (Kenen and 
Meade 2010; Bakoup and Ndoye 2016). The lack of convergence resulted in 
the decision to abandon the two-track approach. ECOWAS, therefore, adopted 
a single convergence criterion for all the fifteen-member state intending to 
                                                             
3 In the thesis, we will sometimes refer to WAEMU countries as the West Africa CFA franc zone or CFA countries and 
the WAMZ ones as English-speaking countries.  
4 The introduction of WAMZ single currency, known as ‘eco' and a shared central bank is conditional on the 
convergence of a set of specific quantitative and qualitative macroeconomic indicators (see Chapter 3 for the 
convergence criteria).  
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introduce the single currency in 2020. Notwithstanding, the achievements of the 
convergence criteria by WAMZ members are decisive for the prospective 
ECOWAS monetary union since most of the other countries are already in a 
currency union (Oshikoya 2010).  
Monetary integration has several components, including countries sharing a 
common currency and a central bank. Albeit, the two key characteristics of 
monetary integration are; when a group of countries permanently peg their 
exchange rates to each other in the integrated area and allow full convertibility 
of national currencies within the region (Tavlas 1993; Robson 2010). It is worth 
mentioning that monetary cooperation and integration is a broader area of study 
which encompasses economic and political cooperation. Also, monetary 
integration covers the integration of financial and banking systems and 
coordination of policy for the implementation of a common currency. Therefore, 
it is important to clarify that this study is an economic analysis, where the scope 
is limited to the empirical examination of the feasibility of the proposed 
monetary integration among WAMZ economies by considering some OCA 
criteria. Hence, the discussion should not be regarded as the sole basis for 
evaluating the pros and cons of monetary integration in WAMZ since it omits the 
potential changes that could be induced through a policy process of monetary 
integration.  
The main literature on monetary integration consists of two strands. First that 
participating in monetary union invariably entails the loss of independent 
national monetary policy, and the associated nominal exchange rate flexibility, 
as policy instruments for adjusting to asymmetric shocks (Mundel 1961; 
McKinnon 1963; Kenen 1969). Therefore, in order to minimise the potential 
costs, Mundel (1961) suggests the importance of factor mobility, wage flexibility 
and the absence of asymmetric macroeconomic shocks in an optimal currency 
area. Thus, the theoretical development of the OCA became the workhorse 
framework for the assessment of the costs and probable benefits of a currency 
union.  
Prior empirical research emphasises the ‘optimality’ of WAMZ in order for a 
common currency to suffice in the region (Debrun et al. 2005; Alagidede et al. 
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2008; Tsangarides and Qureshi 2008; Coulibaly and Gnimassoun 2013; 
Asongu 2014; Harvey and Cushing 2015). These studies have attempted to 
evaluate the optimality of WAMZ by using various OCA criteria, but have 
produced inconclusive results. It is argued that one of the most important 
criteria for assessing the optimality of countries for a monetary union is the 
degree of macroeconomic shock asymmetry (Mundell 1961; McKinnon 1963; 
Kenen 1969). If shocks are symmetric across countries, then a shared policy 
response (i.e., monetary or fiscal expansion/contraction) would be adequate. 
However, if macroeconomic shocks are highly idiosyncratic, a standard 
monetary policy will be inappropriate (Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1992; Buiter 
1997; Buiter 2000; Pisani-Ferry 2013). 
One way of understanding the degree of shock symmetry of WAMZ is to 
investigate shocks to the real effective exchange rate (REER), since the REER 
is likely to move in response to unexpected rather than to expected changes in 
macroeconomic variables (Alexius and Post 2008; Kizys and Pierdzioch 2009; 
Dumrongrittikul and Anderson 2016). Specifically, this thesis addresses the 
issue of shock asymmetry using the dynamics of the REER (see, chapter 4). 
Such an investigation provides an opportunity to examine the cost of WAMZ 
countries surrendering their national monetary policy autonomy and exchange 
rate flexibility to a transnational institution.  
In the second strand, critics argue that the traditional OCA literature establishing 
critical conditions for successful monetary integration is inadequate, as it mainly 
focuses on evaluating the costs of the monetary union (Tower and Willett 1970; 
Ishiyama 1975). In the light of these developments, the new OCA literature 
suggests that monetary union could entail benefits for its members: (a) is 
accompanied with adoption of a more efficient and credible monetary practice 
(Barro and Gordon 1983; Giavazzi and Giovannini 1989; Beetsma and 
Giuliodori 2010),5 (b) the elimination of exchange rate risks and transaction 
costs associated with common currency could increase trade and business 
                                                             
5 A country that suffers from an inflation bias and lacks credibility (Barro and Gordon 1983), can reach a low inflation 
reputation overnight by surrendering itself to the control of the low inflationary central (supranational central bank) 
(Giavazzi and Giovannini 1989). Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010) suggest that the incentive for the central bank to relax 
monetary policy is particularly strong when the central bank is under the influence of a government that wants to reduce 
unemployment. However, this is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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cycle synchronisation between its members (Frankel and Rose 1998; Rose 
2000; Frankel and Rose 2002; Baldwin et al. 2008; Tavlas 2009).6 
The seminal paper of Rose (2000) found that countries in a monetary union 
trade three times more than non-members. This finding initiated an extensive 
debate on the impact of currency union on trade, and since then, several 
empirical studies have been undertaken with varying results (Alesina and Barro 
2002; Frankel and Rose 2002; Glick and Rose 2002; Micco et al. 2003). 
However, few papers have considered the trade impact of a common currency 
within ECOWAS, though the CFA franc zone has existed for over half a century. 
These sparse studies (Anyanwu 2003; Carrère 2004; Nitsch 2004; Ajayi 2005; 
Fielding and Shields 2005; Masson and Pattillo 2005; Hulej et al. 2006; Masson 
2008; Zannou 2010; Adam and Chaudhry 2014) have reported varying results. 
Besides, there has been some criticism of earlier empirical studies utilising the 
often-preferred lognormal gravity equation with OLS for providing implausibly 
large currency union effects due to treatment effects. These include the 
potential endogeneity of monetary union membership, omitted (unobserved) 
variables, zero-valued trade flows, among others (Persson 2001; Melitz 2004; 
Baldwin 2006b; Burger et al. 2009). 
Based on these criticisms, we cannot assume that the effect of a currency union 
is identical across all currency unions, over the country of coverage and period. 
We, therefore, focus on the experience of the West African CFA franc zone and 
argue that their experience would be more representative of the trade benefit of 
the future currency union in West Africa. We further address the argument of 
unobservable or omitted variables bias and zero trade flows in the analysis 
using recent developments in the econometric analysis of the gravity equation.  
 
1.3 Significance and aim of the research  
This study is motivated by the lack of adequate research on assessing the costs 
and benefits of monetary integration in WAMZ. Specifically, the two main factors 
that motivate the research undertaken in this PhD study are. First, in section 
                                                             
6 De Grauwe (2018) further indicates that a currency union instigates greater financial integration, which in turn reduces 
the cost of trading and therefore facilitates stronger trade. 
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1.2, we stated that the failure of WAMZ countries to meet the convergence 
criteria has led to several postponements of the launch of the single currency. 
Consequently, there is ambivalence as to whether WAMZ or ECOWAS 
countries are ready for a common currency. The decision by these countries to 
surrender their national monetary policies to a supranational central institution is 
a vital economic policy that deserves empirical inspection. There is a dearth of 
research on the costs of monetary union in the region. Therefore, the findings of 
this study may be important to policymakers in determining whether the 
countries are in an excellent position to form a currency union. This will inform 
whether the cost of surrendering national monetary policies would be high or 
less.  
Second, there is a need to highlight the consequences of the common currency 
to WAMZ members. The works of Rose (2000) and other studies have widely 
established the impact of a common currency on trade. However, there is a lack 
of adequate research focusing on ECOWAS countries. Moreover, there has 
been criticism of previous estimates for establishing implausible large and 
statistically positive impact of currency union on trade. Therefore, we cannot 
assume that introduction of ECOWAS single currency will increase trade among 
members as the effect of a currency union is identical across all currency 
unions. In this context, this thesis focuses on the experience of the existing 
currency union - the CFA franc zone – in ECOWAS to inform academic 
discussion, policymakers and other stakeholders on the impact of single 
currency on trade thus, if there are trade benefits to be derived from the 
proposed single currency in ECOWAS.  
As a result, the study aims to contribute to the key issues of the pros and cons 
of probable monetary integration in WAMZ. Specifically, the thesis examines the 
economic conditions for successful monetary integration in WAMZ and 
assesses the trade generating effect, as this has not been sufficiently looked at. 
The findings of this study have important policy implications such that it may 
guide policymakers about the feasibility and prospects of potential monetary 
union in WAMZ.  
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In this context, this study attempts to answer the following two research 
questions: (1) Is WAMZ an optimal currency area – have WAMZ economies 
attained adequate macroeconomic shock symmetry for a common monetary 
policy to suffice? (2) What is the effect of a single currency - the CFA franc - on 
bilateral trade? 
In order to answer the first research question, this thesis uses several statistical 
examinations on whether the WAMZ satisfy the essential OCA condition for a 
monetary union - macroeconomic shock symmetry. These include (a) first, it 
assesses the behaviour of the real effective exchange rates (REER) across 
WAMZ countries by estimating the long-run and short-run relationships between 
the REER and its determinants using time series. The model would provide a 
benchmark to derive the equilibrium REER and misalignments for these 
countries. The aim is to assess whether the impact of common fundamentals on 
REER is similar across WAMZ economies and to determine if their REERs are 
converging towards the equilibrium path, respectively. Second, we use a 
structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model to investigate how REERs 
respond to a shock to the REER determinants (oil price, productivity and 
demand shocks) across WAMZ countries. Overall, the analysis aims to assess 
whether WAMZ economies have attained adequate macroeconomic symmetry 
for a common monetary policy to suffice so that the costs of these countries 
giving up the autonomy of monetary policy and the nominal exchange rate are 
minimised.  
The second research question (i.e., the potential effect of currency union on 
trade among WAMZ countries) is examined by focusing on the existing currency 
union, the CFA franc zone in ECOWAS, and estimating its effect on bilateral 
trade. The conclusion would indicate whether the CFA franc zone trade 
generating effect provides a strong case for the WAMZ single currency 
programme. This thesis uses a panel gravity model to answer the second 
research question by addressing all treatment effects identified in the literature 
– zero trade data and unobserved country-pair characteristics.  
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1.4 Main findings 
The section briefly outlines the main findings of the study. Chapter 4 answers 
the first research question. The chapter provides a contemporary examination 
of the degree of macroeconomic shock symmetry by assessing the behaviour of 
the real effective exchange rates (REER) across WAMZ countries. The first part 
of chapter 4 investigates the long-run and short-run relationships between the 
REER and its determinants using a country-by-country Vector Error Correction 
Model (VECM) over the period 1980-2015. We further derive the equilibrium 
REER and misalignments for these countries to examine whether they are 
converging over time towards the equilibrium.  
Overall, productivity differentials, terms of trade, real oil price, government 
consumption and trade openness are found to be important determinants of 
REER in the long run in WAMZ. However, the significant impact of the common 
fundamentals on REER is different across economies. Also, the country-specific 
short-run adjustment factor shows that there is REER mean reversion in 3 
countries, but the speed of adjustment varies across candidate countries. 
Furthermore, the computed REER misalignments suggest that before 2007, the 
REER of WAMZ members experienced high divergence from equilibrium path. 
However, the degree of REER misalignments appears to diminish, converging 
towards equilibrium between 2007-2015. 
The second part of chapter 4 imposes long-run restrictions to identify three 
types of shocks - oil price, productivity (supply) and demand preference shocks 
- from exchange rate determinants using the structural autoregressive model 
(SVAR) over the period 1980-2015 and assess how REERs respond to these 
shocks to characterise asymmetry across WAMZ. This is one of the novelty 
features of the study. From the impulse response analysis, there appear to be 
marked differences in the effects of the oil price shock among the WAMZ 
countries REER. Whereas real oil price shock leads to a real permanent 
appreciation in Nigeria, Guinea and Ghana, the contrary is observed in The 
Gambia and Sierra Leone. The response of REER to supply (productivity) 
shock across the five countries are also asymmetric. The response of REER to 
domestic aggregate demand shocks are positive for all the countries, but they 
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differ in size and speed; indicating idiosyncratic aggregate demand shocks. In 
the case of the variance decomposition, the sources of REER variability are 
idiosyncratic, and they vary significantly across countries.  
The overall evidence from the empirical investigation points to heterogeneous 
economies. The findings imply that, in the absence of an alternative adjustment 
mechanism (such as fiscal transfer schemes), a move towards monetary union 
will be associated with a high cost to the countries in a world where a monetary 
response to a shock is immediate. Idiosyncratic shocks imply the need for 
different policy responses to adjust to macroeconomic shocks. This strengthens 
the case for policy autonomy in the region and is consistent with previous 
studies showing considerable economic divergences amongst WAMZ countries 
as the main constraint to monetary union.  
Chapter 5 assesses whether the CFA franc trade effect provides a strong case 
for the WAMZ single currency programme. Unlike earlier studies, we estimate a 
panel gravity specification, allowing for country-pair and year-fixed effects of a 
comprehensive data set of bilateral trade flows of the 15 ECOWAS member 
countries over the period 1980-2016. The country-pair dummies control for 
heterogeneity since they account for any unobserved characteristics of each 
pair of countries that simultaneously explain trade volumes between them. The 
chapter also estimates the gravity equation by controlling for zero-trade values 
by adding a constant to each trade value to utilise the full sample, including zero 
trade flows in a log-linear estimation.  
The chapter reached two main conclusions: First, estimates from the preferred 
gravity equation indicate that members of the CFA franc zone have promoted 
bilateral trade among members by 60%. A Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood 
(PPML) estimation reinforces the hypothesis that the CFA franc zone augments 
bilateral trade among member countries. Second, the chapter reports a 
significant ‘trade creating effect’ in the CFA franc zone. The findings support the 
hypothesis that currency union increases bilateral trade, which is a helpful guide 
for a WAMZ monetary union. 
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1.5 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is divided into six major chapters. Chapter 1 looks at the research 
background, motivations, questions and the main findings. Chapter 2 discusses 
the theoretical development and methodological debate on monetary integration 
to motivate the approach for this research. This includes discussion of the OCA 
literature, which forms the basis for the analysis in this thesis. The final sections 
of the chapter considered the costs and benefits of monetary integration and the 
methodological discussions on operationalising the OCA theory.   
Chapter 3 provides an in-depth historical background to the thesis, exploring 
monetary developments since the pre-colonial era and their relationship to intra-
West African trade. The rationale of the chapter is that an understanding of 
historical monetary developments would provide an understanding of currency 
monetary arrangements in West African.  
Chapters 4 answers the first research question outlined above: Is WAMZ an 
optimal currency area? In other words, has WAMZ economies attained 
adequate macroeconomic shock symmetry for a common monetary policy to 
suffice? We used several modern time series econometric techniques, such as 
cointegration, error correction models, and variance decomposition in a country 
by country framework, for six West African countries, to examine the degree of 
asymmetries among the WAMZ countries. In chapter 5, we answered the 
second research question of the thesis: What is the effect of a single currency - 
the CFA franc - on bilateral trade? This research question plays a crucial role in 
determining the benefits to be derived from the proposed currency union in 
ECOWAS. This chapter uses the gravity model for a panel of fifteen West 
African countries. Various estimation methods are employed to establish the 
effect of currency union on bilateral trade. 
Finally, chapter 6 concludes providing a summary of key findings of the entire 
thesis, some policy implications and pointing out possible scopes of future 
research.  
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Chapter 2 Developments of monetary integration: 
Conceptual issues and methodology 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to discuss some of the main conceptual issues and 
approaches related to monetary integration to motivate the approach in this 
thesis. We thus start with a brief survey of developments of economic 
integration in section 2.2. In section 2.3, we discuss the main conceptual issues 
in evaluating monetary integration. This revolves around the workhorse theory – 
optimal currency area (OCA) - for assessing the likely success, or the cost and 
benefit of monetary union for a given region. Section 2.4 presents the 
arguments of the new OCA literature, which emerged as an outgrowth of the 
weakness and limitations of the early OCA theory. The final section, 2.5, 
reviews the methodological approaches in terms of operationalising the OCA 
theory. The review is useful to provide an explicit underpinning model for the 
research on how the cost and benefits of WAMZ single currency are estimated.  
 
2.2 Economic integration 
Conceptualising economic integration has tended to prove somewhat a 
challenging task, because various attempts have been made, leading to a 
proliferation of definitions in the literature (Viner 1950; Tinbergen 1954; Meade 
1955; Balassa 1961; Robson 1987).7 Tinbergen (1954: 95) defines economic 
integration as the "creation of the most desirable structure of the international 
economy, removing artificial hindrances to the optimal operation and introducing 
all desirable elements of coordination or unification deliberately". Balassa (1961: 
4) see economic integration as "a process" (involving various measures 
abolishing discrimination between economic units belonging to different 
countries) and "a state of affairs" (the absence of various forms of discrimination 
                                                             
7 The proliferation has led to the interchangeable use of the term regional integration with economic integration and so 
forth. This research is concerned with the latter term 
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between national economies). Besides, Rodrik (2000) reiterates the natural 
benchmark for thinking about international economic integration is to consider a 
world in which markets for goods, services, and factors of production are 
perfectly integrated.   
Contrasting these definitions can be difficult because they are interconnected. 
This interlink has resulted in a broad consensus on three critical issues of 
economic integration: (a) Removing internal barriers to business and economic 
activity amongst the integrating countries. (b) Cooperation or coordination for 
efficient utilisation of resources; intending to produce a broader and more open 
economy expected to benefit member countries. (c) Free movement of goods 
and factors of production within the integrated area. In Africa and other 
developing areas, economic integration, in general, means more than measures 
designed to abolish trade barriers. It is conceived and adopted as a useful 
instrument for economic growth and development and a tool that would 
enhance their bargaining position in the global system (Obuah 1996). 
Notwithstanding, there are various forms of economic integration representing 
varying degrees of integration of economic policies as per the objective of the 
group (Biswaro 2012). Traditionally, the Balassa (1961) levels of economic 
integration are distinguished as a sequencing pattern towards closer integration: 
I. In a preferential trading arrangement (PTA), trading blocs give preferential 
access to specific products from the participating countries. This is managed by 
reducing tariffs but not by abolishing them altogether. II. A free trade area (FTA) 
is an agreement among countries where all tariffs and other quantitative 
restrictions between the participating countries are abolished, whereas each 
country has the autonomy in setting their tariffs on trade with non-member 
countries. III. In a customs union (CU), participating countries not only remove 
tariffs and quantitative restrictions on their internal trade but also introduce a 
common external tariff (CET) on trade with non-member states. IV. In a 
common market (CM) both trade restrictions and restrictions on factors of 
production-labour, capital, and enterprise, are abolished. V. An economic union 
(EU) combines the suppression of restrictions on commodity and factor 
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movements with some degree of harmonization of economic, monetary, fiscal, 
social and other policies.8  
The main criticism of the above is that at present, some economic integration 
exists with a range and variety of rules far richer than these traditional 
distinctions (Baldwin and Venables 1995; Baldwin and Wyplosz 2015). The 
reason is that the conventional forms of regional integration have focused 
mainly on trade integration. However, the concept of deep integration went 
beyond trade with its focus on policy harmonisation in the 1980s, which came to 
include monetary integration (Pomfret 2005). Monetary unification presupposed 
trade integration as the first step in the regional integration sequence. In other 
words, it is only found in conjunction with a customs union or a common market. 
Robson (2010) argues that the sequencing of integration becomes a problem as 
to whether monetary integration precedes or follows economic integration. For 
instance, in West Africa, the CFA franc zone was established before reaching 
customs union in 2000, whereas the Eurozone is a natural outgrowth of the 
European Union. Nonetheless, the significance of monetary integration in the 
process of economic integration is to provide an economic system that 
facilitates the external payments, and the most ambitious way of doing this 
project is to establish a common currency to replace individual national 
currencies (Machlup 1977). Robson (2010) maintains that there is no 
compelling reason to follow the sequence rigidly. The focus of this research is 
on the development of monetary union; therefore, we start the next section by 
reviewing the theory of monetary integration.  
 
2.3 Monetary integration and the OCA Theory 
Throughout history, many academic papers have been written on monetary 
integration, yet there is no generally accepted definition of monetary integration 
(Balassa 1961; Tavlas 1993; Robson 2010). Nonetheless, there are two 
essential characteristics: the exchange rate must bear a permanently fixed 
relationship to each other in the integrated area and full convertibility among 
                                                             
8 The highest form of economic integration is total economic integration which assumes the unification of monetary, 
fiscal, social and counter-cyclical policies and requires the setting-up of a supranational authority whose decisions are 
binding for the member states (Balassa 2013).  
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national currencies within the region (Kawai 1991). A great deal of the literature 
on monetary integration revolves on the theoretical work of OCAs pioneered by 
(Mundell 1961; McKinnon 1963; Kenen 1969). This provides the framework for 
evaluating the real consequences of monetary integration for integrating 
countries. Though the theory was a purely academic exercise during the 1960s, 
an interest in it was revived to bolster the European monetary integration 
(EMU)9 in the 1990s. Subsequently, culminating in the award of the Nobel Prize 
in Economics to Robert Mundell in 1999. This thesis will, in part, draw upon the 
theoretical foundations of the OCA to assess the potential success of a 
currency union in WAMZ.    
In section 2.3.1, we discuss the background debate between fixed and flexible 
exchange rates in its specific relationship to the OCA theory. In section 2.3.2 
the main elements of the OCA theory; the conditions under which a country 
should participate in a currency union. We conclude the section with the 
weaknesses and criticism of the OCA theory in 2.3.3. 
 
2.3.1 Fixed vs flexible exchange rates 
The literature of OCAs emerged as an outgrowth of the debates over the 
relative merits of fixed versus flexible exchange rates (Tavlas 2009; i Marco 
2014). The early 1960s was characterised by the Bretton Wood fixed (but 
adjustable) exchange rates and limited international capital flows. Most 
countries at the time, had fixed their currency to the US Dollar and the US 
Dollar was convertible at a fixed rate into gold (Horvath 2003). In addition, was 
the incipient process of economic and monetary integration among the 
members of the European Economic Community (EEC) (Mongelli 2002)10. 
The context of the debate relates to the appropriate exchange rate regime at 
which to restore equilibrium in the balance of payments. The debate on whether 
                                                             
9 Much of the theoretical and empirical literature reviewed here focus on the creation of a single European Currency 
rather than WAMZ currency. However, this will not adversely affect the study, since the evaluation of the empirical 
literature is undertaken to evaluate and define appropriate practical methodologies for the current research rather than 
gain any insight into the success or otherwise of the Euro. Furthermore, the study will also provide a review of the 
existing literature with a focus on WAMZ. 
10 A proposal for economic and monetary union among the members of the European Economic Community (EEC) is 
first mentioned in the Marjolin Memorandum (Mongelli 2008). 
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to fix or float have their virtues and vices. Friedman (1953) argued that any 
possible error in economic policy might be straightened out by continuous and 
smooth changes in the exchange rates. He suggested that in order to maintain 
both internal and external balance, countries with wage and price stickiness 
should adopt flexible exchange rates. Even if adjustments of domestic wages 
and prices are possible, changes in nominal exchange rates are likely to be a 
more efficient way of effecting competitiveness adjustment than the revision 
wages and prices. In a nutshell, Friedman did not attempt to balance off the 
benefits and costs of floating; instead, his argument in favour of flexible 
exchange rates left the general impression that any country should adopt 
flexible exchange rates, irrespective of its economic characteristics (Tavlas 
1994). 
In contrast to the benefits, free-floating is argued to stimulate speculation, 
uncertainty, and instability.  Any adjustment in case of external shock would 
have an impact on home prices. Its consequences would be swifter in the 
countries which have a relatively high degree of openness (Jovanović 2005). 
On the other hand, the arguments in favour of fixed exchange rates are those 
that justify the introduction of monetary unions, in effect the OCA theory. A 
summary of the distinction between monetary unions and other pegged regimes 
within the context of an OCA consistent with Corden (1972), Robson (1998), 
Meade (2009) and Kenen and Meade (2010) is summarised in Table 2.1. The 
OCA analysis sought to delineate a single-currency domain within which 
monetary and ﬁscal policies, and adjustable exchange rates, could be used 
simultaneously to achieve full employment, a stable internal price level, and 
balance-of-payments equilibrium (Tavlas 1993). The OCA literature has 
become a benchmark for evaluating the likely success of a currency union for a 
given region. We present the various criteria for monetary integration and the 
economic costs and benefits thereof in the next section. 
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Table 2.1 Characteristics of different forms of monetary integration 
Characteristics Informal 
exchange-rate 
union (Pseudo-
union) 
Formal exchange-
rate union 
Full monetary union 
Between members:  
Current account 
convertibility 
Capital market 
integrated 
Exchange rate fixed 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Yes (within 
margins) 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Yes (zero margins) 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Yes (zero margins) 
Currencies Separate Separate Single 
Central banks Multiple, 
independent 
Multiple, strongly 
coordinated 
Single 
Reserve pooling No Yes Yes 
Foreign-exchange 
market intervention 
Separately By single agency By single agency 
Source: Adapted from (Cobham and Robson 1994: 241) 
 
2.3.2 The main elements of OCA theory 
An OCA can be defined as the optimal geographical area for a single currency, 
or for several currencies, whose exchange rates are irrevocably pegged to one 
another with unlimited convertibility for both current and capital transactions, but 
whose exchange rates fluctuate in unison against the rest of the world (Mundell 
1961). The optimum geographical area is a region where borders are defined by 
the sovereign countries choosing to participate in the currency area.  
Optimality concerns various OCA properties - also called "prerequisites," 
"characteristics," "criteria" by some authors - that are likely to determine 
whether it makes sense for a group of countries to give up their national 
currencies for a common currency with other countries in a monetary union. The 
series of criteria is a combination of economic and political factors: shock 
symmetry, factor mobility, degree of openness, product diversification, level of 
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fiscal integration and inter-regional transfers, degree of policy integration, 
similarity of inflation rates, price and wage flexibility, real exchange-rate 
variability (Mundell 1961; McKinnon 1963; Kenen 1969).  
 
i. The similarity of Shocks and Business Cycles 
According to the OCA literature, one of the important criteria is the degree of 
asymmetry of macroeconomic shocks (Mundell 1961; McKinnon 1963; Kenen 
1969). The reason is that participating in monetary union implies giving up the 
nominal exchange rate and monetary policy autonomy for correcting country-
specific shocks, and the costs associated with the loss of monetary policy 
independence increase with the degree of shock asymmetry between countries. 
We can illustrate this using a two-country scenario (country A and B) with the 
assumption of sticky prices in the short run. First, if both countries have identical 
business cycles and experience identical or similar shocks, for example, a 
negative demand shock that is common to both countries, then a common 
policy response in the form of a common monetary will suffice (Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen 1992; Pisani-Ferry 2013). A depreciation of the common currency 
against the rest of the world would be an ideal policy that will fit the two 
countries’ problems. Therefore, the more symmetric the structural shocks, the 
better countries are suited for a common currency area.  
However, in the presence of asymmetric shocks, the solution becomes 
complicated for the common central bank. This is demonstrated using Figure 
2.1, where the vertical axis shows the real exchange rate. With both countries at 
equilibrium at M with 0 output gap, we assume that country A is hit by a 
negative aggregate demand shock leading to a shift in aggregate demand curve 
from 𝐴𝐷𝐴1 to 𝐴𝐷𝐴2. Country A would need a depreciation of its real exchange 
rate with both country B and the rest of the world, but B needs no change since 
it is still at the initial equilibrium point M. Given A was not in a monetary union, 
the country will depreciate its nominal exchange rate, either through devaluation 
or decrease in interest rate, to achieve a real exchange rate of 𝜆1 and a new 
equilibrium at point N. In a monetary union, country A gives up the exchange 
rate and interest rate instruments to smooth out idiosyncratic shocks. Hence, 
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only the supranational central bank has the power to resolve the problems for 
both countries. In such a situation, a single monetary policy would result in 
country-specific inflation and have destabilising pro-cyclical effects, constraining 
the monetary union bind (Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1992; Pisani-Ferry 2013). 
This weakens the case for a common currency, as it may be useful to alter the 
exchange rate for stabilisation purposes or to implement independent monetary 
policies if shocks are highly idiosyncratic. It is worth mentioning that asymmetry 
may result from differences in shocks (impulses) or economic structures 
(responses) (Buiter 1997). When countries that are significantly different, form a 
monetary union, the monetary policy dilemma of the common central bank goes 
beyond asymmetric shocks because symmetric shocks with the asymmetric 
response equally posed the same problems as shown in Figure 2.1 below 
(Kamara 2015). This has been widely understood in the literature as the main 
costs involved when countries participate in a monetary union (Mundell 1961; 
McKinnon 1963; Kenen 1969).  
However, there is also a different perspective wherein a currency area; 
countries could smooth country- or region-specific shocks with efficient 
adjustment mechanisms that help restore equilibrium. The other adjustment 
mechanisms as an alternative to the exchange rate needed to cope with a 
country- or region-specific shocks are discussed below. The underlying reason 
is that a high degree of institutional and structural convergence among the 
countries beforehand minimises the risk of asymmetric shocks, are most likely 
to constitute an OCA (Mongelli 2002).  
Figure 2.1 Adjustments Process in Mundell Model/ Asymmetric shocks 
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Mundell (1961) identified alternative factors - the key attributes of an optimum 
currency area - in correcting external imbalances other than using nominal 
exchange rates suggested earlier by Friedman (1953). We can represent his 
idea using a two-country and two-good in a world with an initial balance of 
payments equilibrium. We illustrate in Figure 2.2 show an increase in demand in 
country A (due to an asymmetric shock in aggregate demand) would create 
excess demand in A and excess supply country B. Mundell then put forth two 
criteria that would restore equilibrium when these two countries are in currency 
union: First, wage flexibility in both countries can restore equilibrium without 
bringing about any sustained unemployment in one country and or inflationary 
pressures in another. When wages are flexible between countries 
contemplating a single currency, the excess demand for labour in country A will 
push the wage rate upward, and the unemployed labour in country B will accept 
a lower wage claim. The increase in wage in A will shift the aggregate supply 
from  𝐴𝑆𝐴1 to 𝐴𝑆𝐴2 and the lower wage in B will increase aggregate supply 
shifting the AS curve from 𝐴𝑆𝐵1 to 𝐴𝑆𝐵2. As a result, increased AS in country B 
will lead to a decrease in the price level and hence B product will become more 
competitive relative to A, which will stimulate demand. Also, the decline in AS in 
A will increase the price level, making A products less competitive relative to 
B’s, reducing demand in A. These corresponding shifts restore the equilibrium 
positions in both countries.  
Figure 2.2 Adjustments Process in Mundell Model/Automatic adjustments 
inflexible factors 
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labour mobility between the two countries, then the unemployed labour from B 
will move to A where the demand for labour is in excess. With this movement, 
there will be no more unemployment in B and the inflationary wage pressures A 
will disappear. Thereby, factor mobility is a crucial attribute of an OCA since it 
provides a substitute for exchange rate flexibility in correcting external 
imbalances. Therefore, a currency area is thus optimal if all participating 
countries or regions have flexible wages or mobility of labour and capital. If 
these criteria are not fulfilled, a system of flexible exchange rates is preferable 
(Volz 2010).  
However, Kenen and Meade (2010: 14) argue that it is utterly unrealistic to 
assume that workers will move quickly from one country to another, even if 
there are no border barriers. Hence, labour mobility is likely to be low, due to 
significant costs, such as for migration and retraining (Mongelli 2002b; Mongelli 
2008). The implication is that labour mobility is a less adjustment mechanism 
within a currency union (Jovanović 2005). On the other hand, Mundell failed to 
distinguish between labour mobility and capital mobility in his initial analysis: 
Goods moved freely between countries in his two-country model, but bonds and 
other claims did not.11 This limits the relevance of Mundell’s argument Crawford 
(1993).  
 
iii. The degree of economic openness 
McKinnon (1963) introduced the idea of openness and trade integration as a 
key characteristic of an optimal currency area.  He defined openness as the 
ratio of tradable (goods that can enter foreign trade) and non-tradable goods 
(goods that do not enter foreign trade because transportation is not feasible for 
them). McKinnon (1963) examined the effects of a shock that changes the 
relative price of tradable and non-tradable on the overall price level. When 
economies are relatively open, variable exchange rates cause a significant 
                                                             
11 While capital mobility was more limited in the early 1960s, when Mundell wrote his paper, it is sensitive to the degree 
of economic activity and the outlook for economic prosperity now (Jovanović 2005). As a result of free capital markets in 
the world, capital tends to flow from regions with low yields on assets to ones yielding higher returns, and this 
phenomenon may have effects in restoring equilibrium.  
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direct and indirect effect on internal price. When the domestic currency 
depreciates against trading partners, the price of tradable will rise relative to 
non-tradable to destabilise the general price level. Also, a devaluation would be 
more rapidly transmitted into the domestic price and cost of living, negating its 
intended effects. This would, in turn, reduce the potential for money, and hence 
money illusion would not be much help in getting labour to accept a cut in real 
wages (McKinnon 1963). 
To stabilise the general price level and the depreciating exchange rate, the 
authorities would require a contraction in demand to push down the prices of 
non-tradable. Other things being equal the degree of openness plays a crucial 
role here. The more open an economy is, the larger the share of tradable in 
output, and the more reduction in demand is needed to restore equilibrium. 
McKinnon noted that the greater a country’s openness, the smaller the chances 
for the effective independent use of exchange rates as an instrument for 
economic stabilisation. The implication is that flexible exchange rate would be 
less effective as an adjustment instrument for redressing the trade balance and 
stabilising prices for more open economies. As such, when countries lose such 
a tool, through a fixed exchange rate or currency union bears the less cost to 
the economy (Corden 1972).  
These and other considerations led McKinnon to conclude that: (a) relatively 
open economies should peg their currencies, and (b) open economies that 
trade extensively with one another would ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to form a currency 
area because such an area would be closer than any of its constituent parts, 
thereby providing a greater buffer against the effects of exchange-rate changes 
(Tavlas 1994).12 Jovanović (2005) submits the reason the openness argument 
fails to explain why small EU states such as Denmark and Sweden have 
internal control over their exchange rate despite strong trade relations with the 
EMU, likewise, why relatively large countries such as Germany and France 
opted for the EMU, while Britain is still out of it.  
                                                             
12 Also, small economies need to link their currencies with the currency of their major trading par tner, as a small 
economy is less likely to efficiently produce all the products it needs (Tavlas 1993; Mongelli 2002). For instance, when 
former colonies link their currency to that of their former master (for example, the CFA franc zone) or when some of the 
transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe linked their currencies to the German mark, as was the case during 
the 1990s (Jovanović 2005). 
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iv. Product diversification 
Kenen (1969) presented the concept of product diversiﬁcation to assess the 
possibility of a currency union. Though the paper included several arguments 
such as fiscal integration and product structures, product diversification became 
the standard component of the optimum-currency-area literature. The paper 
argues that highly diversified economies in production and consumption, are 
better candidates for currency areas than less-diversiﬁed economies. When 
countries are susceptible to sector-speciﬁc or industry-speciﬁc shocks, 
diversiﬁcation provides some insulation, averting the need for prompt 
adjustment in terms of trade via the nominal exchange rate (Tavlas 1994). They 
are more likely to incur fewer costs for abandoning nominal exchange rate 
changes and thus, find a single currency beneficial.   
Furthermore, when a well-diversified economy confronts a drop in the demand 
for its principal exports, unemployment will not rise as sharply as it would in a 
less-diversified national economy. On the other hand, Kenen (1969) highlights 
the importance of using policy instruments - monetary and fiscal restraint - in 
countries that have a low degree of product diversification to cope with 
asymmetric external demand shocks. The implications for developing countries, 
especially WAMZ are that: “being less diversified and less well equipped with 
policy instruments, [they] should make more frequent changes or perhaps resort 
to full flexibility [of the exchange rate]” (Kenen 1969: 54). 
 
v. Similarities of inflation rates 
One criterion for an OCA is the similarities of inflation rates among the potential 
member countries (Fleming 1971). External imbalances can arise between 
countries joining a currency area from persistent differences in national inflation 
rates. Countries with external balance surplus would be forced to accept an 
undesirable inflation rate, whereas countries with external balance deficits 
would be forced to accept an undesirable level of unemployment. Fleming 
(1971) remarks that when inflation rates between states are lower or similar 
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over time, terms of trade will also stay somewhat stable. This will, in turn, give 
rise to equilibrium current account transactions and trade, and reduce the need 
for nominal exchange rate adjustments (Tavlas 1993). As a result, WAMZ 
macroeconomic convergence criteria provide a single-digit satisfaction for the 
potential member countries.  
 
vi. Fiscal integration 
Kenen (1969) proposed fiscal integration as a characteristic to judge optimality 
for participation in a single currency area. He argued that the higher the level of 
fiscal harmonisation between two areas, the greater the ability to smooth out 
diverse shocks through fiscal transfers from a low unemployment region to a 
high-unemployment region. The fiscal transfer system can be a significant tool 
to redistribute funds to cushion individual countries or regions affected by an 
adverse asymmetric shock (Baimbridge and Whyman 2015). Such an 
adjustment mechanism could be, for instance, a unified budget, which 
automatically redistributes from countries or regions experiencing a strong 
economy to those suffering from a recession. 
This is against the backdrop that the absence of nominal exchange rate 
adjustments, labour mobility is unlikely to facilitate the adjustment process. 
Fiscal transfers are part of a non-market-based adjustment process. Tavlas 
(1993) argues that fiscal harmonisation would require an advanced degree of 
political integration and willingness to undertake such risk-sharing. This calls for 
the need for political or fiscal unions. The importance of fiscal adjustment 
mechanisms is demonstrated by the US economy, which has a highly federal 
fiscal system that contributes to regional stabilisation in the case of asymmetric 
shocks. De Grauwe (2000), however, points out that fiscal transfers are hence 
only suited to dealing with temporary demand shocks; when the shock is a 
permanent one, other adjustment mechanisms will be necessary to deal with 
the problem. 
Besides, the recent economic crisis in the eurozone has reinforced the need for 
currency union participants to refrain from running excessive budget deficits and 
not carry the burden of large debts as this could destabilise the single currency.  
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vii. Political integration  
Mintz (1970: 33) suggests that “the major, and perhaps only, the real condition 
of the institution of monetary integration is the political will to integrate on the 
part of the prospective members”. Political will fosters, amongst others, 
compliance with joint commitments sustains co-operation on various economic 
policies and encourages more institutional linkages between members (Mongelli 
2002). Along similar lines are the willingness of prospective members to give up 
their independence or sovereignty in monetary policies (Machlup 1977). 
Haberler (1970) and Tower and Willett (1976) stress the importance of similarity 
of policy attitudes among member countries in turning a group into a successful 
currency area. Countries with a reasonable level of compatibility in preferences 
toward economic outcomes; such as low inflation, high employment and their 
ability to trade-off between these goals make them successful candidates for 
monetary union.  
In summary, countries forming a monetary union must have a shared sense of 
common preferences that outweighs the national interest. This point is 
becoming increasingly apparent in the European Union and other economic 
unions, that political factors are important in determining the success of a single 
currency area (Tavlas 1993). The political factors in each country that determine 
the optimality of WAMZ as a currency area are different. Whereas five countries 
are eager and willing to enter into a single currency, it is not the case in Nigeria. 
One fundamental concern for the CFA franc zone – having a substantial 
backing from France – is whether members would agree to let go of the CFA for 
a West African single currency. However, this thesis focuses only on economic 
and not political issues. 
2.3.3 Weaknesses and limitations of the OCA theory 
The early OCA literature discussed above tends to give the preconditions 
countries must satisfy before joining a currency union. However, the early 
theory has been criticised for being inconclusive and inconsistent (Tavlas 1993). 
For instance, McKinnon (1969) pointed out an inconsistency between his 
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openness criterion and Kenen’s (1969) diversiﬁcation criterion.13 Mundell (1961) 
even argued that it was by no means evident that diversiﬁcation could be used 
to choose among exchange-rate regimes. Also, Robson (1987) and Tavlas 
(1994) observe that several properties are difficult to be measured 
unambiguously. In effect, OCA properties were difficult to be evaluated against 
each other since they lack a unifying analytical framework. Perhaps the most 
trenchant criticism was the crumbling of the main theoretical foundation of the 
OCA -the long-run ineffectiveness of monetary policy (Mongelli 2008). 
As a result, the OCA theory began to recede from the academic discussions 
during the 1970s. At the same time interest in European monetary integration 
subsided in the 1970s after the demise of the Bretton Woods arrangement 
(Mongelli 2008). Against this backdrop, the works of Fleming (1971), Corden 
(1972) and Tower and Willett (1976) revised the OCA theory with greater 
emphasis on the evaluation of the benefits and costs of currency area 
participation. The next section considers developments of the new OCA theory. 
 
2.4 New Optimal Currency Area theory   
The theory of OCAs was resuscitated as a subject of active interest in the early 
1990s due to the progress made toward European monetary integration. As 
observed, the early development of the OCA literature focused on the reduction 
of losses via the possibility for adjustment through alternative means in case of 
shocks. The modern OCA theory writers instead, using theoretical 
developments from various economic branches, stopped focusing on the main 
costs of joining a monetary union and placed more emphasis on the benefits, 
especially within the European Union (Broz 2005). Such theoretical 
developments include; rational expectations, time inconsistency and credibility 
issues and exchange rate determination models (Tavlas 1993).  
So, considering that the new OCA theory tries to explain the monetary values 
and benefits of monetary integration, in line with the economic developments, 
                                                             
13 First, McKinnon’s openness criterion and Kenen’s diversiﬁcation principle lead to contradictory implications about the 
optimal exchange-rate regime; the former criterion suggests that open economies (which are likely to be relatively 
undiversiﬁed) should peg their currencies, whereas the latter criterion postulates that undiversiﬁed economies should 
ﬂoat their currencies against the rest of the world (Tavlas 2009). 
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we commence with the costs and benefits analysis in section 2.4.1. This is 
followed by the monetarist critique of monetary policy, time consistency and 
credibility issues and the effectiveness of exchange rate adjustments in section 
2.4.2, 2.4.3, and 2.4.4, respectively. We finally extend the discussion to include 
the endogeneity of OCA debate in section 2.4.5.  
 
2.4.1 Cost and Benefit analysis  
The previous section considered the fundamental criteria countries must satisfy 
to become an optimal currency area (OCA). Other researchers, on the other 
hand, argue that the focus should be on the relative costs and benefits of 
participating in a currency union for each country (Tower and Willett 1970; 
Ishiyama 1975). The potential benefits of joining or forming a monetary union 
can be categorised into efficiency and credibility gains (Kenen and Meade 
2010). While the main cost of monetary unification is giving up of individual 
member country’s monetary and exchange rate policy instrument. Therefore, 
this section provides the potential benefits and costs that countries derive from 
joining a currency union.14 
 
i. Benefits 
Efficiency gains-Reduction in transaction costs and exchange rate uncertainty: 
At the micro-level, the direct efficiency gains are assumed to arise from the 
reduction in transaction costs and the elimination of exchange rate uncertainty (i 
Marco 2014). Mundell (1961) argues that a single currency is more efficient 
than multiple currencies in performing the roles of medium of exchange and unit 
of account. The prices of currency conversion increase if there are many 
currencies under flexible exchange rates within a region (Mongelli 2008). In 
ECOWAS, six countries belonging to WAMZ have their national currencies that 
are inconvertible within the region. Hence, the removal of currency conversion 
costs, information costs and discouraging price discrimination via a single 
                                                             
14  De Grauwe (2016) provides a critical textbook review of the costs and benefits of the monetary union. An extensive 
review is also available in Emerson et al. (1992). 
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currency can facilitate trade in goods and services between countries otherwise 
with different currencies. 
Assessing the potential aggregate transaction costs savings from the removal of 
currency conversion associated costs for WAMZ countries is high, but it is hard 
to offer a precise estimate due to the absence of aggregate bank data on 
WAMZ exchange rate transactions. In the case of EMU, gains from removing 
foreign exchange transaction costs were estimated to be 0.4% of the group's 
GDP (EU Commission, 1990).  Minford (2002) indicates that the modesty of the 
savings on transaction costs is because the bulk of transactions within the 
European Community go through the banking system occurring limited or no 
currency conversion costs. In the case of WAMZ economies, such savings are 
likely to be higher due to the underdeveloped financial systems, where many 
transactions in the informal sector and between SMEs are in cash. 
In addition, a common currency removes the exchange rate risks associated 
with floating exchange rates. The argument implicitly assumes that exchange 
rate volatility has a negative effect on economic condition (Horvath 2003; i 
Marco 2014). A common currency precludes future competitive devaluations, 
facilitates foreign direct investments and removes the non-tariff barriers to trade 
in goods and services which may encourage more trade (Volz 2010). Moreover, 
the efficiency gain brings a high degree of long-term confidence in future 
investment decisions; which ultimately drive private sector growth (Kenen and 
Meade 2010; Volz 2010). Trade benefits are likely to increase with the degree 
of openness of an economy (McKinnon 1963).  
Accordingly, the magnitude of these direct gains is dependent on the level of 
intra-regional trade and investment. Though the literature following Rose (2000) 
finds positive trade impact of a currency union, the potential gains are often 
likely to be somewhat limited in the case of WAMZ because of the relatively 
small levels of intra-regional trade. Chapter 5 assesses the potential trade-
creation in the region. On the other hand, other studies argue that exchange 
rate risk can be hedged relatively quickly in the forward foreign exchange 
market reducing the associated costs on international trade and foreign 
investment (Kenen and Meade 2010). However, hedging is expensive and 
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complicated, especially in developing countries where such financial 
instruments are often impossible even for shorter periods due to the 
underdeveloped financial markets (De Grauwe and De Bellefroid 1986; Volz 
2010). 
Credible Monetary Policy and a Lower Inflation Bias: Monetary unification 
means giving up monetary policy as an instrument for the stabilisation of 
country-specific economic shocks. One important reason for joining a monetary 
union, especially for countries with high inflation, is that this offers a route to low 
and stable inflation, provided the monetary authority can commit to monetary 
rules (De Grauwe 1997). In a monetary union, a central bank with active 
statutory duty for price stability and political independence provides a consistent 
and credible anti-inflationary policy (Emerson 1992).15 Hence, monetary 
unification becomes a trade-off between reduced stabilising country-specific 
shocks and enhanced credibility of monetary policy resulting in a lower inflation 
outcome. When countries have full discretion to set monetary policy there is a 
possibility of inflation bias.16 According to Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010), the 
incentive for the central bank to relax monetary policy is particularly strong 
when the central bank is under the influence of a government that wants to 
reduce unemployment. However, there is no empirical evidence from the 
Phillips curve argument that higher inflation can be exploited as a means of 
securing economic policy objectives (such as low unemployment), except for 
short-run periods (Emerson 1992). On the other hand, by coordinating monetary 
and fiscal policies, the currency area will bring a more significant monetary and 
price stability, considered as the prerequisite for economic growth (Dornbusch 
2001; Beetsma and Giuliodori 2010).  
In a summary, given that floating exchange rates can be very volatile and that 
this volatility can have essential repercussions when a country engages in 
international trade, it tends to support WAMZ economies quest for an alternative 
                                                             
15 So far, the ECB has by wide and large met its objective of keeping area-wide inflation close to 2 percent. Those euro-
zone members with a history of weak monetary discipline benefited from a substantial reduction in inflation and inflation 
expectations have become low, which suggests that the anti-inflationary stance of the ECB is credible (Beetsma and 
Giuliodori 2010). 
16 The problem of the "inflation bias" has been studied in numerous contributions following the seminal work by Barro 
and Gordon (1983). 
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exchange rate regime that could provide the stability and credibility that a fixed 
exchange rate system had been intended to provide (Meade 2009). 
 
ii. Costs 
The main cost of monetary unification is the loss of monetary independence, 
and often, placing pressure on national fiscal policy. In a monetary union, the 
management of monetary policy and the exchange rate is transferred to a 
supranational central bank. As a result, individual member countries lose direct 
control over these instruments (such as interest rate and nominal exchange 
rate), that may be useful in dealing with country-specific macroeconomic shocks 
(Mongelli 2002). When countries face unexpected shocks, being domestic or 
foreign, the real and nominal macroeconomic variables often tend to fluctuate. 
The resulting variability of macroeconomic variables (such as output or inflation) 
is generally considered to be welfare-reducing and the disappearance of 
monetary policy tools, assuming it is instrumental in affecting macroeconomic 
variability, could, therefore, have implications in terms of welfare (Emerson 
1992). On the other hand, Tavlas (1993) argues that the welfare implications or 
the magnitude of the costs depend on how these economies are vulnerable to 
shocks and the ease with which they can adjust. Accordingly, the greater the 
fulfilment of the OCA criteria prior, the less the need to use monetary policy 
tools when shocks hit countries. 
Also, one difficulty structurally built into monetary union is the inability for 
members to devalue their currency for competitive advantage (Frankel 2013). 
Naturally, the temptation to devalue national currencies against the currencies 
of the main trading partners is stronger when the economy is in recession, and 
the need for preventing a rise in unemployment is highest. However, Beetsma 
and Giuliodori (2010) argue that policymakers today are more aware that 
devaluation can inflict a welfare loss in their own country, making them reluctant 
to engage in such a policy. Thereby, monetary unification effectively forces 
countries to coordinate their national policies, and countries achieve the same 
outcomes for output, but with lower inflation. This is evident from the current 
Euro-area financial crisis, while the EMU prevented any form of competitive 
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devaluations, it would have produced merely higher inflation and undermine 
cooperation among the EU countries in other areas (Beetsma and Giuliodori 
2010).  
Furthermore, in a monetary union, there is reduced the possibility for member 
countries to use seigniorage revenue (inflation tax). Seigniorage is the ability of 
the government to finance its expenditure by issuing/printing money, and it is a 
major source of government revenues, especially for economies suffering high 
inflation (Emerson 1992; i Marco 2014). The countries that intend to form a 
WAMZ/ECOWAS union suffer from chronic budget deficits and their inability to 
raise enough tax revenues make them rely at least in part on seigniorage 
revenues (Debrun et al. 2005; Beetsma and Giuliodori 2010). Hence, a loss in 
seigniorage revenue may impact negatively on a government’s ability to finance 
social, health and education programmes, among others (Oshikoya 2010). 
Emerson (1992) argues that a reduction of seigniorage revenues eliminates a 
perverse incentive towards inflation and fiscal laxity; it should be a source of 
welfare gains whatever the gross public cost.  
In conclusion, the traditional OCA theory has largely ignored the implications of 
monetary unification for fiscal policymaking. However, the recent developments 
in the eurozone debt crisis have provided a practical example of this type of 
cost in a monetary union. Monetary unification affects the interactions among 
the national governments with potential consequences for the monetary and 
fiscal policy mix and, thus, also the macroeconomic outcomes. Because fiscal 
policies are determined at the national level, the fiscal authorities may pursue 
different macroeconomic objectives than the monetary authorities. ECOWAS 
members have a track record of running significant budget deficits, especially 
during times of weak commodity export prices. It is generally considered that 
member countries carrying the burden of substantial debt could undermine the 
single currency. In effect, a fiscal expansion may produce harmful cross-border 
spillovers. For instance, the eurozone authorities had to intervene to bail out 
Greece (and, to a lesser extent, other Southern European countries) in the 
recent debt-refinancing problems. These complications with fiscal policy could 
present a rationale for some fiscal policy restrictions for member countries 
(Beetsma and Giuliodori 2010). The implications of fiscal policy restrictions 
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could be substantial for the ECOWAS members; as currently they rely heavily 
on fiscal policy as a tool with which to manage their economies. However, the 
degree to which the ECOWAS countries would be able to meet such fiscal 
discipline rules, the better the proposed currency union would be. 
 
2.4.2 The Monetarist critique: long-run ineffectiveness of monetary policy 
The early OCA theory discussed in section 2.2 was embedded in the belief that, 
at least in the short run, monetary policy is an effective policy instrument to 
attain an optimum point along the Phillips curve. This view implies that the loss 
of monetary policy instruments to undertake business cycle stabilisation17 in a 
monetary union imposes a high cost on an economy (Corden 1972; Mongelli 
2008; Tavlas 2009). Nevertheless, the monetarist critique and the literature on 
the inflation bias postulating the long-run ineffectiveness of monetary policy 
undermined this perception in the 1970s.18  
Friedman (1968) pointed out that economic agents or labour tend to negotiate in 
terms of real rather than nominal wages; hence, the Phillips curve should be 
augmented by expected inflation. This results in a vertical long-run Phillips 
curve where there is no long-run trade-off between unemployment and inflation 
rates. 
Consequently, monetary policy becomes ineffective in the long-run as the 
Phillips curve is displaced by the natural rate of unemployment (NRU) 
(McCallum 1989). The implication is that the best that macroeconomic policy 
can hope to achieve is price stability in the medium term (Friedman 1968). 
Hence, the expected costs of losing direct control over national monetary policy, 
implicit in early OCA theory, seem modest subject to the above conditions. 
                                                             
17  The cost that is represented by wider cyclical fluctuations, is more severe when shocks are asymmetric vi's-à-is the 
other partner nations. 
18 See Lucas (1972), Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983). 
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2.4.3 Credibility and time consistency issues 
Also, one of the preconditions for countries joining a currency area discussed 
above is the convergence or similarity of inflation rates (Fleming 1971). 
However, proponents of the modern OCA theory have argued that a country 
with a reputation of high inflation and a record of reneging low inflation 
commitment would find it hard to reduce inflation without a long and pricey 
process of disinflation. Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon 
(1983) have argued that national monetary policy authorities often face time-
inconsistency and credibility problems. This results in “inflation bias” - thus 
when the use of discretionary policy by policymakers create incentives for 
surprise inflation to reduce the short-run unemployment. Such reductions in 
unemployment come at the cost of higher inflation and lower credibility in the 
long run.  
Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010) stated that this incentive is particularly strong 
when the central bank is under the influence of a government that wants to 
reduce unemployment. In such situation, commitment to time consistent policy 
rules are often hampered for political reasons, and the only practical alternative 
is to peg the currency to a country of a more efficient monetary practice 
(Giavazzi and Giovannini 1989; De Grauwe 1992). Alternatively, joining a 
monetary union, whose monetary policy entails greater credibility may carry 
benefits (Barro and Gordon 1983). In effect, a high inflation country can reach a 
low inflation reputation overnight by surrendering itself to the control of the low 
inflationary central bank without any cost from the loss of monetary policy 
control. In summary, the new OCA projects how monetary integration may be 
even more beneficial when the variance of inflation rates is high, thereby the 
similarities of inflation rates from the early OCA literature may not be a 
necessary precondition (Broz 2005).  Clerc et al. (2011) state that many 
countries joined the EMU according to this logic.  
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2.4.4 The Effectiveness of Exchange Rate Adjustments 
The view of the early OCA literature is that the nominal exchange rate acts as a 
useful adjustment tool in restoring external disequilibrium since exchange rates 
were thought to be influenced primarily by movements in trade flows (Tavlas 
1993). Hence, the cost of losing direct control over the nominal exchange rate 
depends on the stabilising benefits of exchange rate flexibility.  
The new OCA literature has argued that the loss of the exchange rate as a 
policy tool may be less detrimental initially thought due to the potential 
inefficiency of exchange rate changes (Obstfeld 2002). The resurgence of 
exchange rate pessimism stems from the fact that in very open economies, 
devaluation does not work because prices and wages immediately increase to 
wipe out any competitive advantage (Pomfret 2005). In addition, the emergence 
of the asset model of exchange rate determination (the portfolio-balance 
channel) (Branson 1990) and the Ricardian equivalence and perfect foresight 
by agent’s concept (De Grauwe 1989) have stressed that the nominal exchange 
does not adjust immediately to correct external disequilibria as implied by the 
old OCA theory. For instance, developing countries - especially WAMZ 
countries - that devalued their currencies as a recovery effort under the 
structural adjustment package have faced mixed outcomes. In some cases, 
their trade balance and output improved, while deteriorated or remained 
unchanged in others (Pomfret 2005).   
The other opposing view is that some episodes of nominal exchange rate 
adjustment have been effective in restoring equilibrium after a shock. For 
instance, the 1982 devaluation in Belgium helped restore the domestic and 
trade account equilibrium at a lower cost (De Grauwe 2000); the Italian 
devaluation contributed to sustaining economic activity after the exit from the 
ERM in 1992 (Mongelli 2002). However, Mongelli (2002) argues that these 
examples should be recognised as one-off interventions and that the exchange 
rate instrument cannot be used systematically.  
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2.4.5 The endogeneity of OCA  
One significant contribution towards the new OCA literature emanated from 
Frankel and Rose (1998) endogeneity arguments. As recalled, the early OCA 
literature sought to identify the criteria that countries must satisfy before joining 
a monetary union (i.e. ex-ante). Instead, the endogeneity literature, pioneered 
by Frankel and Rose (1998) and Frankel and Rose (2002) has focused on 
changes in economic structure and performance that may result from 
participation in a monetary union, i.e. ex-post. Frankel and Rose (1998) argued 
that a common currency would act as a powerful driver of convergence: the 
possibility of countries turning endogenously into an OCA ex-post instead of ex-
ante.   
The authors’ argument is grounded in the following two hypotheses: First, the 
introduction of a single currency eliminates the exchange rate risk (and, 
therefore, the cost of hedging), lowers information costs, and raises price 
transparency, reducing market segmentation and encouraging competition. By 
the removal of borders (broadly defined to include separate monies), monetary 
unification will lead to an intensification of bilateral trade (Tavlas 2009). 
Secondly, there is a positive linkage between trade integration and income 
correlation (Frankel and Rose 1998). Precisely, trade integration will propel 
industrial specialisation between countries in the goods in which they have a 
comparative advantage. More significant intra-industry trade will contribute to 
common demand shocks, as well as a greater correlation of policy shocks 
through more similar policies. This, in turn, will lead to greater business cycle 
harmonisation from industry-specific shocks, lessening the need of country-
specific monetary policies and reducing the cost of giving up a nationally 
tailored monetary policy (Tavlas 2009; Pisani-Ferry 2013; Gong and Kim 
2018).19 Hence, the endogenous OCA literature leads to the conclusion that 
                                                             
19 For instance, increased trade among industrialized countries, like European countries, is typically intra-industry trade 
based on economies of scale and imperfect competition. Therefore, it does not lead to a higher specialization of the 
countries (as argued by Krugman) which could cause the higher possibility of asymmetric shocks (Horvath 2003). 
Instead, increased international trade patterns and business cycle correlations become endogenous. This represent a 
simple application of the famous Lucas critique (Broz 2005). According to the Lucas Critique, a prediction based on 
historical data would be invalid if some policy change alters the relationship between relevant variables. If the policy 
change alters the relationship between the variables, then past relationship between the variables would differ in the 
future relationship.  
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participation in a monetary union itself reduces asymmetric shocks among 
participants.  
In Figure 2.3, the downward sloping OCA line shows that the net benefits of 
joining a monetary union depend positively on the extent of trade and income 
correlation between countries. Countries above the OCA line with high trade 
linkage and high-income correlation would find it beneficial forming a currency 
union (Mongelli 2002). Furthermore, because the endogeneity of OCA 
properties evolves, even if prospective candidates for currency union are under 
the OCA line, once they join further trade integration will increase the income 
correlation and countries will move upwards, crossing the OCA line in Figure 
2.3 (Frankel 1999).  
Figure 2.3 Openness, Income correlation and OCA line 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            Source: Frankel and Rose (1997), Frankel (1999) and De Grauwe and Mongelli (2004) 
Therefore, a country’s suitability for monetary union does not depend on the 
prior satisfaction of the OCA criteria, but once a country enters a common 
currency area further economic integration will turn this country endogenously 
into an OCA ex-post (Frankel and Rose 1998). This buttress the argument that 
the real and or nominal convergence criteria set for entry into a currency union 
(i.e., EMU) was not necessary because convergence could occur endogenously 
once a currency area was put in place (Wagner 2014).20  
In the same line, we can argue that even if WAMZ is formed with non-optimal 
members, continued economic interaction could shift towards an OCA, and the 
                                                             
20 (see, Emerson et al. 1992; Frankel and Rose 1997; Mongelli, 2002, 2008) 
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single monetary policy is more likely to be union-wide appropriate over time. 
However, the main obstacles to forming the WAMZ are the differences in 
external shocks (Beetsma and Giuliodori 2010). The terms of trade shock tend 
to be relatively large and are typically not very highly correlated across the 
countries. 
Moreover, internal trade among prospective union members is relatively small. 
This contrasts with Europe, where the high level of intra-regional trade and 
international trade links enforced the synchronisation of business cycles 
(Frankel and Rose 1998; Artis 2003) eventually leading Europe to become a 
common currency area ex-post (Mongelli 2002a; Fidrmuc 2004; Baxter and 
Kouparitsas 2005; Willett et al. 2010). On the other hand, the estimates of the 
trade gains show significant variations across studies (Rose 2000; Persson 
2001; Frankel and Rose 2002), which provides the fundamental arguments of 
the endogeneity hypothesis. Hence, a critical question here is whether WAMZ is 
anchored on the expectation that trade integration and income correlation will 
increase once a currency union is created. 
In contrast to the pro endogeneity OCA theory, Krugman (1993) argues that 
increased economic integration increases the probability of asymmetric shocks. 
While the monetary union may intensify trade, it might also facilitate localised 
specialisation. In other words, due to the economies of scale, higher integration 
would lead to a regional concentration of industrial activity (Horvath 2003) and 
the less diversified output could increase the divergence of asymmetric shocks 
(See also, Eichengreen 1990; Bayoumi et al. 1994). This, in turn, makes the 
business cycle more heterogeneous. Accordingly, the costs of the loss of direct 
control over national monetary policy would rise faster than the net benefits 
(increase intensification of trade) ex-post (Mongelli 2002). Krugman (1993) uses 
data from North America to show that increase in trade integration, facilitate 
further divergence instead of increasing income correlation and economic 
convergence. Therefore, increased integration does not guarantee economic 
convergence; instead, it increased the cost of monetary union. An increase in 
integration would move a country away from the OCA line in Figure 2.4; more 
openness and less correlation. Some Economists critique Krugman’s 
hypothesis for suggesting that a common currency would be most desirable for 
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two countries that otherwise have nothing to do with each other (Basten 2006). 
Besides, Krugman argues the cause why the price of monetary union may go 
up faster than the benefits to the possibility that it would take longer for a region 
to endogenously become an Optimum Currency Area.  
Figure 2.4 Krugman’s specialisation effect 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          Source: Frankel and Rose (1997), Frankel (1999) and De Grauwe and Mongelli (2004). 
Finally, a summary of the endogeneity argument is presented in Figure 2.5. 
Figure 2.5 Endogeneity of the OCA (Frankel and Rose vrs Krugman) 
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2.5 Methodological approaches and debates  
We reviewed in section 2.2.3 that the early OCA criteria lacked an operational 
measure to gauge optimality. When interest in European monetary integration 
resurfaced in the early 1990s, there were also theoretical advances in 
macroeconomic theory and econometric techniques with which to evaluate the 
issue of monetary integration (Tavlas 1994; Mongelli 2008). Thus, the various 
approaches aimed to operationalise the OCA and develop ex-ante criteria for 
assessing the potential consequences of monetary unification (Pisani-Ferry 
2013). Various econometric tools were used to assess why specific groups of 
countries may form an OCA either at empirical data indicating convergence or 
at projections and anticipated trends.  
These methodological approaches can be categorised into two: the first seeks 
to assess the degree of the cost involved in abandoning monetary policy 
autonomy, while the second project the benefits, specifically higher trade 
integration. It is worth mentioning that most of the empirical literature has been 
conducted in the context of European monetary integration in some sense 
(Mongelli 2005). This thesis argues such models underpinned by theories of 
monetary integration could be applied in the context of the proposed WAMZ 
currency union if certain assumptions and justifications are held. 
 
2.5.1 The Costs 
As mentioned earlier, the main cost of joining a currency union is the loss of 
autonomy in monetary and exchange rate policy of the individual member 
countries. The new OCA literature argues that the degree of the cost depends 
importantly on the nature of the shocks to which the participating countries in a 
currency area are subjected (Tavlas 1994). As a result, modern works 
operationalising the OCA considers the analysis of shocks affecting economies 
a crucial area of inquiry since those shocks almost capture the interaction 
between several properties of the early OCA (Masson and Taylor 1993; Alesina 
and Barro 2002). The intuition (based on Mundell 1961 and Kenen 1969) is that 
in the event of disturbance, if the speed with which the partner countries 
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adjusts21 are similar, then the need for policy autonomy is reduced and the cost 
of losing direct control over the nominal exchange rate falls (Mongelli 2008). 
Correspondingly, several methodological approaches have appeared to 
examine empirically the issue of shocks focusing on the nature of shocks or 
shock asymmetry. Three broad types of empirical approaches have been 
applied: Asymmetry of shocks; Cluster analysis and Generalised Purchasing 
Power Parity (G-PPP). 
 
i. Asymmetric shocks 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) pioneered the literature using a Structural 
Vector Autoregression (SVAR) model for the analysis of monetary union. 
Building on the VAR model proposed by Blanchard and Quah (1989), the 
authors utilised SVAR to identify supply and demand shocks. The patterns of 
correlation of these shocks across members of the European Community (EC) 
were compared with the ones prevailing in the United States (Artis 2003). The 
underlying rationale of their study is that countries experiencing similar 
disturbances are likely to respond with similar policies, thus making them better 
candidates for a monetary union. They reported less correlated shocks (mainly 
because of the low degree of labour mobility) for European countries relative to 
the States in the US and concluded that forming a union in Europe might be 
pricey. Other works, including Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994), Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1997) and Barro and Tenreyro (2007) have also utilised different 
methods to evaluate the nature of shocks in EMU. Arguably, the VAR empirical 
studies focus mostly on Europe. There is scarcity of such published work in 
WAMZ (Fielding 2002; Fielding and Shields 2005; Houssa 2008). Given the 
criticisms to VAR models, Houssa (2008) used dynamic structural factor models 
to estimate aggregate demand and supply shocks for West African countries. 
The paper reports negative and low positive correlations of supply shocks and 
concludes against forming a monetary union of the West African countries 
because the countries will find it difficult to adjust to supply shocks in a 
                                                             
21 Taking into consideration also the policy responses 
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monetary union. However, demand shocks are more similar among the French-
speaking countries of the region. 
 
ii. Cluster analysis 
This methodology delineates the OCA properties based on clustering countries 
that share a significant set of integration characteristics or homogeneities, 
reflecting their suitability for monetary union (Kamara 1986; Tsangarides and 
Qureshi 2008). Cluster analysis appears to be a relatively appealing 
methodology and has been applied to a wide variety of research problems, 
assessing potential currency union member countries (Artis and Zhang 1997; 
Artis and Zhang 1998; Artis and Zhang 1999; Artis 2003). Clusters are formed 
based on countries' similarity in respect of vectors of characteristics (the OCA 
criteria) such as business cycle synchronisation, bilateral trade intensity, 
symmetry of shocks, synchronisation of a country's monetary policy, inflation 
convergence, among others. The OCA characteristics are often centred on an 
anchor country, taken as a benchmark. For instance, Artis and Zhang (2002) 
formed clusters of potential EMU members using six OCA criteria, which were 
centred on Germany, the benchmark country.  
Though the cluster analysis is an appealing methodology and allows for 
modifications, the initial problem is the attempt to systematically define the 
relevant integration variables among the many OCA properties, measure them 
and then identify an optimum grouping strategy (Kamara 1986). Also, the 
reliance on detailed economic data makes it unsuitable for developing countries 
like WAMZ where data is scarce. Finally, identifying an anchor country will be 
difficult among WAMZ countries. Qureshi and Tsangarides (2008) assess the 
prospects of forming the proposed monetary unions in WAMZ and ECOWAS 
using cluster analysis. Countries were clustered into groups sharing high 
similarities based on OCA criteria; output volatility, real exchange variability, 
regional trade intensity, terms of trade synchronisation, inflation, government 
balance, and debt-servicing requirement. They report considerable 
dissimilarities on the economic characteristics of the West African countries. 
They find countries in WAEMU tend to cluster together. The paper suggested 
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against the formation of ECOWAS single currency against the backdrop of that 
stage. 
 
iii. Generalised-Purchasing Power Parity Analysis/Real Exchange Rate 
Another methodology that emanated in the monetary integration literature is the 
Generalised Purchasing Power Parity (G-PPP) by Enders and Hum (1994). This 
approach based on cointegration analysis examines the extent to which group 
of countries exhibits convergence of their real exchange rate. The theory of G-
PPP states that real exchange rates tend to be nonstationary because they are 
influenced by some nonstationary macroeconomic variables such as real 
output, terms of trade, government consumption and interest rates. Hence, if 
the fundamental variables are sufficiently interrelated, as in a currency union, 
real exchange rates may share a common stochastic trend. For two economies 
to qualify for creation of a currency union, they must experience symmetrical 
shocks to their macroeconomic variables. The number of common stochastic 
trends is an indicator of the pattern of external shocks affecting the countries 
and whether monetary policy coordination will be successful in reducing their 
effects (Mouratidis 2001).  In summary, the G-PPP postulates that, where 
higher cointegration of real exchange rates exists among participating countries, 
monetary union would incur lower costs.  
On the other hand, the G-PPP method has been argued to represent just one 
facet of the OCA criteria, making an inadequate approach. Also, policy 
interventions can alter real exchange rates (through the nominal rate) without 
affecting the underlying economic causes, thereby undermining the basic 
cointegration analysis assumption that real exchange rates capture the 
economic fundamentals. 
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2.5.2 Benefits 
i. Increased Trade and the Gravity Model 
Trade is not the only factor to consider when forming a monetary union. 
However, each potential union must be evaluated to the full spectrum of its 
benefits and costs. Frankel and Rose (1998) argue that a common currency 
promotes closer trade links and more synchronised cycles. Hence, the last 
strand of literature relies on using econometric analysis to calculate the trade 
benefits of a common currency (Mongelli 2008). 
The modification of the standard gravity model of trade contributed as the main 
methodological motivation. The standard gravity model includes variables for 
national incomes and distances as determinants of bilateral trade. Rose (2000) 
modified the standard gravity model with other variables, including a dummy 
variable for the presence of a common currency in the estimation. Using a 
gravity model on a panel covering 186 countries during 1970-1990, Rose 
reported that a common currency shared between two countries increase 
bilateral trade by three times as much as do otherwise similar countries with 
different currencies. Though this paper motivated several studies into the 
currency union trade generating effect, the rather large impact of currency union 
on trade raised a great deal of scepticism (Persson 2001). Consequently, other 
evidence drawn from the EMU (Micco et al. 2003) has suggested a moderate 
impact of a single currency on trade between members, much less than initially 
reported by Rose. 
Against this backdrop, the thesis assesses the potential effect of a single 
currency on intra-regional trade of WAMZ (ECOWAS) in chapter 5. It is worth 
mentioning that the proposed currency union is considered as an essential 
policy strategy aimed to increase intra-regional trade - which is currently 
considered to be rather low (see Chapter 3).  
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2.6 Chapter summary 
The classic OCA analysis sought to evaluate the circumstances under which 
macroeconomic policies could most effectively restore or attain the goals of low 
unemployment, low inﬂation, and balance-of-payments equilibrium in the face of 
shocks to an economy. The underlying framework attached considerable weight 
to the ability of the authorities to ﬁne-tune an economy in the short run.  
However, the OCA witnessed several ups and downs during the 1970s and 
1980s reflected, in part the following paradoxes among the contributions made 
by Mundell, McKinnon, and Kenen. Besides, the weaknesses and limitations of 
the analytical framework behind the OCA theory then started to emerge. 
Subsequent developments, in both the international monetary system and 
academic thinking, weakened the case for using macroeconomic policies to 
ﬁne-tune an economy. Participating in a currency union is now deemed to 
generate fewer costs in terms of the loss of autonomy of domestic monetary 
policy instruments and creating more emphasis on the benefits of currency 
areas. Also, the literature on the endogeneity of the OCA reinforced the trade 
benefits of monetary unions. 
Furthermore, some significant advancement in Econometrics made it possible 
to ’operationalise’ several OCA properties, providing a consistent framework in 
which a country’s characteristic can be used to determine its optimal exchange-
rate regime.  
Having discussed the theoretical underpinnings of OCA theory and its various 
criteria, we turn to the empirical investigation of whether WAMZ constitutes 
such an OCA. This is an issue that a large part of the growing literature on 
WAMZ has focused on. Before we get into estimating the level of convergence 
among WAMZ countries and the potential trade benefits of monetary union, the 
thesis first reviews the historical development of monetary integration in West 
Africa (in the next chapter) to understand better the current developments in the 
region. 
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Chapter 3 Monetary integration in West Africa: A 
historical reflection 
 
3.1 Introduction  
Monetary integration has several components, including sharing a common 
currency and a central bank or allowing the convertibility of currencies for a 
group of countries. It could also involve a group of countries fixing their 
exchange rates to each other, though the rates may vary for each member with 
non-members (Corden 1972). One support for monetary integration lies in the 
proposition that it has the potential to stimulate community trade because it 
removes exchange rate costs and provides certainty in the trading (Rose 2000; 
Alesina and Barro 2002; Frankel and Rose 2002). Moreover, countries aspiring 
to form a deep integration scheme could advance to economic and political 
union status. This could have a broader implication for sustainable peace and 
prosperity and the tackling of common issues such as climate change (Laird 
2002). 
Therefore, countries aspiring for economic and political union status must 
consider what kind of monetary integration process is desirable. The increased 
number of regional economic communities around the world suggests that 
discussions about whether countries should pursue a shallow or deep 
integration scheme will continue. The Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) was formed in 1975 to achieve an economic and political 
union status as stipulated in article 2 of their 1975 treaty (Aryeetey 2001). A 
revised 1993 ECOWAS treaty demonstrated the need to establish regional 
institutions that would accelerate the deep integration goal.  
Thus, two monetary integration zones emerged from the revised 1993 treaty. 
The first is the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) 
established in 1994 by the 8 French Speaking countries in West Africa. It must 
be noted that these eight countries shared a single currency (the CFA Franc) 
inherited from the colonial era. Guinea Bissau which was a Portuguese colony 
in West Africa joined WAEMU in 1997. The second monetary zone was 
established in 2000 by the 5 English speaking countries and Guinea Conakry 
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(French Speaking) as the 6th member; called the West African Monetary Zone 
(WAMZ). It is hoped that once the convergence process is met, the two 
monetary zones will merge to establish a single currency (eco) and a central 
bank that would effectively transform ECOWAS into an economic union. 
ECOWAS is currently working on launching the eco in 2020.  
However, monetary integration is not a new phenomenon in West Africa, 
although current research has paid insufficient attention to this. Indeed, 
research has demonstrated the presence of common currencies such as the 
cowries and gold in pre-colonial West Africa (Hopkins 1970; Johnson 1970; 
Guyer 1995; Hopkins 2014). The colonial-era also encompassed common 
currencies and central banks such as the West African shilling of the British 
colonies and the CFA franc of the French colonies. The West African Currency 
Board acted as a central bank for the British West African colony while the 
French used their central bank in Paris as the central bank of the colonies. 
Given the mounting historical evidence of the existence of common currency in 
the sub-region, a natural question arises; why did the common currencies not 
promote intra-West African trade? The chapter develops an argument that the 
use of trade as the primary motivation of a single currency in the ECOWAS 
seems untenable given the low levels of intra-WAEMU trade. 
Nonetheless, the current attempt for monetary integration could be accelerated 
if ECOWAS members reflect on their past institutional arrangements and adjust 
to modern economic realities. How the evolution of these arrangements can be 
explained, and the nature of the current system understood, remain matters of 
considerable controversy (Akyeampong 2006). Albeit, the study of the history of 
African economies, at least for the pre-colonial period to the post-colonial 
regimes of the contemporary era, has been marked by several concepts being 
offered either by neoclassical economic historians (North and Thomas 1973; 
North 1994; Akyeampong 2006; Harreld 2016) or those applying Marxian 
economic thought (Harreld 2016). 
Pierson (1996) argues that institutional change is a path-dependent process. 
Thus, when institutional and policy changes are in place, social actors adapt to 
those changes, frequently making substantial investments in the process. 
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Consequently, the notion of path dependence has been applied to various 
social sciences research because of the increasing interest in institutions and 
economic growth (Magnusson and Ottosson 2009). The path dependency 
theory supports the proposition that an appreciation of historical changes is one 
crucial aspect of understanding current institutional development in a country or 
region (North 1990; Acemoglu et al. 2001; North 2006; Nunn 2007; Acemoglu 
and Robinson 2013). Accordingly, the historical past related to monetary 
integration in West Africa could be divided into three periods, namely; the pre-
colonial era, the colonial era and the post-independence and subsequent 
formation of ECOWAS. A holistic assessment of the process of monetary 
integration and its relationship to intra-community trade from a historical point of 
view has not been sufficiently done in West Africa. If history matters, then our 
analyses must explore the particularities; i.e., events, structures and 
circumstances of the past (Hodgson 2002). 
Therefore, this chapter aims to contribute to the existing literature by assessing 
monetary integration in West Africa from the pre-colonial era to the present day. 
This study would deepen our understanding of the process of monetary 
integration in West Africa today and the extent to which lessons could be drawn 
from history. The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 will discuss 
the process of monetary integration in West Africa in the pre-colonial era. 
Section 3.3 will discuss monetary integration during the colonial era, while 
section 3.4 will discuss the current attempts to launch a common currency and 
central bank in the ECOWAS region. Section 3.5 summarises and concludes 
the chapter. 
 
3.2 Pre-colonial era  
This section seeks to evaluate the monetary systems in pre-colonial West Africa 
and assess the extent of monetary cooperation within the area. Written 
accounts of West African history by people living outside the region received 
prominence with Muslim traders in the trans-Saharan trade. The trans-Saharan 
trade witnessed the growth of Empires in West Africa, especially in the middle 
belt of the region. Whether the Saharan trade could be directly associated with 
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the growth of empires in the region has not been sufficiently researched (Guyer 
1995). The most commonly known empires of Western Sudan (Ghana, Mali, 
and Songhai) were called trading empires because they emerged, expanded 
and evolved as regional and international trade hubs (Guyer 1995). The ease at 
which goods and services were exchanged played a role in the expansion of 
trade in the region. Trade by barter and the use of commodities facilitated the 
exchange of goods (Bah et al. 2017). 
So, discussion about monetary integration in West Africa in the pre-colonial era 
demonstrates the extent to which there exists a real subsistence economy, a 
barter system and an organised system of exchange where monies or 
commodities were used in the exchange of goods. These three scenarios will 
be the basis to understand monetary integration in West Africa in the pre-
colonial era. 
 
3.2.1 Barter system  
A subsistence economy exists when people consume what they produce 
without any trade (Bohannan 1959; Ekundare 1973; Webb Jr 1982). However, 
Webb Jr (1982) argued that a real subsistence economy has no analytical 
usefulness because it is not found in the historical or ethnographical records. 
Human beings and their ancestors probably have always lived in groups and 
exchanged goods and services in various forms. Thus, the historical narratives 
where a subsistence economy is treated as the first phase in the development 
of trade and money was little more than to set off the succeeding stages. 
Therefore, the concept of a barter economy probably represents the nature of 
exchange in many ancient societies, including in West Africa than a pure 
subsistence economy. For this, discussion about the monetary event should 
start with a barter system because it demonstrates exchanges between groups 
of people. 
The idea of barter is complicated because of the difficulty to establish what 
constitutes a barter and whether the goods exchanged could be treated as 
money (Webb Jr 1982). Therefore, we should define money and establish its 
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properties to locate barter within it. Modern-day money is treated as a medium 
of exchange, a store of value and a unit of account (Sloman et al. 2006; 
Asmundson and Oner 2012). It is also treated as notes and coins and fiat in 
modern economies, and this will be discussed in more detail in the later 
sections. Barter occurs when goods are exchanged for other goods where the 
price is expressed either implicitly or explicitly (Webb Jr 1982; Asmundson and 
Oner 2012), provided there is no coercion to do so and that participating agents 
treat the goods having equal use-value and it is to their mutual benefit (Webb Jr 
1982). In this case, goods used in a barter economy could be treated as a 
medium of exchange that partially qualifies it as money.  However, the extent to 
which a barter system demonstrates a unit of account and a store of value has 
not been established in the existing literature. Asmundson and Oner (2012) are 
of the view that if the goods are not easily transferable to a third agent because 
the agents may not fancy the good or their preference may not be available at 
the time, then we cannot treat such goods as money. However, if non-
perishable goods are exchanged repetitively, then they can assume the 
properties of money in the context of the store of value (Webb Jr 1982). It still 
leaves the unit of account as a basis for money unaddressed in a barter system 
where goods are priced in common denomination. 
Nonetheless, several papers have examined trade and the barter system in 
West Africa that could improve our understanding of monetary integration in the 
region. Hopkins (2014) highlighted that many trading centres in West Africa 
used the barter as a means of a business transaction. Ekundare (1973) recalled 
that the people of West Africa adopted the barter system of exchange long ago, 
before the advent of foreign traders. It suited the partially subsistence 
economy22 of the region. The early exchanges were the results of surplus 
production over and above the subsistence need. The amount of produce a 
family could offer and the goods it required in exchange were often small in 
quantity and value (Ekundare 1973). This process was only likely to occur within 
small clusters of people or villages. 
                                                             
22 Partially subsistence economy refers to a limited number of goods being exchanged while the rest are directly 
consumed by the producers.  
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The pure barter economy was convenient for a small amount of trade between 
groups of people within the region. Barter was also convenient for trade 
between West Africa and especially with the Arabs and later the Europeans 
because each party required specific goods that were readily available from one 
another. For example, the Arabs brought salt, so needed in West Africa in 
exchange for gold (Waines 2012). Within West Africa, goods such as textiles, 
kola nuts, ivory, copper, and food as well as live animals were traded in a barter 
system because there was a demand for them (Bah et al. 2017). However, as 
trade expanded within the region and between the region and the rest of the 
world, the viability of a barter system to serve as a unit of account required large 
quantities of these goods to be exchanged. The fundamental difficulty for a 
barter economy was the extent to which the goods are transferable to a third 
party, especially when it involves perishable goods such as food. 
Our understanding of monetary integration in West Africa could be enhanced if 
we examine trade between the empires and kingdoms at the time as well as 
goods used as the medium of exchange. The trading quantities are unknown, 
although, Bah et al. (2017) summarised several papers which demonstrated 
that intra-West Africa trade and trade with the outside world at the time were 
extensive. These activities inevitably required a medium of exchange that was 
generally going to be acceptable. 
Ekundare (1973) made a distinction between a barter system and commodity 
trading, which extend to goods being treated as money in a barter system and 
commodity currencies. That is, any commodity adopted as a currency was 
known to be generally accepted as a medium of exchange in the empires and 
for trade with foreigners that were employed extensively for exchange rather 
than for consumption. In this, Ekundare (1973) treated a barter system as a 
pure exchange of goods that are meant for consumption rather than for a third-
party exchange. This is plausible because a barter system would not require an 
extensive trade that was gradually taking a foothold into intra-West African trade 
and trade with the rest of the world. Therefore, a shift occurred from the pure 
use of a barter system with a commodity as a medium of exchange. 
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The review in this section demonstrated that trade expanded in West Africa and 
with the rest of the world, the commodity was used as a medium of exchange 
although some papers treated this exchange as barter. 
3.2.2 Commodity trading and currencies in West Africa 
Despite the barter economy existed in West Africa, some of the goods used for 
exchange could not be treated as money because they did not serve as a unit 
of account. These goods included cloth, gold, salt, and iron. Nonetheless, the 
barter did serve as a medium of exchange and a store of value, though the 
exchanges were not extensive. Therefore, the expansion of trade necessitated 
the need to have a unit of account in addition to the other properties of money 
to smooth transactions (McPhee 1971; Hopkins 2014). 
The empires of Western Sudan epitomised the extent of monetary integration in 
West Africa. These empires span from the 7th century to the 18th century (Bah et 
al. 2017). They comprised of a King that oversaw lesser kings. For example, 
during the Mali Empire, Mansa Musa’s reign saw 24 lesser kings under his 
direct authority. As a result, the extent to which commodities were treated as 
common currencies in precolonial West Africa was made easy with the political 
structure of the empires that acted as a single administration or a federation. 
Moreover, the influence of Muslim traders through the trans-Saharan trade 
routes meant that the empires needed a common medium of exchange in order 
to facilitate domestic and international trade. In other words, there was some 
element of cooperation to accept some commodities as a medium of exchange 
because of the extensive trade.   
Hence, several commodities were used in West Africa as a medium of 
exchange and were treated as common currencies because they were 
generally acceptable and were convertible to each other (Johnson 1970; 
Conrad 2010; Hopkins 2014). These commodities included cowries, salt, gold, 
cloth, grains, iron rod, manilas, and copper (Adomakoh 1962b; Johnson 1970; 
McPhee 1971; Lovejoy 1974; Odunbaku 2012; Hopkins 2014). In order to 
maintain the convertibility of these commodity currencies, their values were 
fixed against other currencies outside West Africa especially the dinar or they 
were used as benchmarks (Johnson 1970; Hopkins (2014). This was facilitated 
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by the cooperation of these empires with North African regions, especially 
present-day Morocco and Libya because they had representatives that 
monitor’s trade agreements.  
Within the region, these commodities also acted as common currencies. For 
example, Webb Jnr (1982) argues that grains, cloth, salt, and livestock were 
traded in Senegambia and other regions of West Africa and were also a staple 
food. Webb Jnr (1982) highlighted that cloth could be treated as monetised 
currency in Senegambia because it was used in the exchange of other goods 
such as salt and grains. Moreover, ‘cloth' also qualifies as a property of money 
because it was used as a medium of exchange, a store of value and unit of 
account in the region. Furthermore, it was used to purchase other commodities 
and was transferable. The prices of grains and livestock and the extent to which 
they fluctuate were determined by the season harvests rather than the quantity 
of cloth that acted as a common currency. This is entirely consistent with the 
Keynesian economic perspectives about how demand determines prices rather 
than money supply. Although this has not been explicit in the existing literature, 
it was likely that even where the cloth was not sufficiently available as a medium 
of exchange; there would have been a tendency to use the grains and livestock 
to trade in a barter system. 
Similar accounts have been noted in other parts about West Africa, where other 
commodities were used as common currencies (Johnson 1970; Lovejoy 1974; 
Guyer 1995). For example, Guyer (1995) argues that small commodity 
production, exchange, and monetisation were firmly established in precolonial 
Africa. For instance, the Asante empire monetarized pieces of iron or iron rods, 
’nnabuo’ as their common currency and was in circulation and was generally 
acceptable. Their acceptability was due to their practical value as objects that 
could be beaten into the form of weapons or agricultural equipment. Guyer 
(1995) cited by Hopkins (1973:69), where the iron rods were split into small 
denominations to facilitate exchange. The other small kingdoms in West Africa 
such as the Hausa and Oyo empires preferred the use of cowries and traded 
with the savannah and the Guinea regions in the North and Western part of 
West Africa (Johnson 1970). While Oyo exported locally made woven cloth and 
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‘kola nuts’ to the Savannah, they imported horses, salt, and dresses that 
corroborate the presence of cooperation between these trading kingdoms.  
The review of the literature demonstrated that the system of commodity 
currencies in West Africa appears to be fragmented, given that many were in 
circulation. This fragmentation was due to the presence of partially autonomous 
lesser kingdoms within the empires of Western Sudan and the degree of their 
supply. These fragmentations imply that the control of money supply was 
fragmented. However, what can be established is that these commodity 
currencies were convertible because the lesser empires were directly under the 
authority of the larger empire or at least a high degree of cooperation ensured 
the convertibility of these currencies. 
Moreover, the presence of these empires and the cooperation that existed 
meant that there was a gradual move toward the adoption of a single currency. 
The cowries began to act as money in greater parts of West Africa. This was 
made possible because the empires of Western Sudan gradually absorbed the 
smaller kingdoms into a single administration in West Africa. Indeed, Hopkins 
(2014) highlighted that without colonial rule, West Africa was gradually leaning 
toward an economic and political union. Nunn (2008) also demonstrated that 
without colonial rule, Africa would have been on a much-advanced stage in 
terms of the development of their institutional framework and general well-
being. Acemoglu et al. (2001) also associated poverty and underdevelopment in 
former colonies to changes in the institutions resulting from European 
colonialism. These assertions demonstrated that West Africans recognised the 
value of integration as we understand it today to expand trade and to maintain 
peace. Bah et al. (2017) maintained that the small kingdoms agreed to be ruled 
by a King to harmonise trade and maintain peace because trading could not 
flourish without peace. This is plausible because most of the kingdoms derived 
their wealth through trade expansion. 
Therefore, this process skewed monetary integration toward the use of cowries 
as a single currency and administration. The ’cowries’ were gradually playing an 
important role in regional and international trade. Conrad (2010) highlighted that 
West Africans had preferred the cowrie as a medium of exchange as early as 
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the 13th century. This period also witnessed a significant shift in the growth of 
wealth and empires as trade expanded. Johnson (1970) also argued that cowrie 
and gold were the most common currencies in West Africa in the pre-colonial 
era. Hopkins (2014) noted that the other currencies mentioned earlier were only 
used where the cowries were less available. Odunbaku (2012) stated that the 
cowries were used as a medium of exchange in almost all, the West African 
kingdoms in the pre-colonial and the colonial era. These findings demonstrated 
that although other commodities were used as currencies, the cowries seem to 
be the most widely used. 
Moreover, it was also directly convertible into all the other commodity currencies 
which qualify as money. Furthermore, Johnson (1970) and Hopkins (2014) 
demonstrated that the cowrie was fixed in value against currencies outside 
West Africa, such as the dinar. This ensures certainty in the trading system 
within the region and with the rest of the world. Therefore, the cowrie did act as 
a common currency in West Africa in the pre-colonial era and the colonial era. 
These cowries initially originated from North Africa and the Middle East and 
later the Maldives and East Africa (Lovejoy 1974). On the other hand, it is not 
clear how the Kings or their royal officers issued the cowries. Nonetheless, 
given that the Empires of Western Sudan acted as a single administration and 
the cowrie was used extensively and was fixed in value, it was likely that the 
royal office acted as a central bank. 
In summary, we can argue that virtually pre-colonial West Africa had economies 
sufficiently developed to require the use of common currencies as mediums of 
exchange and units of account (Johnson 1970; Lovejoy 1974; Hopkins 2014). 
This suggests the existence of common currencies or a standard monetary 
system during the era. On the other hand, colonialism also marked a historical 
shift in our understanding of monetary integration in West Africa. 
 
3.3 Colonial Era: Arrival of the Europeans and Colonialism  
The arrival of European sea traders and subsequent colonialism marks a new 
epoch in defining the history of West Africa (Davidson and Buah 1978; Heldring 
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and Robinson 2012; Acemoglu and Robinson 2013; Hopkins 2014). The era 
marked a significant break with the past and signified the start of the modern 
economic history of West Africa. While there seemed to be an organised 
economic system during the pre-colonial era, this phase saw a shift from 
primitive institutional arrangements to the adoption of standardised currencies 
and a well organised monetary system (Nunn 2007; Nunn 2008). 
The economic history of West Africa since the first days of European contact 
may be divided into two stages: First, the arrival of the Europeans on the coast 
of West Africa played a significant role in establishing the new commerce, 
dominated by the Atlantic slave trade, which flourished until its legal abolition in 
the early 19th century. Between 15th and 17th centuries, the Portuguese made 
the first remarkable exploration of the coasts of West Africa and were 
subsequently joined by other European merchants: English, French, Dutch, 
Danes, and traders from the north German ports. By the end of the 18th century, 
the English and French had established themselves in several positions on the 
coast of West Africa (Davidson and Buah 1978; Akyeampong 2006; Cham 
2007; Hopkins 2014).23  
The abolishment of the slave trade ushered in the second phase of European 
contact in West Africa, thus colonialism. This phase wrought an economic 
revolution in West Africa as colonial rules were set up between the late 19 th 
century and early 20th century (McPhee 1971; Olaniyan 1971). By exploiting 
linguistic, ethnic and cultural differences, West Africa was partitioned into small 
units (states) arbitrarily between 1885 and 1906 as the rivalry between Britain 
and France intensified (Keltie 2014). The new West African States- except 
Liberia24- were colonised subsequently by France, Britain, Germany, and 
Portugal. France gained a large part of the region; Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal. While the West African 
British colonies consisted of Ghana, the Gambia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. 
Germany traded with Togoland (Togo), Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde 
                                                             
23 Initially, the principal aim of the European merchant mariners was in the commercial interest. For many centuries, 
gold that appeared in Europe, North Africa, and Asia were brought by the Moors and the Muslims across the caravan  
routes of the Sahara. Therefore, the Europeans determined to divert this trade into their own hands by trying to 
circumvent Muslim control of the Euro-Asia trade network. Nonetheless, gold was needed in Europe to pay for the 
spices they sought in south India and elsewhere in the East (McKenzie 1983).  
24 Liberia has been an independent state since the American-Liberians declared the country independent in 1847, i.e., 
where free slaves from America settled 
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(Portugal). Adomakoh (1962) and other scholars have argued that to this day 
the ethnic separation, although made absolute by the independence of the 
various countries, have had some negative influences on the political and 
development agenda of the West African countries.25   
This section aims to explore the evolution of institutional development, 
especially the monetary systems in West Africa during the colonial era. We will 
try to identify whether these structures facilitated greater economic or monetary 
cooperation in the region. 
 
3.3.1 Institutional Development 
Institutions form the incentive structure of societies, and the political and 
economic institutions, in consequence, are the underlying determinants of 
economic performance (North 1990 and 1994). As argued in section 2, before 
European penetration, institutional changes were taking place already. African 
societies were at various stages of development, from communalism to a 
transitional stage below class-ridden feudalism (Walter 1972: 80). Trading by 
barter and the use of commodities as a medium of exchange in part facilitated 
the exchange of goods amongst the West African states and later with the 
Europeans traders. 
However, the institutional developments in West Africa during the colonial era 
reflected the general economic and international commercial expansion in the 
19th century (McPhee 1971; Helleiner 2003; Bah et al. 2017). The aim was to 
transform the indigenous institutional structures into ones that conformed more 
closely to international or colonial countries’ standards. Eventually, external or 
intercontinental trade expanded (exports and imports). The colonial institutional 
developments contributed to two areas of debate. First, the traditional view in 
the existing literature is that colonialism directly interrupted the natural evolution 
of institutions in West Africa and part led to its current underdevelopment 
(Walter 1972; Acemoglu et al. 2001; Nunn 2007; Nunn 2008; Heldring and 
                                                             
25 McPhee (1971), Olaniyan (1971), McKenzie (1983), Guyer (1995) and Hopkins (2014), have argued that the motive 
behind the first scramble for West Africa (Africa) was undoubtedly a product of many important developments in Europe 
at the time, i.e., economic (industrial revolution, etc.), scientific and religious. 
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Robinson 2012; Acemoglu and Robinson 2013). Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2013) described the European institutional arrangements as ‘extractive’, 
literally designed to extract resources. The underlying argument is that the 
institutional reforms oriented West African economies towards foreign 
economies instead of targeting domestic or regional economic growth since it 
was dominated by unequal exchange (Manning 1998). As a result, the process 
of economic cooperation among the West African States and the development 
of domestic and regional institutions retarded Olaniyan (1971). 
Other papers have demonstrated that institutional reforms brought about by 
colonialism such as transportation networks, communication,26 trade structures 
and modern money (common currencies) in part, promoted or could have been 
vital in promoting economic cooperation (Hopkins 1970; Bah et al. 2017). In this 
section, we explore the developments of monetary systems, specifically 
common currencies and highlight the driving forces behind the reforms during 
the colonial era. A sketch of these reforms will contribute to our understanding; 
whether the monetary systems could have enhanced economic integration in 
West Africa.  
 
3.3.2 Development of Monetary Institutional Framework  
The colonial-era introduced some reforms in the system of exchange, such as 
the use of monetised metal currencies and fiat money, which transformed the 
domestic monetary system of West Africa, (Hopkins 1970; Helleiner 2003). 
Long before the partition of West Africa, other currencies like the Spanish 
doubloons and dollars, the American doubloons and double eagle, the Maria 
Theresa dollar,27 the French-franc piece, cowries and among others were in 
circulation as legal tender (Shannon 1950; Adomakoh 1962b; Ekundare 1973). 
These currencies can be classified into three groups based on their origin: 
Imperial coins, foreign coins and indigenous money (including barter). The latter 
has been treated extensively in section 3.2.1. The other currencies conditions 
were frequently as diverse as their origin and the standard media of exchanges 
                                                             
26 Telegraphs, and postal systems were set up, linking colonial capitals to Europe, and linking military and administrative 
posts in the hinterland to the capitals  
27 An old Austrian coin 
58 
 
varied from one area to another. These foreign coins were exported to West 
Africa by the Europeans and, mostly circulated within the narrow confines of the 
coastal trading enclaves (Ofonagoro 1979). 
Against the backdrop, the colonial authorities sought to replace the 
heterogeneous monetary systems within the region. The British enacted 
regulations to ensure that the English silver shilling was the only currency used 
in the West African colonies, and abolished foreign currencies in 1880. The 
French franc also became the currency of the French colonies in West Africa in 
1826 and beyond, which later changed into the CFA francs. Furthermore, 
Adomakoh (1962) explains that the German marks were in circulation in 
Togoland before the First World War in 1912. 
Generally, two main factors contributed to this reform: foremost, Kirk-Greene 
(1960) and Johnson (1970) explain that the indigenous money was 
cumbersome to transport within the country or across the region in any quantity. 
However, Ofonagoro (1979) contends that the shillings introduced by the British 
were also bulky when dealing with them in millions, indicating that the inherent 
transportation issues cannot be the motive behind it. Therefore, a more 
plausible explanation can be found in the main thrust of the colonial 
government’s economic policies in the colonies (Ofonagoro 1979; Helleiner 
2003). Second, considering the expansion of commerce at the time, the colonial 
countries ensured that the currencies of the colonies were soundly based, 
readily convertible, and otherwise compatible with the gold standard so that 
international trade could be conducted with smooth efficiency (Hopkins 1970; 
Helleiner 2003). Hence, a common currency was appropriate to reduce 
currency-related transaction costs associated with economic transactions 
between the Europeans and the colonies. 
Subsequently, during the last decade of the 19th century, the main currencies in 
circulation in West Africa were the British silver coins in the British West African 
colonies, and the French franc pieces in the French West Africa colonies 
(Adomakoh 1962; Hopkins 1970). These currencies were later operated in the 
form of currency boards. Hence, this section intends to provide a sketch of the 
development of the two central monetary systems; the sterling and Franc 
59 
 
monetary standards and assess whether they fostered West African economic 
integration. This will contribute to our understanding of the current monetary 
systems among West African countries.  
 
i. The Sterling Standard and West African Currency Board (WACB) 
The commencement of the British Administration in West Africa inevitably 
meant that every aspect of its existence was to be controlled by British Imperial 
legislation (Akinrinsola 2003). Moreover, the monetary system was no exception 
to this. The monetary development or reforms were consistent in the four British 
colonies; the Gambia, Gold Coast (Ghana), Nigeria and Sierra (Pennington 
1848; Shannon 1950; McPhee 1971). In 1825, the Imperial Government 
attempted to assimilate the currency of the colonies. The British shilling went 
into general circulation as a standard coin of the Empire28 and thereby 
establishing an official sterling exchange system. The shilling was legal to be 
given concurrent circulation with the other coins already in circulation. 
Subsequently, the new West African common currency received considerable 
resistance in the colonies. In most parts of the interior, where people were not 
used to foreign coins, the British coins were regarded with mistrust, as the 
natives continued with their conventional mode of exchange (i.e., cowries, 
barter, and so on)29 (Ekundare 1973). Several measures - including several 
demonetisation ordinances - were taken to popularise the new coin currency 
and oust the old commodity currencies, which were hampering international 
trade (Chalmers 1972; Webb Jr 1982; Akinrinsola 2003). The Demonetisation 
Ordinance No. 2 of 1880 was passed to abolish the use of foreign silver coins in 
the colonies.30 This was against the backdrop of a considerable number of 
Spanish dollars, Dutch silver and the 5-franc piece of silver circulating within the 
area. The falling gold-price of silver in the 1870’s nearly removed the British 
                                                             
28 After the act of 1816 had established gold as the only standard of value in the United Kingdom, the metallic money in 
the UK had been made a sound, and silver coinage had been successfully established as token money (Adomako 
1962).  
29 These traditional systems of exchange remained among the West African states before the WACB was set up in 1912 
(McPhee 1971; Akinrinsola 2003). 
30 Except for the Gambia, in 1893 it was estimated that about 80% of the coins in circulation in the Gambia was French 
five-franc pieces; the remainder was British silver coins. The preponderance of French franc in the Gambia is explained 
by the peculiar configuration of the country (Adomako 1962)  
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silver coin from circulation.31 Also, Ordinance No. 9 of 1889 was passed by the 
colonial Government to demonetise gold dust and nuggets. Ekundare (1973) 
explains that the colonial government declared fixed prices in sterling for 
manilas and Maria Theresa dollars in 1902 and prohibited their importation 
afterwards in Nigeria.    
Hopkins (1970) described that by the end of the century and onwards, the most 
important British colonies in West Africa, Nigeria and the Gold Coast, had 
begun to absorb the sterling silver (mainly shillings, florins) on a large scale, 
particularly along the coastal areas, where the people had long been 
accustomed to European ways. The British silver coin also gained popularity in 
Sierra Leone, and even more so in the Gambia, where the French francs were 
in wide circulation. Subsequently, wider circulation and demand for the British 
silver coins led to a tremendous increase in the export of silver coins into West 
Africa by the British Treasury boosting seigniorage profit (Olaniyan 1971). The 
figures for coin imports into West Africa from 1886 to 1911 are shown in Figure 
3.1.32  
 
Figure 3.1 A comparison of British Sterling Silver issued for circulation in West 
Africa colonies and the U.K 
 
Source: Adomakoh (1962): Report of Departmental Committee on Special Currency for West Africa. 
 
                                                             
31 The Spanish dollar appears to have been by far the most popular and to have had the most extensive circulation.   
32 Note that paper money did not exist in any of the colonies currently. 
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Figure 3.1 indicates that at some point (1902-1904; 1909-1910), the silver coins 
exported to West Africa were more or nearly equivalent to what was in 
circulation in the United Kingdom. The high demand resulted from the 
expanding turnover of sterling on the west coast as exports were converted into 
imports. Thus, most of the export earnings were exchanged for imported 
consumer goods such as textiles and hardware (Hopkins 1970). On the other 
hand, the domestic economy also absorbed the sterling through the payment of 
official salaries and public works (McPhee 1971).  
With the spread of sterling and the expanding trade, came the introduction of 
British banks or financial institutions. It was difficult for commercial banking to 
develop or have existed in West Africa before the colonial era, for a reliable 
currency is vital to modern banking. That being so, banks became a necessity 
once the coin currency was in circulation. The banks enhanced the circulation of 
the British silver coins indirectly through shipping; importing coin from the Mint, 
which, owing to the peculiar geographical features of the region almost 
inevitably forced into a monopoly (McPhee 1971; Olaniyan 1971).  
In 1891 the African Banking Corporation (ABC) established a branch in Lagos 
but ended its operation in the following year. The Bank of British West Africa 
(BBWA) was registered in 1894 in Lagos and took over the function of the ABC. 
The bank started with four branches in Lagos, Accra, Freetown, and Bathurst 
(Banjul). In 1961 it had about 104 branches in West Africa: 41 in Ghana, 53 in 
Nigeria, 9 in Sierra Leone, and 1 in the Gambia.  Moreover, the Bank of Nigeria 
established in 1909 was later absorbed in 1912 by the BBWA, making it the 
only bank operating in the British West Africa colonies until the Colonial Bank, 
which served in the West Indies started to commence business in West Africa in 
1917. Barclays Bank Ltd subsequently acquired the Colonial Bank in 1926, and 
before most West Africa countries attained independence, it had established 
about 200 branches (Adomakoh 1962).  
Up till 1953, the BBWA and Barclays Bank Ltd enjoyed monopolies as the only 
two banks operating in the British West African colonies. However, since then, 
there have been crucial local banking developments in the region, importantly 
the creation of central banks after the colonies attained independence. It is also 
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worth noting that banks of different metropolitan countries were confined to their 
territories. Hence, until recently, the banking institutions existing in West Africa 
have predominantly been European (Adomakoh 1962). 
The continued supply of the sterling coins and the banking system gradually 
raised some concerns within the colonies and among the colonial authorities. 
To begin with, the monopoly BBWA had in supplying the coins became a matter 
of controversy among the merchants, trading houses and a newcomer and rival 
bank, the Bank of Nigeria (Hopkins 1970; McPhee 1971). Secondly, there were 
growing concerns with the rapid expansion in the volume of silver coin 
circulating in British West Africa, which could have a severe effect on monetary 
stability in the United Kingdom in the case of a shock in the colonies (Hopkins 
2014).33 Besides, as trade operations expanded, it was increasingly 
inconvenient to settle or transport and count large quantities of silver coins 
(Clauson 1944). Finally, the colonies were buying large amounts of British silver 
coins from the United Kingdom at a price much above its intrinsic value, thereby 
accruing much seigniorage profits to the Imperial Government and not to the 
colonial territories (Clauson 1944; Hopkins 1970; Helleiner 2003). 
These anomalies, coupled with growing pressures from the official circles in the 
colonies, prompted the setting up of the Emmott committee in 1911 (Clauson 
1944; Hopkins 1970; Olaniyan 1971). The committee recommended introducing 
a distinct common currency for all the British West African colonies. 
Subsequently, the West African Currency Board (WACB) was formally 
inaugurated in 1912. An independent board was set up to supervise the supply 
of the new currency, manage reserves based on gold and securities, and 
facilitate convertibility into sterling, from its headquarters in London. Its reserves 
backed the money, though it was held at parity with the sterling.34 The 
seigniorage profits from issuing the new currency were to support the Colonial 
Government developmental projects within the colonies. Besides, issuing and 
                                                             
33 The concern was the stability of the coin value in the region. This is because the face value of the British silver coins 
was well above their metallic value (token coin) and because they were not backed up by a local reserve of gold, there 
was a risk that a crisis of confidence might produce a depreciation of their value (Helleiner 2003). Furthermore, it was 
feared that a trade depression will result in a temporary contraction of the currency circulating in the colonies and will be 
liable for the return of silver coins from the colonies to the UK (Adomako 1962)  
34 The system established was not a gold exchange standard, but a sterling exchange standard. Meaning, when the 
British silver depreciated in terms of gold, so too did the West African pound (Hopkins 1970).  
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storing the common currency in West Africa was discharged by the BBWA, 
acting as agent for the board (McPhee 1971).    
The first of the new coins were introduced in 1913, and the notes followed in 
1916. The new silver coinage was minted in denominations of two shillings (2/-), 
one shilling (1/-), sixpence (6d) and threepence (3d) and the denominations of 
the notes were; £1, 10/-, and 2/-. In 1916, the first notes were issued in Nigeria 
and subsequently introduced in the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone and the Gambia35 
(Clauson 1944; McPhee 1971). The Europeans and the educated natives 
widely used the notes, but other natives received them with reluctance, 
although the Government did its best to remove ingrained prejudices by printing 
notices and verbal instructions. Consequently, the West Africa pound became 
the only legal tender for payment and was convertible only within the West 
Africa region (McPhee 1971). The evolution of a common currency in British 
West African colonies became fully established by 1922,36 except modifications 
in the denominations and design of the notes and coins issued. The currency 
mostly remained the same until the countries eventually attained independence 
in the 1950s and '60s (Adomakoh 1962). 
The reports of the West African Currency Board proved as the prototype of the 
standard monetary system in colonial territories (Kirk-Greene 1960). Monetary 
integration was achieved partially as the use of common currency: From the 
colonial authorities’ point of view, it assisted the development of trade between 
West Africa and the United Kingdom, while at the same time relieving the 
mother country of all responsibilities toward the currency of the colonies. So 
from the West African point of view, the Currency Board system gave stability to 
and confidence in the colonial currency by the continued absolute parity with 
sterling; it practically eliminated the risk of inflation by providing strict control 
over the currency issue; it corrected any tendency toward the accumulation of 
deficits in the balance of payments by ensuring that the local currency and 
sterling were automatically convertible; and it provided some additional 
                                                             
35 The Gambia, one of the strongholds of the French five-franc piece, eventually absorbed the new currency notes in 
March 1918. 
36 By 1922 sterling silver had virtually disappeared from British West Africa, and the new monetary system had become 
fully developed (Hopkins 1970)  
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revenue, which had not been available to the colonies before 1912. (Adomakoh 
1962; McPhee 1971; Helleiner 2003). 
 
ii. Franc zone  
The economy of Francophone West Africa37 also went through a fundamental 
transformation during the colonial era and the development of money and 
financial institutions, which somehow followed a similar pattern like the British 
West African countries (Olaniyan 1971). Generally, the French colonies were 
organised under the French West African Federation. As already established in 
section 3.3.1, the French imperial government also sought to replace the 
‘indigenous’ medium of exchange with modern money (Manning 1998). By the 
Royal Ordinance of France in 1826, the currency of French colonies in Africa 
was assimilated to that of France. The French franc became the currency of 
French colonies in Africa. Additionally, the Banque Du Senegal was established 
in 1853 as the first bank created by the French in French West Africa colonies. 
The creation of the bank facilitated continental trading and enabled the colonial 
authorities to drive West African countries into a monetised economy (Manning 
1998). There was an impressive growth in the supply of money in the colonies. 
It demonstrated the West Africans switching from their old monies to French 
francs. Nevertheless, the increased circulation of the French franc in West 
Africa was of great concern to the Imperial authorities. To minimise the risk of 
France's domestic monetary system being disrupted by the sudden repatriation 
of fiduciary coins, French policymakers established the Banque de l' Afrique 
Occidentale (BAO) in 1901 with authority to issue French currency in its African 
colonies (Helleiner 2003). Prior, the Banque Du Senegal was liquidated in 1901 
to make way for the BAO. The BAO administered the common currency of 
French West Africa, although it was a private investment bank, the board 
always included colonial officials, becoming an administrative arm of the 
colonial governments (Olaniyan 1971; Manning 1998). 
                                                             
37 The French West African colonies included; Ivory Coast, Dahomey (Benin), French Sudan (Mali), Mauritania, Niger, 
Senegal, Togo and Upper Volta 
65 
 
At the end of the First World War, the French determined that their colonies 
should be tied more to the economy of the metropolitan, for instance, trade 
(import and export) of their colonies should be directed towards France. Hence, 
the French authorities undertook several investments in the form of concessions 
and financial support for the BOA in the colonial economies. However, Manning 
(1998) argues that the strategy was capital extraction instead, which became 
the source38 of French wealth in West Africa. In the aftermath of World War 
Two, France abandoned its commitment to the use of French francs in its 
African colonies in 1945 and subsequently created a distinct currency known as 
Franc des Colonies Françaises d’Afrique (CFA franc) for various colonial 
regions.39 The CFA francs creation was to prevent wartime inflation in France 
from being exported to the colonies (Helleiner 2003). Moreover, the 
metropolitan French franc devalued in December 1945 to correct for wartime 
inflation (Stasavage 1996). These reforms in West Africa were also part of the 
Bretton-Woods agreements, whereby France had the continued right to control 
the currencies of its African colonies, as part of the after-war recovery strategy 
(Manning 1998; Couharde et al. 2013). 
The CFA Franc zone has two monetary unions: The West African region was 
referred to as Financial Community of Africa while those of the Central African 
Zone as the Financial Cooperation in Central Africa and both were of equal 
value. Initially, the currencies were established with values of 1.7CFA=1FF but 
later changed to 2CFA=1FF in 1948 when the metropolitan franc was devalued 
again (Stasavage 1996; Helleiner 2003). The nominal parity altered during the 
currency reform of 1968 at 50CFA=1FF. This parity remained unchanged until 
the 1994 devaluation. The Banque de France initially issued the CFA franc, but 
this responsibility later transferred to two regional issuing banks created in 
1955; the Central Bank of Equatorial African States and Cameroon, later 
renamed the Bank of Central African States (BEAC), and the Central Bank of 
West African States (BCEAO). The central bank's headquarters were initially in 
Paris (Fielding 2002). However, Medhora (1992) argues that the transition of 
banks issuing notes in the Franc zone shows that the nexus of monetary 
                                                             
38 Taxes, and import/export duties were sources of extracting wealth from the AOF  
39 Equatorial Africa, West Africa, Somaliland, Madagascar, Reunion, St. Pierre and Miquelon 
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operations has become more African and more flexible after independence, 
though this subjected to lots of criticism. 
In summary, there is an indication of monetary integration within both the 
French and British colonies in West Africa since they were brought together to 
create a single currency zone with a fixed parity to the French franc and the 
sterling. However, they were not without criticisms. The main criticism, which 
was both political and economic was that the currency boards were exploiting 
the West African colonies. When the colonies have a favourable balance of 
payment, the currency boards accrue more sterling or franc (reserves), which 
were deposited in London and Paris, instead of directing funds towards 
diversifying and developing the local economies (Shannon 1950; Hopkins 1970; 
Akinrinsola 2003).  
Also, though we do not have data on the level of intra-West African trade, the 
literature demonstrates that the common currencies expanded international 
trade; export of commodities and import of manufactured goods from Europe 
(Helleiner 2003; Hopkins 2014). The nature of export, mainly; commodities, raw 
materials produced in the colonies were not in high demand within the sub-
region. Furthermore, aside from the common currencies, medical advances, 
and improvement in transportation such as railways, roads were crucial to the 
considerable expansion of intercontinental commerce (McPhee 1971; McKenzie 
1983). Manning (1998) and Bah et al. (2017) argue that the rail lines40 provided 
an essential link from the seaport to the navigable portions and did not follow 
the traditional trade routes that existed previously; hence, it was of little use for 
intra-West African trade at the time. This is because, long before trading with 
the Europeans, there was a network of land and sea routes that remarkably 
served the needs of West Africa trade. For instance, land routes linked so many 
ethnic groups in the region; the Hausa (in Nigeria) with Gurma (in Dahomey) 
and Gonja (in Ghana), Masina (Mali) was linked with Kong (Ivory Coast) and 
with Ashanti and so on (Guyer 1995). The rail lines did not connect major West 
African towns or commercial centres. They instead served the purpose of 
                                                             
40 The first railroad in francophone sub-Saharan Africa was built in the years from 1883 to 1885 and linked the ports of 
Dakar and St.-Louis in Senegal. Other major railroads, all constructed before World War I, including the extension of the 
Senegal railroad from Kayes on upper Senegal to Bamako on the Niger in the 1890s, and later a link from Kayes to 
Dakar (Manning 1998).  
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linking the sources of raw materials to European purchasers, and the European 
manufacturers to West African purchasers. Though common currencies existed 
during the colonial era, they could not support regional economic cooperation 
such as intra-regional trade. 
Nonetheless, despite the emphasis on external trade, Africa only produced very 
little in the total world output. For instance, before 1939, Africa produced less 
than 5% of the world output of primary products, and this trend continues today 
(Hopkins 2014). 
 
3.4 Post-Independence  
In the previous sections, we observed that the pre-colonial era in West Africa 
gradually evolved toward the use of cowrie shells as a common currency. 
During the colonial period, the French and British West African colonies 
participated in some form of the monetary union (currency boards) based on the 
Franc and Pound Sterling, respectively (Fielding 2002). However, after 
independence, the idea of forming a regional economic or monetary 
cooperation among the Anglophone West African states was not deemed a 
matter of urgent consideration (Akinrinsola 2003). Consequently, the WACB 
dissolved as the various British West African colonies achieved political 
independence in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The new countries preferred 
complete economic freedom, with an independent central bank, own currency,41 
halting the process of economic and monetary cooperation within the region 
(Fielding 2002; Kenen and Meade 2010). 
On the other hand, most of the newly independent states in the French West 
Africa colonies retained close economic links with the former metropolitan 
power (Cobham and Robson 1997; Fielding 2002). Following independence in 
the 1960s, France reviewed the existing monetary agreement with the former 
colonies (emphasis in West African countries),42 leading to the establishment of 
the West African Monetary Union (WAMU) in 1962 (Medhora 1992; Manning 
                                                             
41 Mainly practiced ﬂoating exchange rate policies 
42 Guinea in 1960 undertook an independent monetary reform; created own currency, Guinea franc, and national central 
bank. Mali also left the WAMU and established its money in 1962.  
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1998; Couharde et al. 2013).43 At the time of founding WAMU, its membership 
comprised the Republics of Côte D’Ivoire, Dahomey (now Benin), Mali, Niger, 
Mauritania, Senegal, Togo and Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso). This section 
will cover the developments in monetary cooperation in West Africa after 
independence and highlight current initiatives towards monetary union in the 
sub-region.  
 
3.4.1 ECOWAS Efforts at Regional Monetary Integration 
The idea of regional integration and subsequently, monetary integration began 
to gain ground because the West African economies were increasingly 
marginalised on the international front (Akinrinsola 2003).44 To synthesise the 
often-divergent interests of these groups and foster closer economic 
cooperation in the region ECOWAS was formed with the signing of the Lagos 
Treaty on 28th May 1975 by 15 West African states. This was the first formal 
attempt to unite the Anglophone and Francophone countries in the region after 
independence. Currently, ECOWAS member countries include eight 
francophone nations, four former British colonies (The Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, 
and Sierra Leone), two former Portuguese colonies (Cape Verde and Guinea 
Bissau), as well as Liberia, which was never a European colony.45 Figure 3.2 
illustrates the composition of WAMZ and WAEMU countries within ECOWAS as 
discussed in this section.  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
43 In the monetary domain, existing colonial currency unions were confirmed in post-independence West and Equatorial 
Africa and transformed into monetary unions with independent central banks (Cobham and Robson 1994).  
44 It’s worth noting that the idea of "regional integration projects in Africa was also driven by the asp irations of the 
founding fathers of African independence for closer political and economic integration of the continent to promote 
African unity, foster self-reliance and enhance collaboration and eradicate colonialism” (Saho 2016). 
45 The seven non-WAEMU countries in ECOWAS have not tied their monetary or exchange-rate policies together: each 
has its currency, operates its independent monetary policy, and has a floating exchange rate (Cape Verde, however, 
pegs its domestic currency to the euro) (Kenen and Meade 2010).   
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Figure 3.2 Membership of ECOWAS 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Since its formation in 1975, ECOWAS has pursued a broad agenda, including 
the quest for regional economic cooperation, development and integration, 
encompassing trade, shared institutions, and monetary union in the sub-region 
(Ojo 2003; Masson and Pattillo 2005; Kenen and Meade 2010). Per the 
objective of this study, the discussion will be limited to monetary integration 
arrangements. One crucial instrument ECOWAS hopes to use to promote 
economic integration and thereby boosting intra-regional trade is common 
currency (Robson 1983; Masson and Pattillo 2002). The justification is 
strengthened by the economic benefits postulated in the literature, specifically 
potential intra-community trade increase (see chapter 2). Generally, intra-
ECOWAS trade is low in comparison with other regional blocs as shown in 
Table 3.1. Between 2000 and 2015, overlooking informal trade, intra-regional 
export as a percentage of total exports has rarely increased beyond 10%.  
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Table 3.1 Intra-Regional Trade (% of total export)  
 WAEMU ECOWAS ASEAN EU28  
ECOWAS 
share in 
world 
Exports (%) 
2000 15.76 9.15 23 67.73 0.47 
2001 13.64 9.66 22.38 67.31 0.446 
2002 12.06 10.95 22.69 67.49 0.453 
2003 14.99 9.89 24.72 68.56 0.488 
2004 15.2 8.91 24.87 68.52 0.582 
2005 14.35 9.54 25.25 67.83 0.639 
2006 14.23 8.34 24.87 68.10 0.644 
2007 15.2 8.35 25.19 68.12 0.624 
2008 14.88 9.18 25.42 67.19 0.693 
2009 12.16 9.52 24.6 66.55 0.664 
2010 12.54 7.44 24.99 64.83 0.75 
2011 11.49 7.1 24.91 63.74 0.846 
2012 13.16 7.4 25.92 61.92 0.842 
2013 13.22 9.03 25.96 61.44 0.766 
2014 15.55 7.97 25.39 62.61 0.726 
2015 12.67 10.33 24.29 62.59 0.53 
2016 13.54 11.67 24.01 63.74 0.44 
Source: Authors' computation based on UNCTAD 2017 data, ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) EU28 
(European Union) 
 
Therefore, the very ﬁrst attempt at regional monetary integration was the 
establishment of the West African Clearing House (WACH), legally 
commissioned on 25th June 1975 and started operations in July 1976 (Osagie 
1979). The objective of the multilateral clearing mechanism was to promote the 
use of the currencies of member states for intra-regional trade46 and to promote 
monetary cooperation within the sub-region. In effect, the payment mechanism 
                                                             
46 The low level of intra-West African trade resulted from the absence of exchange markets in the sub-region and the 
use of foreign currencies such as the US dollar in the settlement of international obligations between West African 
(Osagie 1979) 
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devised for the Clearing House was aimed at reducing transaction costs, 
shortening the period it takes to effect payment and reducing the volume of 
paperwork required for intra-West African trade (Osagie 1979; Ojo 2003). 
Under this arrangement, the West African Unit of Account (WAUA)47 was 
introduced as the benchmark rate for determining the relative strengths of the 
currencies48 in the WACH's payment mechanism. The WAUA is akin to the 
special drawing rights (SDR) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This, in 
part, facilitated in the evacuation of the problem of inconvertible currencies 
within the region. The WACH failed due to factors including; low transactions, 
non-conformity and weak commitment by member states to adhere to the 
clauses of the agreement (Akinrinsola 2003).  
The difference between the CFA zone and former British colonies currencies 
continue to hinder intra-community trade. In practice, trade settlements were 
carried out in major reserve currencies, which included the French Franc, the 
Dollar, and the Pound, while payment orders were processed by foreign banks 
stationed in the US, London and Paris (Osagie 1979). Sy (2014) also report 
about 50 per cent of intra-African trade financial settlements are conducted by 
banks outside the continent at extra cost due to exchange rate conversion. The 
incurring of high transaction costs serves as a disincentive for trade and 
investment, creating some rigidity in the sub-region.   
In 1987, a timetable for moving into a monetary union was first outlined under 
the auspices of the ECOWAS Monetary Cooperation Programme (EMCP) (Ojo 
2003; Kenen and Meade 2010). The introduction and implementation of a set of 
macroeconomic convergence criteria and other measures set out were 
expected to pave the way for the establishment of a single monetary zone and a 
standard central bank for the sub-region by the year 2000.49 However, the 
EMCP suffered several setbacks, which delayed its implementation and the 
initial timetable for the monetary union 1992, was postponed several times. 
                                                             
47 Equivalent to one Special Drawing Right (SDR) of the IMF 
48 The currencies involved included the CFA Franc (for the Franc zone), the Gambian Dalasi, Ghanaian Cedi, Liberian 
Dollar, Malian Franc, Nigerian Naira and the Sierra Leonean Leone 
49 Moreover, the EMCP sought to develop further the WACH into a system of linked exchange rates tied to the 
clearinghouse unit of account to improve its payment mechanism and enhance intra-regional trade.  Subsequently, the 
convergence mechanisms were revised in June 2012 and December 2015 by the Authority of Heads of State and 
Governments. The revised convergence criteria in May 2015, was rationalized to six criteria, comprising four primary 
criteria and two secondary criteria out of the previous eleven (Wama Speech) (see table 3.3). 
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Primarily due to the insufficient political commitment, and the different stages of 
monetary harmonisation marked by the realities of the existence of the CFA 
franc zone group of eight countries (Ojo 2003; Kenen and Meade 2010).  
During 1996, the WACH metamorphosed into the West African Monetary 
Agency (WAMA) because of operational inadequacies and the fact that the 
objectives for its establishment were not fully realised. The Agency mandate 
was broadened to include responsibility for monitoring, coordinating and 
implementing the EMCP, geared towards the eventual conduct of the single 
monetary policy and the establishment of the ECOWAS single currency 
(ECOWAS). Also, WAMA is expected to facilitate regional trade through the 
maintenance of close surveillance over the monetary, fiscal and exchange rate 
policies of member states to encourage a stable intra-regional exchange market 
conducive to the enlargement of trade.50 
Considering the constraints, the institutions created to advance ECOWAS 
monetary integration have faced, the authorities felt that integration in the whole 
of ECOWAS is difficult because of some differences in governance inherited 
from the colonial epoch.51 As a result, ECOWAS saw the creation of two 
monetary zones as the best option (Debrun et al. 2005; Fielding and Shields 
2005). A brief discussion of the two monetary zones follows:   
 
3.4.2 WAEMU  
The West African Francophone countries monetary arrangement evolved into 
the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) as part of the 
ECOWAS integration strategy. The WAEMU was established by a treaty signed 
in Dakar on 10th January 1994 by the Heads of State and Government of seven 
West African countries using the CFA Franc. The aim of the treaty- built on the 
achievements of the WAMU- was to create a new framework for promoting 
economic integration and development of member countries and provide the 
credibility required to sustain the fixed exchange rate for the common currency 
                                                             
50 Currently, WAMA is facilitating the alignment of WAMZ and WAEMU to prepare for the ECOWAS economic and 
monetary union (Alagidede et al. 2012). 
51 Based on the 1993 revised treaty, ECOWAS seek to promote co-operation and integration, leading to the formation of 
an economic union in West Africa. 
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(Debrun et al. 2005; Fielding and Shields 2005). The eight current member 
states include; Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau (joined in 
1997), Niger, Senegal, Togo, and Mali (re-joined in 1984), all former French 
colonies (except Guinea-Bissau, a former Portuguese colony), and their ties 
with France remain strong even today.52 
The WAEMU is a complete monetary union with a central bank, la Banque 
Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de I’Ouest (the BCEAO), common currency; 
CFA franc (CFA stands for “le Franc de la Communauté Financière Africaine” 
since 1958; from 1945 through 1958, CFA stood for “Colonies Francaises 
d’Afrique”), and pooled international reserves. The headquarters of BCEAO is in 
Dakar,53 Senegal with national branches in member states. The BCEAO is the 
sole issuer of currency in the Union, and the French Treasury has a historical 
obligation to guarantee the unlimited convertibility of the CFA francs for French 
francs (now euros) at a fixed rate, making it a convertible currency on the world 
scene (Fielding and Shields 2005). Before 1994, the CFA franc has been 
pegged to the French Franc at the rate of CFAF 50 = FF 1, after which it was 
devalued to CFAF 100 = FF 1 in 1994. Now, since the launch of the European 
currency, the CFA franc is pegged to the euro at the parity of 655.957 CFA = 1 
euro. The pooled international reserves are deposited in a special operating 
account in Paris held by the French Treasury, and each member country's 
contribution must constitute at least 65% of its total reserves (Couharde et al. 
2013).54   
It has been argued that the CFA Franc zone has benefited from the relative 
monetary stability of the union. The fixed parity to the French franc (now euro) 
arrangement limits the zone's control over its monetary policy and thereby 
enables members to stabilise price levels and enhance credibility relative to the 
non-WAEMU countries. Jones (1969) contended that France's continuous 
participation in the union ensured credibility in the functioning of the system, 
thereby preventing members from pursuing unsound policies. Consequently, 
                                                             
52 For more details see (http://www.uemoa.int/en). 
53 The headquarters of the central bank for the franc zone continued to be in Paris, France but were later moved to 
Africa in the reforms of 1972 (Bach 2016). 
54 Except those needed for current expenditures by a member government, and for meeting a member’s obligations to 
the International Monetary Fund, deposited with the Bank for International Settlements or other central banks, or used to 
underwrite short-term bonds in the international financial market. 
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WAEMU has been hailed as one of the successful existing monetary unions, 
low inflation levels, more integrated- became a customs union with a standard 
external tariff in 2000 - and contribute a significant proportion of intra-ECOWAS 
trade relative to non-WAEMU members (Fielding et al. 2005). For instance, 
intra-WAEMU exports were 15.8% and 15.6% of their total world exports in 
2000 and 2014 while intra-ECOWAS exports were 9.15% and 7.97% in the 
same period (see Table 3.2).55  
On the contrary, though the CFA Franc zone has been one of the oldest 
existing monetary unions, overall macroeconomic performance has been 
unsatisfactory. Problems include slow growth and weak intra-community trade 
(Nitsch 2004; Liedong 2017). Furthermore, the fixed exchange rate with the 
French franc (now euro) can undoubtedly be seen to have contributed to closer 
trade ties with Europe instead (Sugimoto 2008). Current data show that 
WAEMU countries trade more with France and the European Union than among 
themselves.56 To conclude, the implication is that the trade benefits of a 
common currency for ECOWAS may appear limited unless ECOWAS hope to 
trade more with itself or attract more investment after the launch. 
 
3.4.3 WAMZ  
The success of WAEMU, reinvigorated the non-WAEMU members to establish 
a second monetary zone, the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ), intended to 
accelerate ECOWAS broader monetary union agenda (Tsangarides and 
Qureshi 2008; Kenen and Meade 2008). In 2000, the WAMZ was formed by 
Heads of States of The Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Guinea in 
Accra, Ghana. Subsequently, Liberia joined in 2010 as the 6th member 
(Odularu 2009). 
The fast-track integration strategy dubbed, ‘Accra Declaration’ set forth the 
objectives, action plan and institutional arrangements of WAMZ. In the first 
phase, the new zone will launch a single currency called ‘ECO.' Later, WAMZ 
and WAEMU will merge to form a broader monetary union in ECOWAS in the 
                                                             
55 UNCTAD Database 2018 
56 The data source is the UNCTAD Database 2018  
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second phase (Bakoup and Ndoye 2016). The view is that it would be easier to 
merge the two currency zones than the present multiplicity of currencies 
existing in the sub-region. In other words, it was considered unfair to arrange a 
merger between an organised zone that is working and an unorganised 
coalition of countries with separate currencies (Fielding and Shields 2005; 
Houssa 2008). Also, the introduction of Eco is conditional on the convergence 
of a set of specific quantitative and qualitative macroeconomic indicators.57 
Table 3.2 presents the ECOWAS Monetary Cooperation Programme (EMCP) 
and WAMZ convergence criteria. The EMCP targets all ECOWAS members 
while the WAMZ indicators are for the six member countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
57 These are comparable to the Maastricht type convergence criteria. 
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Table 3.2 WAMZ and ECOWAS Convergence Criteria 
EMCP WAMZ 
Primary Criteria Primary Criteria 
Average annual 
Inflation rate 
Single digit (<10%)  <10% 
The ratio of the 
budget deficit 
(including grants) to 
GDP 
Lower than or equal 
to 3% of GDP 
 ≤-4% 
Central bank 
financing of budget 
deficits. 
≤10% of the 
previous year’s tax 
revenue. 
 ≤10% of the 
previous year’s tax 
revenue 
Gross external 
reserves 
≥ 3 months of 
imports 
 ≥ 3 months of 
imports 
Secondary criteria Secondary criteria 
Nominal exchange 
rate 
Stable (+/- 10%) Exchange rate 
stability 
Stable (±15%) 
The ratio of total 
public debt to GDP 
Not more than 70% Tax revenue/GDP 
ratio 
>20% 
  Public investment 
from domestic 
receipts 
>20% 
  Real interest rate >0 
  Salary mass/total 
tax revenue 
<35% 
 
More importantly, the West African Monetary Institute (WAMI) was set up in 
Accra, Ghana, on January 2001 and began operations in March 2001 to 
undertake technical preparations and groundwork for the establishment of a 
common West African Central Bank and the common currency. The mandate 
includes implementing policies meant to facilitate deep trade integration, 
financial sector integration, payment system development and statistical 
harmonisation (Ojo 2003). Initially, the authorities called for WAMZ common 
currency in 2003, and subsequent merger with WAEMU 2004, but this has been 
postponed many times-2003, 2005, 2009, 2015 and 2020-because the 
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convergence criteria have not been met by some countries (Kenen and Meade 
2010; Bakoup and Ndoye 2016). The successive postponements and non-
compliance by the deadline for launching the single currency have fuelled the 
debate whether there is still the political will among the countries to execute this 
project in 2020. It is a legitimate question, but not the focus of this study. Aside 
from the political will, the convergence criteria seem to be the hurdle of the 
single currency project. Liedong (2017) argues that unless the convergence 
criteria are revised to reflect the real macroeconomic situation in the zone, the 
single currency project will remain work-in-progress for the unforeseeable 
future. Thus, the fundamentals are far from realisation because of internal and 
external shocks facing these countries over which they do not have much 
control (WAMA convergence report 2016). 
In summary, ECOWAS failure to merge WAMZ with WAEMU will have more 
profound implications in attaining deep economic integration stipulated in the 
1993 revised treaty. Moreover, the extent to which ECOWAS influences 
decisions in the region could be limited. Hence, the existence of WAMZ and 
WAEMU poses challenges as well as opportunities for ECOWAS concerning 
policy coordination or whether regional institutional convergence can be 
achieved.  
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3.5 Chapter Summary  
This chapter has provided an account of the historical changes of monetary 
systems in the pre-colonial, colonial and post-independence West Africa. This 
chapter aimed to deepen our understanding of the evolution of monetary 
systems and its relationship with trade in the region. Further, to reflect and 
identify the extent to which the creation of WAMZ could further strengthen 
economic integration and intra-community trade in the sub-area.    
A review of the West African's past suggests that, before European contact, 
common currencies such as the cowries, barter, and gold existed, although their 
use was often restricted to certain types of transactions or specific groups of 
people (Hopkins 1970; Johnson 1970; Guyer 1995; Hopkins 2014). Therefore, 
the development of continental trade with the European sea traders was grafted 
on to the pre-existing system of commerce in the region (Ofonagoro 1979; 
Manning 1998).  
Colonialism signalled a move towards standardised monetary systems and the 
use of modern common currencies. The fact that West Africa came under the 
control or influence of two central metropolitan powers segregated the currency 
of West Africa into two monetary zones; the West African shilling for the British 
colonies and the CFA Franc for the French colonies. The chapter established 
that monetary integration was achieved partially as the use of common 
currencies resulted in the removal of exchange rate costs and associated 
currency transaction costs (Hopkins, 2014). However, critics have argued that 
the monetary reforms halted the natural evolution of the indigenous monetary 
systems, and the common currencies did not encourage intra-community trade 
(Fuller 2009).  
After independence, the CFA countries continued to maintain the colonial 
monetary systems which evolved subsequently into a full monetary union 
known as WAEMU. In contrast, the Anglophone countries abandoned the 
WACB and introduced new national currencies and central banks. These 
currencies have had their challenges; exchange rate uncertainties, inconvertible 
within the sub-region, and among others. Later, the non-WAEMU countries 
formed a second monetary zone knows as WAMZ. The motivation is that using 
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a common currency would spur intra-community trade (Decks 2016). Currently, 
the focus of ECOWAS is on aligning WAEMU and WAMZ, as preliminary steps 
of establishing a union-wide common currency in 2020, although there has 
been a lack of progress. Table 3.3 provides a summary of the historical 
changes of monetary arrangement in West Africa discussed in the above 
paragraphs.  
In conclusion, although a common currency will help address the issue of 
multiple currencies and exchange rate fluctuations that affect intra-regional 
trade, the chapter argued that a common currency would not adequately 
address the recurrent low intra-ECOWAS trade. The level of trade between the 
WAEMU countries is low, even though they continued to use a single currency 
after independence. The institutional structures during colonialism facilitated 
specialisation in the growth of agricultural and “extractive” production for export 
to international markets (Guyer 1995; Hopkins 2014). The demand for these 
commodities is non-existent in the sub-region.  
 
Table 3.3 Development of monetary arrangements in West Africa 
 Pre-colonial  Colonialism Post-independence 
 West Africa Anglophone Francophone Anglophone Francophone 
Common 
currency 
Y Y Y N Y 
Cowries/Barter CFA West African 
Shilling 
- CFA 
Source: Authors’ compilation. Note: Y=yes, the monetary arrangement exists; N=no, the monetary arrangement did not 
exist  
 
 
 
 
80 
 
Chapter 4 Real Exchange Rate and Asymmetric 
Shocks in the West African Monetary Zone 
(WAMZ) 
 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter focuses on one of the main issues in the debate of the monetary 
union in the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ), the degree of asymmetry in 
macroeconomic shocks. The WAMZ, now composed of 6 countries (Ghana, 
The Gambia, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone), was created in 2000 
as a second monetary zone in addition to an already existing West, African 
Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU).58 The project aimed to fast track and 
facilitate the deepening of economic integration in the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS). The intention is that WAMZ and WAEMU will 
be merged to form a single monetary zone in West Africa by 2020 to enable 
members to exploit both institutional and economic benefits (Debrun et al. 2005; 
Fielding and Shields 2005; Masson and Pattillo 2005; Masson 2008; Couharde 
et al. 2013; Ekpo and Udoh 2014).  
The main economic cost of a monetary union to WAMZ discussed in chapter 2 
results from the loss of independent national monetary policy, and the 
associated nominal exchange rate flexibility, as policy instruments to 
asymmetric shocks (Buiter 2000; De Grauwe 2000; De Grauwe and Mongelli 
2005; Rubio and Comunale 2017). The degree of the cost depends on the 
debate about the relative merit or effectiveness of nominal exchange rate 
flexibility as a buffer for adjusting to asymmetric shocks, especially for small 
open economies (Obstfeld et al. 1996; Kamar and Ben Naceur 2007; Beetsma 
and Giuliodori 2010; Gervais et al. 2016). Coulibaly and Gnimassoun (2013) 
detailed the frequent use of exchange rates by WAMZ countries in response to 
economic shocks. For instance, during the 2016 falling oil prices, Nigeria floated 
its fixed currency exchange rate to correct a current account imbalance. The 
floating of the Nigerian naira after months of policy debates saw the currency 
                                                             
58 WAEMU members (former French colonies) are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, 
Senegal, and Togo; established in 1994 with a central bank and a single currency known as the CFA franc.  
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immediately plummet by 40% (Lumkile 2016). On the other hand, the more 
similar these countries are in terms of structural measures, such as sufficiently 
flexible labour and capital markets (Mundell 1961; McKinnon 1963; Kenen 
1969); the existence of adequate shock-absorbing mechanisms, such as 
interregional risk-sharing arrangement and automatic fiscal transfer schemes, 
(Kenen 1969; Mundell 1973; Mélitz and Zumer 1999)59 and the presence of 
common shocks with a similar impact, the lower the costs in losing exchange 
rate stabilizing mechanisms for these economies (Tavlas 1993; Alesina and 
Barro 2002; Tavlas 2009; Clerc et al. 2011).  
In West Africa, the degree of risk-sharing among these countries is quite low 
(Tapsoba 2011). The political convergence in terms of having a unified budget 
to facilitate financial transfers from countries experiencing a strong economy to 
those suffering from a recession is hindered by high government debts, which 
are typical in developing countries including the ones studied here (Buigut and 
Valev 2005; Houssa 2008). Although data on factor movement in the region is 
sparse,60 it is unrealistic to assume that workers will move quickly from one 
country to another, even if there are no border barriers (Kenen and Meade 
2010). This is due to the high costs associated with migration and retraining.   
Consequently, the OCA literature points to the importance of symmetry in 
macroeconomic shocks of monetary union candidates. If shocks are symmetric 
across countries, like a negative demand shock that is common to all WAMZ 
countries, then asymmetrical policy response in the form of a common 
monetary and fiscal expansion would be adequate. However, if shocks are 
highly idiosyncratic, a common monetary policy will be inappropriate (Bayoumi 
and Eichengreen 1992; Buiter 1997; Pisani-Ferry 2013). This is the proposition 
that because of divergences in economic structure (the sectoral or industrial 
composition of production, financial structure, demand, labour market 
institutions etc.), the monetary transmission mechanism differs among 
                                                             
59 Such an adjustment mechanism could be in terms of a unified budget, which automatically redistributes from 
countries experiencing a strong economy to those suffering from a recession. However, De Grauwe (2000) argues that 
fiscal transfers are only suited to dealing with temporary demand shocks. When the shock is a permanent one, other 
adjustment mechanisms will be necessary to deal with the problem (Volz 2010). 
60 Adepoju (2005) documents movement of a significant amount of labour from Ghana to Nigeria during the 1970s oil 
price boom. Intraregional movements of people within the group has been made easy with the introduction of ECOWAS 
common passport since 2000. 
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countries. Consequently, a common monetary policy will impact asymmetrically 
in different countries and sectors (Buiter 2000). 
Relatively few empirical studies have used the dynamics of various 
macroeconomic variables to help assess asymmetry of WAMZ economies and 
have produced inconclusive results. For instance, Alagidede et al. (2008),  
Tsangarides and Qureshi (2008), Asongu (2014) and Harvey and Cushing 
2015) have revealed the existence of high levels of macroeconomic 
heterogeneity due to the diverse economic structures of the West African 
countries, especially those belonging to the WAMZ. Others like Debrun et al. 
(2005), Coulibaly and Gnimassoun (2013) have reported evidence of 
macroeconomic convergence regarding competitiveness since the 
establishment of WAMZ convergence criteria in 2001.  
This chapter provides a contemporary examination of the degree of asymmetry 
by assessing the behaviour of the real effective exchange rates (REER) across 
WAMZ countries. The dynamics of REER can have considerable effects on 
output and prices; providing evidence on REER behaviour among prospective 
monetary union candidates would suggest the potential costs of sacrificing 
exchange rate flexibility. A stable and coordinated REER between these 
countries would suggest that shocks demanding exchange rate adjustment are 
small, and, consequently, that the cost of giving up nominal exchange rate 
flexibility would be small. Conversely, large divergent REER can generate 
competitiveness differentials among candidates and would indicate the 
importance of exchange rate flexibility (see Edwards 1988b; Von Hagen and 
Neumann 1994; De Grauwe 1996; Balázs and Amina 2003; Coudert and 
Couharde 2003; Obstfeld and Rogoff 2009; Lane 2012; Dumrongrittikul and 
Anderson 2016).  
Several approaches have improved our understanding of the link between 
exchange rates and macroeconomic fundamentals such as; productivity, terms 
of trade, trade liberalization, government consumption, oil price, and interest 
rates (Edwards 1988b; MacDonald 1998; Égert et al. 2006; Dufrénot et al. 2008; 
Tsen 2011; Chowdhury 2012; Kia 2013; Chen et al. 2017). However, the 
relative significance of shocks to these fundamentals and the mechanisms 
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through which they affect REER in WAMZ has not been extensively examined. 
Unlike previous literature, we focus on fundamental shocks to REER, since the 
REER is likely to move in response to unexpected rather than to expected 
changes in macroeconomic variables (Alexius and Post 2008; Kizys and 
Pierdzioch 2009; Dumrongrittikul and Anderson 2016). The chapter, therefore, 
identifies three shocks of interest from exchange rate determinants using a 
structural autoregressive model (SVAR) and assess how REER of WAMZ 
countries respond to the shocks. Notably, the increasingly large dependence of 
these countries on the export of primary commodities points to the growing 
importance of both external (such as oil price; terms of trade) and domestic 
(productivity; demand) shocks to the REER (Obstfeld and Rogoff 2005; Chen 
and Chen 2007; Obstfeld and Rogoff 2009; Chowdhury 2012; Dumrongrittikul 
and Anderson 2016). Therefore, the relative role of a common external shock 
on REERs is taken as the key indicator to characterise macroeconomic 
asymmetry across the countries. By asymmetry, we understand not only the 
prevalence of country-specific shocks that cause REER fluctuations, but also a 
different response to common external shocks.  
The chapter contributes to the extant empirical literature through several ways: 
first, it investigates the long-run and short-run relationships between the REER 
and its determinants using a country-by-country Vector Error Correction Model 
(VECM) over the period 1980-2015. Second, we estimate and assess the 
pattern of REER misalignments using the permanent components of 
fundamentals as in the Behavioural Equilibrium Exchange Rate (BEER) 
procedure. Third, we impose long-run restrictions in a three-vector 
autoregressive (VAR) model to identify economically meaningful structural 
shocks, i.e. oil price, productivity (supply) and demand preference- to REER 
determinants over the period 1980-2015. We consider impulse response and 
variance decomposition in order to characterise asymmetries in terms of the 
sign, magnitude, persistence and relative contribution of the disturbances 
across these countries. Our broad aim is to provide an empirical analysis that 
can inform policy debates on whether WAMZ economies have attained 
adequate macroeconomic symmetry for a common monetary policy to suffice.  
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The rest of the chapter is organised as follows; Section 4.2 discusses the 
related literature. Section 4.3 provides the empirical methodology. Section 4.4 
presents the data description and preliminary analysis. Section 4.5 contains 
data analysis and results, while Section 4.6 provides chapter summary.  
 
4.2 Related literature 
There are two main strands of related literature. The first concerns work on the 
real exchange rate (RER) determinants. The literature on RER determinants 
has been challenging. Theories - such as the purchasing power parity (PPP) - 
that view the exchange rate as the relative price of domestic and foreign monies 
have been widely criticised on both theoretical and empirical grounds (Balassa 
1964; Samuelson 1964; Dornbusch 1976; Frenkel 1976; Officer 1976). The 
apparent critiques relate to obstacles in international trade, the lack of 
standardised goods baskets and different price structures between countries 
(Officer 1976).61 Also, one widespread criticism by Balassa (1964) and 
Samuelson (1964) is the so-called Balassa–Samuelson effect. Thus, RER 
persistently deviates from PPP for the presence of productivity diﬀerentials in 
traded goods between countries.  
On the other hand, many contributions have established a link between the 
RER and fundamental economic variables (Meese and Rogoff 1983; Edwards 
1988b; MacDonald and Taylor 1993; Clark and MacDonald 1999; Kia 2013). 
Edwards (1988; 1989) modelled that in the short run, both real and nominal 
variables affect the RER while in the long run, only real variables affect the 
RER. Clark and MacDonald (1998) behavioural equilibrium exchange rate 
(BEER)62 model directly estimate a reduced form equation of the relationship 
between macroeconomic fundamentals and the REER. The focus of this 
chapter is to first establish a behavioural link between the REER and 
macroeconomic variables in the WAMZ. Therefore, the BEER approach is more 
                                                             
61 Rogoff (1996) argues that the incurrence of transaction costs associated with transportation, tariffs, and other 
impediments to trade make prices to differ between countries and thereby violate the law of one price.  
62 The BEER approach has been used extensively in the case of industrial countries than developing countries. In spite, 
in the literature, it is argued that the BEER model is not founded on any specific exchange rate theory and in that sense 
may be understood as a very general approach to modelling REER (Egert et al. 2006). 
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appropriate since it estimates a reduced-form equation that explains the 
dynamics of the REER in terms of economic fundamentals. 
Empirical studies on Sub-Saharan African countries have reported long-run 
relationships between RER movements and fundamental determinants using 
time-series techniques and cross-section comparisons (Elbadawi 1994; Baffes 
et al. 1999; Hinkle and Montiel 1999; Montiel 1999; MacDonald and Ricci 2004; 
Dufrénot and Yehoue 2005; Elbadawi and Soto 2005; Iimi 2006; Roudet et al. 
2007; Abdih and Tsangarides 2010; Lebdaoui 2013). These studies mainly 
based on the implicit assumption that there is cointegration have provided 
inconsistent results in terms of the signs and the magnitudes of the coefficients 
of the fundamentals employed. One reason for the lack of a clear and 
consistent pattern of results relates to how studies differ in the way they 
integrate proxies for fundamentals due to the lack of actual data on certain 
fundamentals. Furthermore, these proxies may not accurately capture the 
relative effects of domestic and partner countries (Christiansen et al. 2010). 
Therefore, the thesis computes the fundamental variables or proxies to capture 
the relative effect of WAMZ countries and their respective five top trading 
partners.  
The second strand of studies relates to the empirical work on RER 
misalignments in terms of the deviation of actual RER from its equilibrium value 
and the degree at which these deviations are corrected. Most empirical studies 
on WAMZ countries have reported periods of macroeconomic instability or 
shocks in fundamentals to have been widely associated with the era of RER 
deviations or misalignments (Opoku-Afari et al. 2004; Youngblood 2004; Daboh 
2007; Iossifov and Loukoianova 2007; Aliyu 2009; Cham 2010; Korsu and 
Braima 2011; Coulibaly and Gnimassoun 2013; Asongu 2014). Opoku-Afari et 
al. (2004) find that export price fluctuations contribute significantly to exchange 
rate misalignments in Ghana in the short-run. The paper further reveals that the 
RER is slow to adjust to equilibrium after a temporal shock, implying a lack of 
policy effectiveness or flexibility in the country. Policy actions like the Structural 
Adjustment Project (SAP) and democratic elections in 1992 and 2000 
significantly contributed to the direction of misalignments.  
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In contrast, Youngblood (2004) reveals that RER most likely trend towards the 
equilibrium path after a disturbance in Ghana and the divergences in the 
nominal exchange rate in the short-run arise due to cyclical changes in 
fundamentals and policy changes. The view is reinforced in Iossifov and 
Loukoianova (2007) reporting a relatively fast mean reversion, i.e. a half-life of 
2-3 years in Ghana’s REER. In the case of Nigeria, Aliyu (2009) reports 
evidence of overvaluation and undervaluation in the Naira for the period 1986 to 
2006, and the episodes of misalignments are consistent with periods of policy 
reforms. For instance, a massive inflow of oil revenues and stable 
macroeconomic performance accounted for undervaluation of the RER between 
2000 and 2006. However, the paper finds that deviations from the equilibrium 
path are eliminated within 1-2 years.  
In a cross-country estimation, Daboh (2007) derive the equilibrium RER for 4 
WAMZ members over the period 1970 to 2006 and finds that mean reversion 
varies among the countries, for instance, in The Gambia, it takes one year while 
up to four years in Nigeria, suggesting potential price rigidities. Also, Cham 
(2010) reveals that between 2000 and 2005, real exchange rate variability 
increased substantially with an uneven degree across WAMZ members. The 
study suggests that the cost associated with joining a monetary union would 
have been higher during that period for the members. Coulibaly and 
Gnimassoun (2013) report that significant improvement in terms of trade during 
the 2000s via increasing commodity prices and better net foreign asset 
positions contributed to the equilibrium RER appreciation, thereby increasing 
the probability of having an undervalued exchange rate. Asongu (2014) 
acknowledges significant evidence of cross-country differences in the REER 
response to changes in fundamental determinants, but the paper finds a stable 
error correction mechanism from the panel estimations.  
In summary, several studies have improved our understanding of the link 
between exchange rates and fundamentals, and different sources of real 
shocks such as oil prices, fiscal policy, and productivity shocks, have been 
shown to play a significant role in explaining real exchange rate movements. 
However, to our knowledge, no study has considered the relative significance of 
these shocks and the mechanisms through which they affect REER to assess 
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the convergence process of WAMZ countries. The chapter, therefore, focuses 
on fundamental shocks to REER, since the REER is likely to move in response 
to unexpected rather than to expected changes in macroeconomic variables. 
Furthermore, contrary to the existing literature the chapter expands the data set 
by incorporating Guinea and further evaluate the behaviour of the REER 
misalignments amongst member countries in order to explore any degree of 
REER coordination in the view of the proposed currency union.  
 
4.3 Methodology   
This chapter aims to assess the suitability of WAMZ countries for a monetary 
union, precisely to examine the degree of asymmetries among these countries 
using the REER. This section discusses the time series econometric techniques 
and the dataset used to achieve this aim. The empirical approach of this 
chapter is twofold. The first step is to assess the long-run and the short-run 
relationships between the REER and its determinants across WAMZ countries. 
We apply individual country cointegration and VECM, and further derive the 
equilibrium REER and misalignments for these countries. The time series 
techniques used are described in sub-section 4.3.1. In the second step, we 
impose long-run restrictions in a three-vector autoregressive (VAR) model to 
identify meaningful structural shocks, i.e. oil price, productivity (supply) and 
demand preference to three REER determinants. The structural vector 
autoregressive (SVAR) model is described in sub-section 4.5.4. 
 
4.3.1 Cointegration Approach 
As established in section 4.2 above, the study follows Clark and MacDonald 
(1998) BEER model to estimate a reduced-form equation that explains the 
dynamics of the REER in terms of macroeconomic fundamentals. Specifically, 
we assume a linear relationship between the REER and its determinants.  
There are different time series estimation techniques available in the literature 
to estimate a reduced-form equation of the REER and its determinants. Such 
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methods include OLS estimation. However, Montiel (1999) argued that often 
studies that employ this approach assume that the series is stationary and 
therefore neglect the issue of verifying the time-series properties of 
fundamentals. Also, Nelson and Plosser (1982), Elbadawi (1994), Baffes et al. 
(1999) and Elbadawi and Soto (2005) discovered that time-series data evolve 
such that their mean and variance are not constant, especially for developing 
countries. That is, when the series in a model are non-stationary, each variable 
can meander without any tendency to return to the equilibrium path (Bierens 
1996).  
Consequently, recent studies have instead explored the application of unit-root 
econometrics in estimating long-run relationships. This is because relying on 
non-stationary time series data may lead researchers to wrongly conclude that 
two variables are related when they are not (Marcellino et al. 2006).  However, 
Gujarati (2009) suggests that when non-stationary series become stationary by 
the ability of first difference or detrend, it means that cointegration is likely to 
exist amongst the variables. However, while the process of differencing may 
provide stationary variables, this can be at the cost of removing important long-
run information (Maddala 2001). That is, in modelling time series, one requires 
assuring that the long-run relationship reflects the co-movements of variables 
due to underlying equilibrium tendencies of economic powers, rather than 
common, but unrelated, time trends in the data (Harris 1995). 
Engle and Granger (1987) introduced an effective method – the Granger’s 
Representation Theorem (GRT) - known in the literature as cointegration test, to 
analyse non-stationary processes without losing valuable long-run information. 
The cointegration technique was first introduced by Granger (1981) and later 
developed by Granger and Weiss (1983), Engle and Granger (1987), Johansen 
(1988), Johansen and Juselius (1990), Johansen (1995), and among others. 
The theory of cointegration provides a unified framework for exploring the long-
run relationship among non-stationary economic variables that take a 
systematic co-movement among them in the long run. If two-time series 
variables are non-stationary, but some linear combination of them is a 
stationary process, then they are said to be cointegrated or interpreted as long-
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term relations exist between them (Bierens 1996). This means, if at a point in 
time, these two variables have drifted too far apart, there will invariably be a 
trend for them to keep reasonable proximity to each other (Enders 2008). 
Therefore, we estimate the long-run relationship between the REER and its 
determinants using cointegrating approach. Montiel (1999) claims that 
cointegration-based estimates of REER determinants for developing countries 
appear promising in at least two respects. First, despite short samples, 
questionable data, and likely structural instabilities in its applications, 
cointegrating relationships are often found between REERs and broad 
fundamentals suggested by theory. Second, estimates of the effects of 
fundamentals on REER generally prove to be consistent with theoretical priors. 
Before applying the cointegrating technique, it is necessary to assess the 
stochastic properties of the time series variables; to consider whether the 
variables are stationary or nonstationary. This procedure is critical since 
macroeconomic time series must be 𝐼(1) before the Johansen cointegration 
approach can be employed (Enders 2008). 
 
i. Unit root testing  
Macroeconomic data often appear to possess a stochastic trend, and the 
presence of such trend influences the statistical behaviour of estimators. As a 
result, stationarity test is of significant interest to economists because the 
existence of a common trend between any two data series does not always 
imply that there is a meaningful economic relationship between them (Granger 
and Newbold 1974). Models containing non-stationary series might often lead to 
a problem of spurious outcome, whereby the results obtained suggest that there 
are statistically significant relationships between the variables in the regression 
model when in fact all that is obtained is evidence of contemporaneous 
correlations rather than meaningful causal relations (Harris 1995). 
Therefore, a key preliminary step is to determine the order of integration of each 
variable in the model, to establish whether it is non-stationary or not. In this 
study, we employ different time series stationarity tests. The augmented Dickey 
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and Fuller (1979) and Phillips and Perron (1988) unit root tests, also known as 
ADF and PP unit root test, respectively. We estimate the general ADF model, 
which includes a constant and time trend. The ADF and PP test the null 
hypothesis that a time series contains a unit root (i.e., it is nonstationary) 
against the alternative of stationarity (Harris 1995). The appropriate length of 
lags will be decided upon checking the model selection criteria such as Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) and Schwartz Criterion (SC).  
 
ii. Johansen Cointegration and Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) 
The two commonly time series techniques used in the literature to examine 
cointegrating relationships among series are the Engle and Granger (1987)63 
and Johansen (1995) cointegration tests. The Engle and Granger procedure 
has been widely used in the literature since it is a straightforward and easy 
method. It involves using OLS regression with variables in levels. Besides, the 
Engle and Granger procedure is argued to perform better in small samples 
relative to the Johansen method. However, its weakness is that while it is 
applied to multiple variables, it cannot detect multiple cointegrating relations 
(Enders 2008).  
On the other hand, the superiority of Johansen methodology over Engle-
Granger technique is that it fully captures the underlying time series properties 
of the data and offers test statistic for the number of cointegrating vectors 
(Enders 2008). It is found to underperform in small samples because the 
estimation of a system of equations requires several lags, and this reduces the 
degrees of freedom substantially (Panday 2014). We address this constraint by 
using a sample size of 35 observations.  
The Johansen (1995b) cointegration test is based on the maximum likelihood 
estimation method. Under the assumption that all variables are endogenous, 
which does not require the choice of a dependent variable64 we estimate the 
Johansen procedure consistent with a reduced vector autoregression (VAR) 
                                                             
63   This approach tests the residuals of cointegration regression for stationarity in a single equation whilst Johansen 
method that runs cointegration analysis in multivariate systems. 
64 The Johansen approach addresses the endogeneity problem of variables (MacDonald 1998).  
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model of order 𝑝 in (2) to examine the long-run relationships that may exist 
among the representative variables. 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴1𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝐴2𝑦𝑖𝑡−2 … + 𝐴𝑝𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑝 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡      1 
Where, 𝑦𝑖𝑡  is (𝑛 × 1) vector of 𝐼(1) variables for country 𝑖; 𝐴𝑡 are (𝑛 × 𝑛) 
matrices of coefficients; 𝑝 is the lag length – detail discussion presented in 
section 4.5.2 - and 𝜇𝑡 is (𝑛 × 1) vector of independent and identically distributed 
errors shock 
The Engle and Granger (1987) representation theorem states that the existence 
of an error-correction representation depends on the existence of cointegration. 
Therefore, we specify a simple VECM65 between the REER and the 
fundamentals that restrict the long-run behaviour of the endogenous variables 
to converge to their cointegrating relationship while allowing for short-run 
adjustment dynamics (Gervais et al. 2016) in equation 3: 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝛽
′𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + Γ1∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + ⋯ + Γ𝑝−1∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑝+1 + Φ𝐷𝑖𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖𝑡   2 
Where, 𝑦𝑡 = (ln(𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟) , ln(𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑) , ln(𝑡𝑜𝑡) , ln(𝑜𝑖𝑙) , ln(𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛) , ln(𝑔𝑜𝑣), 𝑟𝑖𝑟𝑑  
is (7𝑥1) vector of variables, and Γ𝑖 = −(𝐼 − 𝐴1 − ⋯ − 𝐴𝑖) 𝑖 = 1,2,3, … … , 𝑝 − 1, 𝛽
′ 
represents the long-run equilibrium relationships between the REER and the 
fundamentals, and the 𝜶 matrix, measure the speed of adjustment of the REER. 
To evaluate REER comovement in WAMZ, we expect a significant and negative 
𝜶 coefficient for all the participating countries. This would indicate that the 
REER tends to stabilise itself in the event of exogenous shocks. 𝑫𝒕, is a vector 
of deterministic components, such as constant, seasonal dummies and 
intervention dummies. 
We first estimate the 𝜷′ using the conventional Johansen cointegration tests for 
the time series on a country-by-country basis, by assuming that all variables are 
endogenous in the system.66 Testing for cointegration using the Johansen 
method requires testing for the reduced rank or determining the number of 
cointegrating vectors in the system (Johansen 1988; Johansen 1995a). 
                                                             
65 Further discussions related to VECM applications are provided by Johansen (1995a), Lütkepohl and Krätzig (2004),  
and Enders (2008). 
66 Johansen (1995) argue that all variables in the system must have the same order of integration. Hence, we did not 
include the I(0) variable, 𝑟𝑖𝑟𝑑 in the cointegrating space. Furthermore, The Johansen approach does not require the 
choice of a dependent variable. This addresses the endogeneity issues of variables (MacDonald 1998). 
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Therefore, both the Johansen’s trace and max-eigenvalue test statistics are 
used to assess whether the variables are cointegrated and if so, the number of 
cointegrating relationships. The drawback of using both tests is that results 
drawn from both might be inconsistent. The reason is that the Johansen 
procedure can be susceptible to the lag length and deterministic components 
included in the VAR system. We, therefore, applied the necessary tools in 
determining the appropriate lag length and deterministic components, to prevent 
misleading hypothesis testing (Enders 2008).   
It is worth noting that, the above methodologies employed to assess the long-
run relationship between the RER and determinants could pose two main 
challenges, according to Kubota (2009). First, even though the BEER model 
defines the existence of a long-run relationship among RER and its 
determinants, it is not always possible that the RER may be in equilibrium at 
every point in the long run due to imperfections, rigidities or regulations. 
However, the equilibrium may be achieved gradually in the long run. Therefore, 
the process of a short-run adjustment must complement the long-run 
equilibrium model in the empirical analysis. Secondly, it is essential to consider 
the very likely possibility of parameter heterogeneity across countries. We can 
assume reasonably that the six countries can differ regarding, for instance, 
monetary arrangements or different access to the worldly goods and capital 
markets —and perhaps even in the parameters characterising the long-run 
equilibrium.  
 
4.4 Data description and preliminary analysis 
The study employs annual data for five WAMZ member states (Ghana, The 
Gambia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Guinea) over the period 1980-2015. The 
country coverage and the sample period are determined by data availability; 
hence, the reason for omitting Liberia. The dependent variable, the REER, is 
calculated using a trade-weighted index of bilateral exchange rates, adjusted by 
consumer prices (see appendix 4A.1). The weights used were trade weights 
constructed using Zanello and Desruelle (1997) technique and data from the 
International Monetary Fund Directions of Trade (DOTs). The computed weights 
93 
 
are reported in appendix 4A1. The trading partners chosen for each WAMZ 
country were their respective five major trading partners whose trade level 
accounted for over 50% out of total trade averaged for the period 2010-2014.  
The nominal effective exchange rate is defined as the price of the domestic 
currency in terms of the trading-partner currency. We employ nominal effective 
exchange rates instead of bilateral exchange rates because the WAMZ 
members’ foreign exchange transactions are conducted in a global context with 
the involvement of more trading partner countries in different proportions. The 
REER and other relevant variables are indexed to 100 in 2000 (WAMZ 
formation year), and an increase in the index of the REER implies a real 
appreciation of the domestic currency relative to the basket of currencies of the 
respective trading partners, whereas a decline implies a real depreciation of the 
domestic currency.  
The domestic determinants are the relative productivity differential, 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑 (proxy 
to capture the Balassa-Samuelson effect).67 This variable is constructed from 
real GDP per capita in PPP68 for each WAMZ country relative to the top 5 main 
trading partners using the same weights as for the calculation of the REER 
series. The effect of fiscal policy is captured using the proxy variable 𝑔𝑜𝑣, 
defined as total government consumption as a per cent of GDP. Also, a proxy 
accounting for trade controls or trade openness is the variable 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛, 
constructed as the total trade (sum of exports and imports) as a percentage of 
GDP. The 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛 is omitted in the regression model for Guinea due to insufficient 
data for the entire observation period. Finally, we use the annual interest rate in 
per cent of nominal long-term bonds69 (10 years for most countries) minus the 
percentage change in the CPI index from the previous year relative to its 
effective foreign equivalent, as a proxy for real interest rate differential rird.  
The fundamental external determinants are Real oil prices, 𝑜𝑖𝑙 and relative 
terms of trade, 𝑡𝑜𝑡. 𝑜𝑖𝑙 is the US dollar prices of oil converted to the domestic 
currency and then deflated by the domestic consumer price index (CPI). 𝑡𝑜𝑡 is 
                                                             
67 Clark and MacDonald (1999) used the ratio of the domestic consumer price index (CPI) to the wholesale price index 
(WPI) relative to the equivalent foreign (trade weighted) ratio to capture the Balassa-Samuelson effect. This ratio is 
designed to proxy the ratio of traded to non-traded price. However, data for WPI/PPI is not available for these countries. 
68 Real per capita GDP is used instead of real per capita GDP in PPP for countries where the latter is unavailable.  
69 Data is not available for most WAMZ countries, therefore WDI construction is used, i.e., real interest rate is the 
lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as measured by the GDP deflator. 
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constructed as the ratio of domestic export unit value to import unit value as a 
proportion of the equivalent effective foreign ratio. All the variables are 
expressed in natural logarithms except 𝑟𝑖𝑟𝑑 because of some negative 
observations. Besides, all the series used in this study have been derived either 
directly or by computations using various datasets. The sources and expected 
signs of the variables are reported in Table 4.1. Furthermore, Table 4.2 reports 
WAMZ members national currencies.    
Finally, the expected long-term signs of all the explanatory variables on the 
REER consistent with theoretical priors (see Obstfeld et al. 1996; Clark and 
MacDonald 1998; Clark and MacDonald 1999; Hinkle and Montiel 1999; Chen 
and Chen 2007) are briefly discussed:  
Productivity differential (𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑): According to Obstfeld et al. (1996) international 
productivity differences between countries relative to that of the main trading 
partner countries can have implications on the REER, and the impact is 
expected to follow the Balassa-Samuelson effects (Balassa, 1964 and 
Samuelson, 1964). According to the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis, there is a 
tendency for countries with higher productivity in the tradable sector to have 
sustained RER appreciation without losing competitiveness. The suggestion is 
that the appreciation will restore both internal and external macroeconomic 
balances.  
The external terms of trade (𝑡𝑜𝑡): The 𝑡𝑜𝑡 is defined as the relative price of 
exportable to importable. It is widely recognised for capturing exogenous 
changes in world prices that affect a country’s REER. This, we expect to find a 
positive coefficient. However, the effect of 𝑡𝑜𝑡 changes on REER from a 
theoretical perspective is not possible to know a priori (Edwards, 1989). The 
ambiguity is noticeable in developing countries where most of them are 
primarily primary commodity exporters. Most WAMZ countries, mainly export 
primary commodities such as oil, gold, diamond, lumber, and or agricultural 
products (e.g., coffee and cocoa). The prices of these commodities are 
regulated in international commodity markets.  
Notwithstanding, the non-diversified export, often concentrated in a small 
number of commodities, render their economies more vulnerable to sharp 
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movements in the 𝑡𝑜𝑡 (Di Bella et al. 2007). 𝑡𝑜𝑡 shocks are argued to have 
massive impact on fluctuations in national output and the REER. Even temporal 
𝑡𝑜𝑡 shocks have a significant impact on private saving and the current account 
balance (Akyeampong 2006). On the other hand, an improvement in 𝑡𝑜𝑡 will 
impact the trade balance positively, and thus lead the REER to appreciate 
(MacDonald and Ricci, 2004).  
Real oil prices (𝑜𝑖𝑙): Similarly, if the home country is more dependent on 
imported oil, a real oil price rise may increase the prices of tradable goods in the 
home country, and thereby cause a real depreciation of the home currency. 
Moreover, to improve competitiveness when an oil price shock worsens the 
term of trade, the home country would have to raise the nominal exchange rate, 
which would lead to a further real depreciation (Cheng 2007). Therefore, the 
impact of 𝑜𝑖𝑙 on REER depends on whether the home country is oil import-
dependent or not.  
Trade openness (𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛): The growing degree of trade openness is consistent 
with a reduction in exchange controls. However, the relationship between 
openness (analogous to commercial policy) and REER has been demonstrated 
in the literature through the connection of sustainable tariff level and the 
equilibrium value of the RER (Arapovic 2009). For instance, lifting trade 
restrictions, such as a reduction in tariffs lead to a decline in the domestic price 
of imported goods, and subsequently REER depreciation. Consequently, raising 
restrictions on cross-border trade (decline is trade openness) leads to higher 
domestic prices of imported goods and thus should cause the REER to 
appreciate. The consequence of liberalisation of trade policy is sometimes 
ambiguous, but the empirical literature often finds a negative effect (See Dufret 
and Yehoue, 2005). 
Government spending (𝑔𝑜𝑣): In the literature, the impact of changes in the 
fiscal balance, i.e., government spending on the REER is ambiguous. According 
to Montiel (1999), the effect of government spending on the REER depends on 
which sector (tradable or non-tradable) these changes affect. If government 
spending falls relatively more on the nontraded sector, it will provoke excess 
demand pressures in that market, causing the REER to appreciate (Edwards, 
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1989 Froot and Rogoff (1995). However, an increase in government spending in 
the traded sector creates an incipient trade deficit, which requires a real 
depreciation in order to maintain external balance (Arapovic 2009).  
The real interest rate differentials (𝑟𝑖𝑟𝑑):- are frequently introduced in monetary 
and uncovered interest rate parity models (Maeso–Fernandez et al. 2002). 
MacDonald and Ricci (2004) explain that the real interest rate differential could 
represent several factors, ranging from aggregate demand for productivity and 
persistent monetary policy. For instance, if the countries preference for 
domestic absorption outweighs savings, the real interest rate would have to be 
high in an economy with less than perfect capital mobility. Concurrently, greater 
demand boosts the relative prices of tradable and non-tradable goods, causing 
an appreciation of the REER. Chudik and Mongardini (2007) argued that 𝑟𝑖𝑟𝑑 is 
unlikely to play a significant role in developing countries due to the less 
developed financial markets.   
The above discussions are summarised by (1): 
𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒓𝒕 = 𝒇( 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅
+, 𝒕𝒐𝒕+/−, 𝒐𝒊𝒍+/−, 𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒏−, 𝒈𝒐𝒗+/−, 𝒓𝒊𝒓𝒅+)  3 
Where +/- represents real appreciation and real depreciation of domestic 
currencies, respectively.   
Table 4.1 Variables, definitions, sources and expected signs 
Variables Definitions Source Expected 
signs 
𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟 Real effective exchange rate IMF IFS n/a 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑 Productivity differential WDI + 
𝑡𝑜𝑡 Terms of trade WDI/OECD +/- 
𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛 Openness WDI - 
𝑔𝑜𝑣 Government consumption WDI +/- 
𝑜𝑖𝑙 Real oil prices IMF +/- 
𝑟𝑖𝑟𝑑 Real interest rate differential WDI + 
𝑐𝑝𝑖 Consumer price index IFS/WDI n/a 
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 Total trade (exports + imports) DOTs n/a 
Note: +/-, represents real appreciation and real depreciation of domestic currencies, respectively.   
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Table 4.2 WAMZ countries’ currencies 
Country Currency 
Ghana Ghana Cedis 
The Gambia Dalasi 
Guinea Guinea Franc 
Liberia  Liberian dollar 
Nigeria Naira 
Sierra Leone. Leone 
 
4.4.1 Real effective exchange rate (REER) 
The REERs plot in Figure 4.1 shows considerable variation in behaviour across 
the five countries and time, reflecting the changing country-specific exchange 
rate policies. It is evident from the graph that before 1985, almost all WAMZ 
countries REERs consistently appreciated on average, except The Gambia 
where the REER continuously depreciated over the sample period. Afterwards, 
a sharp depreciation is observed in the rest of the countries REERs between 
1983 -1986, with the break reflecting the structural economic reforms that the 
countries undertook in the 1980s (Alagidede et al. 2008). For instance, in 
Ghana, the introduction of the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) in 1983 
brought about a dramatic devaluation of the effective exchange rate after 
maintaining an overvalued exchange rate for most of the 1970s (Fosu 2001). 
The Ghanaian Cedi was floated by the monetary authorities with the onset of 
ERP 1983 under the guidance of the World Bank and the IMF (Boamah 2009), 
while in Nigeria the Naira was floated in 1986 following the introduction of 
structural adjustment policies. Guinea’s currency was devalued in 1986. Implicit 
in the recommendation of a devaluation is the view that the real exchange rate 
is out of equilibrium; hence an effort to correct the severe overvaluation of the 
currency and to bring into line official and parallel market prices (WorldBank 
1986).  
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Also, Figure 4.2 has been included to shows the discrepancies that are 
suppressed in Figure 4.1. The graphs clearly displace unstable REER in all the five 
countries consistent with discussion in Figure 4.1.   
Figure 4.1 Real Effective Exchange Rate (1980-2016) 
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Figure 4.2 Real Effective Exchange Rate (1985-2016) 
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4.4.2 Order of integration 
We test each variable for the presence of a unit root by using the augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root tests. The results from 
the ADF and PP tests show that in all cases the tests fail to reject the null 
hypothesis that the series are integrated of order one at the 5% significance 
level, except interest rate differentials (rird), which is 𝐼(0) in all five countries 
(See Table 4.3). 
Also, we conducted a stationarity test in the presence of structural break on the 
REER. According to Perron (1989), if there is a break in the deterministic trend, 
then conventional unit root tests may produce a misleading and biased 
conclusion. Hence, we employ the Perron (1997) unit root test with a structural 
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break to examine only the REER. Despite the structural breaks, the REER of 
WAMZ countries remain 𝐼(1), except Sierra Leone which is 𝐼(0).  In the case of 
Sierra Leone, we accept the REER as 𝐼(1) based on the ADF and PP results 
since the Perron (1997) unit root test is not the main unit root test for the study. 
Therefore, we have enough evidence to validate the use of cointegration tests. 
The test results are reported in Table 4.4. Interestingly, most of the breakpoints 
were in the 1980s, which is consistent with the major economic reforms 
discussed above.  
Table 4.3 Unit Root Test 
  ADF PP  
Variable 
Observati
on 
Level First Difference Level  First Difference 
Deci
sion 
  Constant 
Constant 
& trend 
Constant 
Constant 
& trend 
Constant 
Constant 
& trend 
Constant 
Constant 
& trend 
 
 Ghana 
𝒍𝒏(𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒓) 1980-2015 -1.55 -1.86 -6.12*** -6.25*** -1.37 -1.87 -6.12*** -6.62*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
𝒍𝒏(𝒕𝒐𝒕) 1980-2015 -2.07 -2.46 -7.29*** -6.06*** -2.06 -2.44 -7.27*** -8.51*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
𝒍𝒏(𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅) 1980-2015 1.65 -2.90 -3.43** -4.03** 1.65 -2.30 -3.54** -4.12** 𝑰(𝟏) 
𝒍𝒏(𝒐𝒊𝒍) 1980-2015 -1.18 -1.83 -5.40*** -5.39*** -1.24 -1.83 -5.31*** -5.33*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
𝒍𝒏(𝒈𝒐𝒗) 1980-2015 -1.28 -2.91 -4.88*** -4.81*** -1.38 -3.19 -8.04*** -8.25*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
𝑟𝑖𝑟𝑑 1980-2015 -4.00*** -5.27*** - - -3.99** -5.40*** - - 𝑰(𝟎) 
𝒍𝒏(𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒏) 1980-2015 -2.92 -2.80 -6.09*** -7.63*** -1.39 -1.67 -4.81*** -5.03*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
 The Gambia 
𝒍𝒏(𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒓) 1980-2015 -0.27 -2.46 -5.12*** -5.08*** -0.21 -2.22 -5.12*** -5.08*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
𝒍𝒏(𝒕𝒐𝒕) 1980-2015 -2.43 -2.84 -6.24*** -6.15*** -2.47 -2.31 -6.32*** -6.21*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
𝒍𝒏(𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅) 1980-2015 -0.97 -2.52 -7.61*** -8.19*** -0.88 -2.51 -7.80*** -7.62*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
𝒍𝒏(𝒐𝒊𝒍) 1980-2015 -0.86 -2.31 -5.45*** -5.35*** -0.86 -2.31 -5.43*** -5.30*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
𝒍𝒏(𝒈𝒐𝒗) 1980-2015 -1.90 -2.23 -7.94*** -8.13*** -1.72 -2.48 -8.70*** -9.96*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
𝑟𝑖𝑟𝑑 1980-2015 -4.46*** -5.55*** - - -4.49*** -5.59*** - - 𝑰(𝟎) 
𝒍𝒏(𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒏) 1980-2015 -1.83 -1.92 -7.03*** -7.03*** -1.75 -1.82 -7.05*** -7.05*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
 Nigeria 
𝒍𝒏(𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒓) 1980-2015 -1.93 -1.77 -4.40*** -4.41*** -2.08 -1.77 -4.31*** -4.24** 𝑰(𝟏) 
𝒍𝒏(𝒕𝒐𝒕) 1980-2015 -1.66 -2.01 -4.45*** -4.54*** -1.70 -1.92 -5.27*** -5.30*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
𝒍𝒏(𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅) 1980-2015 -1.96 -2.71 -4.72*** -5.34*** -2.08 -2.68 -4.72*** -5.35*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
𝒍𝒏(𝒐𝒊𝒍) 1980-2015 -0.50 -2.91 -6.37*** -6.23*** -0.46 -2.82 -6.39*** -6.24*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
𝒍𝒏(𝒈𝒐𝒗) 1980-2015 -2.59 -2.62 -6.54*** -6.46*** -2.58 -2.64 -6.57*** -6.49*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
𝑟𝑖𝑟𝑑 1980-2015 -5.72*** -6.53*** - - -5.72*** -7.27*** - - 𝑰(𝟎) 
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𝒍𝒏(𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒏) 1980-2015 -1.92 -1.80 -7.57*** -7.56*** -1.93 -1.82 -7.52*** -7.52*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
 Sierra Leone 
𝒍𝒏(𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒓) 1980-2015 -1.40 -1.18 -4.49*** -4.56*** -1.54 -1.55 -4.47*** -4.49*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
𝒍𝒏(𝒕𝒐𝒕) 1980-2015 -0.65 -2.02 -4.88*** -4.78*** -0.67 -2.02 -4.88*** -4.72*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
𝒍𝒏(𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅) 1980-2015 -1.79 -1.22 -5.07*** -5.37*** -1.79 -1.10 -5.07*** -5.09*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
𝒍𝒏(𝒐𝒊𝒍) 1980-2015 -1.88 0.08 -4.54*** -5.15*** -1.79 -0.05 -4.65*** -5.15*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
𝒍𝒏(𝒈𝒐𝒗) 1980-2015 -2.73 -3.08 -9.56*** -9.43*** -2.65 -3.49 -9.74*** -9.62*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
𝑟𝑖𝑟𝑑 1980-2015 -3.37** -4.68*** - - -3.32** -4.66*** - - 𝑰(𝟎) 
𝒍𝒏(𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒏) 1980-2015 -2.639 -3.117 -7.12*** -7.10*** -2.767 -3.150 -7.07*** -7.07*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
 Guinea 
𝒍𝒏(𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒓) 1980-2015 -1.86 -1.99 -5.69*** -5.73*** -1.83 -2.07 -5.72*** -5.82*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
𝒍𝒏(𝒕𝒐𝒕) 1980-2015 -2.04 -2.27 -6.08*** -5.99*** -1.95 -2.23 -6.15*** -6.04*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
𝒍𝒏(𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅) 1980-2015 -0.81 -1.91 -3.77** -3.70** -0.78 -1.65 -3.74** -3.66** 𝑰(𝟏) 
𝒍𝒏(𝒐𝒊𝒍) 1980-2015 -0.85 -1.73 -4.72*** -4.62*** -0.85 -1.91 -4.71*** -4.61*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
𝒍𝒏(𝒈𝒐𝒗) 1980-2015 -1.12 -0.91 -4.19*** -4.35*** -1.38 -1.16 -4.08*** -4.35*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
𝑟𝑖𝑟𝑑 1980-2015 - - - - - - - - - 
𝒍𝒏(𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒏) 1980-2010 -1.67 -2.29 -6.36*** -6.33*** -1.59 -2.22 -6.57*** -6.60*** 𝑰(𝟏) 
Note: *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level to reject the unit root null hypothesis, 
respectively. 
 
Table 4.4  Perron (1997) unit root test with structural break ln(reer) 
 Levels First difference Decision 
Country  t-stat  Year Break  t-stat Year Break  
Ghana -3.954     (1) 1986 -6.436*** (0) 1988 𝑰(𝟏) 
Gambia -4.203     (1) 2001 -6.249*** (0) 2003 𝑰(𝟏) 
Nigeria -4.014     (1) 1986 -5.287*** (0) 1987 𝑰(𝟏) 
Sierra 
Leone 
-4.803*** (0) 1986 - - 𝑰(𝟎) 
Guinea -3.926     (1) 1985 -6.624*** (0) 1986 𝑰(𝟏) 
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are the lag order. The lag parameters are selected based on the AIC. Null 
Hypothesis: lreer has a unit root with a structural break in the intercept. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level to reject the unit root null hypothesis, respectively  
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4.5 Empirical results  
4.5.1 Introduction  
This section presents and discusses the empirical results. In section 4.5.2, we 
apply a country-by-country cointegration and VECM to examine the long-run 
and short-run relationships between the REER and its determinants across 
WAMZ countries over the period 1980-2015, respectively. Further, in section 
4.5.3, we derive and assess the pattern of REER misalignments using the 
permanent components of the REER determinants for these countries. In 
section 4.5.3, we impose long-run restrictions in a three-vector autoregression 
(VAR) model to identify economically meaningful structural shocks, i.e. oil price, 
productivity (supply) and demand preference- to REER determinants. We 
consider impulse response and variance decomposition in order to characterise 
asymmetries in terms of the sign, magnitude, persistence and relative 
contribution of the disturbances across these countries. The overarching aim is 
to examine whether these shocks to REER determinants differ across WAMZ 
countries to help inform policy decision on common monetary policy for the 
group. 
 
4.5.2 Cointegration results   
The study employs Johansen cointegration and VECM to analyse the long-run 
and the short-run relationships between the REER and the selected 
macroeconomic fundamentals, respectively.  
In this section, we follow five general steps to achieve the aim. First, we assess 
the order of integration of each variable that enters the multivariate model, 
which can be established by unit root tests. It was established in 4.4.2 that all 
the variables are 𝐼(1), except rird. The second step involves setting the 
appropriate lag-length and the deterministic trend in the VAR model in order to 
ensure that the estimated residuals are not autocorrelated. Third, estimate the 
rank of cointegration matrix, i.e. testing for the number of cointegration 
according to (Johansen 1995). The fourth step involves normalising the 
cointegrating vector to assess the impact of the fundamentals on REER. The 
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final step involves estimating and interpreting the short-run adjustment factors 
or speed of adjustment of the REERs and the fundamentals using VECM. 
 
4.5.2.1 Setting the appropriate lag-length and deterministic trend 
As discussed in section 4.3.1, the Johansen cointegration test can be 
susceptible to the optimal lag selection and deterministic components (Harris 
1995). Hence setting the appropriate lag length and deterministic components 
in the VAR model is critical as misspecification often generates autocorrelated 
errors (i.e., serial correlation) (Lütkepohl 2006). Besides, Johansen (1995) 
cautions against overestimating the lag length as too many lags would reduce 
the power of the test. Increased number of lags leads to loss of a degree of 
freedom in a cointegrating VAR. On the other hand, Garratt et al. (2000) point 
out that too few lags may not capture the actual error process. 
In order to address the issue of determining the appropriate lag length for the 
model, we conduct five different lag length selection criteria to decide the 
optimal lag length. These are; sequentially modified likelihood ratio (LR), final 
prediction error criteria (FPE), Akaike information criterion (AIC), Schwarz 
information criterion (SIC), and Hannan-Quinn information criterion (HQ). These 
tests are widely used in the literature to determine the appropriate lag length in 
VAR models (Enders, 2010).  
Appendix 4A.2 presents the results for each criterion with a maximum lag of 3 
(3 was chosen a priori bearing in mind the number of variables contained in the 
vector, the limited sample size and the nature of the data). Overall, we selected 
an optimal lag of 1 for all the countries; the lag selection was based on the 
lowest Schwarz information criterion (SIC). Although one lag is very restrictive 
even for annual data (Baffes et al. 1999), longer lag lengths leave us with very 
few degrees of freedom.70  
Given that the optimal lag length has been determined, the Pantula principle of 
Pantula (1989) - suggested by Johansen (1992) for use to find both 
cointegrating rank and the correct specification of the deterministic term - is 
                                                             
70 Diagnostics tests were conducted to ensure that the selected lag lengths ensure the VAR and the associated VECM 
model residual do not suffer from autocorrelation, non-normality, etc. 
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applied to identify the deterministic components for the cointegration test. The 
Pantula idea involves estimating three alternative models and moving from the 
most restricted to the least restricted model. The three models applied in this 
study are: (a) Model 2 - no deterministic component; (b) Model 3 - intercept but 
no trend; (c) Model 4 - and intercept and trend. Next, the trace test or maximum 
eigenvalue test statistic is compared to the critical value in each case, and the 
most appropriate model is deemed to be the one where the null hypothesis is 
not rejected for the first time (Hatemi-J 2002).  Relying on the Pantula principle, 
the LR test results reported in Appendix 4A.3 suggest including the following 
deterministic components in each country’s VAR model: Model 4 for Ghana, 
The Gambia and Nigeria, and Model 3 for Sierra Leone and Guinea should be 
included in the VAR model.  
 
4.5.2.2 Johansen cointegration results  
Now that we have determined that all the series involved in our analysis are 
𝐼(1), the optimal lag length is one and the deterministic components in the VAR 
system; we proceed to conduct Johansen cointegration test on the REER and 
the fundamentals for the five WAMZ countries.  
Testing for cointegration using the Johansen method requires testing for the 
reduced rank or the number of cointegrating vectors (Johansen 1991; 1995). 
The rank of the matrix is determined by testing whether its eigenvalues are 
statistically different from zero. There are two test statistics to be used for this 
task: The trace and maximum eigenvalue tests indicate whether there is 
cointegration and, if so, the number of cointegrating relationships thereof.   
Table 4.5 reports the trace and maximum eigenvalue test of cointegration for 
the five countries over the period 1980 to 2015. Based on the likelihood ratio 
statistics, we strongly reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration for all 
countries at the 5% significance level. Therefore, we conclude the existence of 
a long-run relationship between the REER and fundamental determinants. A 
detailed analysis of the cointegrating vectors is provided in the next section to 
assess the behaviour of the REER across WAMZ countries. The major 
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implication derived from both the trace and maximum eigenvalue tests is the 
evidence of one cointegrating relation among the variables in the system of 
these economies. The results support the theory of generalised purchasing-
power-parity (G-PPP)71 in WAMZ countries REERs (Enders and Hum 1994).  
 
Table 4.5 Johansen Cointegration Statistics 
 
Ghana The Gambia Nigeria Sierra Leone Guinea 
𝝀𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒆 𝝀𝒎𝒂𝒙 𝝀𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒆 𝝀𝒎𝒂𝒙 𝝀𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒆 𝝀𝒎𝒂𝒙 𝝀𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒆 𝝀𝒎𝒂𝒙 𝝀𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒆 𝝀𝒎𝒂𝒙 
Lags 1 1 1 1 1 
𝒓 = 𝟎 107.17*** 41.52*** 103.07*** 40.53*** 119.02*** 46.27*** 131.75*** 63.94*** 82.26*** 40.52*** 
𝒓 = 𝟏 65.65 28.41 62.53 28.47 72.75 25.67 78.55 28.30 41.74 20.82 
𝒓 = 𝟐 37.24 19.29 34.06 20.01 47.07 19.27 48.40 24.47 20.92 10.49 
No. of 
CE 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Note: *, ** and *** denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. We test the 
existence of cointegration in the vector of variables(ln (𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟), ln (𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑), ln (𝑡𝑜𝑡), ln (𝑜𝑖𝑙), ln (𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛), ln (𝑔𝑜𝑣) using the trace test developed 
by Johansen (1991; 1995).  
 
It is worth mentioning that our initial Johansen cointegration tests with all the 
fundamentals in the system recorded more than one cointegrating relationship 
in Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Guinea.72 It is well established in the literature that 
the existence of multiple cointegrating vectors complicates the interpretation of 
the equilibrium relationship between the REER and its fundamental 
determinants and presents the problem of identification (Johansen 1992; Iimi 
2006). Therefore, we addressed the above problem by omitting the 𝐼(0) 
variable, rird, from the cointegrating vector, while yielding just one cointegrating 
relationship.73  
 
                                                             
71 The G-PPP theory suggests that the fundamental economic variables determining RER are nonstationary and if the 
fundamentals are sufficiently integrated, as in a currency area, the real rates will share common trend. 
72 Cheung and Lai (1993) and Baffes et al. (1999) argue that the likelihood ratio test of cointegration is known to be 
sensitive to small-sample bias, making the properties of the trace test different from its asymptotic properties 
sometimes. 
73 Harris (1995) argues that for every stationary variable included in the multivariate model, the number of cointegration 
equations will increase correspondingly. 
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4.5.2.3 Interpreting the cointegrating vector 
In this section, we emphasise the long-run cointegration equation derived from 
the 5 WAMZ countries. The argument for the discussion is that monetary union 
would appear more feasible when the long-run coefficients in the five equation 
systems have similar signs, i.e. the variables move in the same direction. 
In order to interpret the cointegration results, a necessary first step is to 
normalise the cointegrating vector on the coefficient for the REER. The results 
of the normalised cointegrating vectors for the five sample countries are 
reported in Table 4.6. Overall, the coefficients of the estimated variables are 
statistically significant for the 5% level of significance. Also, the coefficients of 
the fundamentals- productivity differential, terms of trade, openness, 
government consumption, and real oil price- capture their long-run impact on 
the REER, but these are different across economies.  
1. An increase in the relative productivity differential is associated with a 
real appreciation (confirming the Balassa–Samuelson effect) in Guinea 
and Sierra Leone. However, the estimated coefficient associated with 
productivity differential has an unexpected sign – negative - in the 
remaining three countries, suggesting that increase productivity 
differentials are associated with real depreciation. A plausible reason is 
that an increase in productivity differentials might be generated by 
productivity growth in the non-traded sector of these economies, which in 
theory has unclear effects on the prices of non-traded goods. See 
Edwards (1988b) for further explanation.   
2. An improvement in terms of trade is associated with an appreciation of 
the REER in all the countries, except in Nigeria. This is in line with 
Chudik and Mongardini (2007) argument that since the prices of the 
commodities exported by developing countries (here WAMZ members) 
are determined in the world market, an improvement in terms of trade will 
positively affect the trade balance, and subsequently lead to REER 
appreciation.  
3. An increase in the degree of openness is associated with a real 
depreciation in all countries, except in Guinea where the variable is 
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omitted in the regression due to insufficient data for the entire 
observation period. This suggests that increasing trade liberalisation 
arrangements among these countries is associated with a real 
depreciation of the REERs; consistent with the traditional view. Thus, an 
increase in the degree of openness is associated with decreasing trade 
barriers, imports rise more than exports, and the deterioration in the 
trade balance results in REER depreciation (Égert et al. 2006). This 
could be the result of the high degree of trade liberalisation 
arrangements that the countries have achieved through ECOWAS 
common trade policies since 1975.  
4. Expansionary government consumption is associated with a real 
appreciation in The Gambia, Guinea, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone while the 
contrary, a real depreciation is observed in Ghana. The conflicting sign 
reported is consistent with the literature, which argues that the prediction 
depends on the allocation of government consumption expenditure to 
tradable and non-tradable goods. However, for the case that actual data 
on government expenditure on non-tradable are minimal and are almost 
non-existent in many developing countries, the real sign of this proxy can 
be either positive or negative (Edwards 1988b; Elbadawi 1994; Elbadawi 
and Soto 2005; Ricci et al. 2013).  
5. Finally, an adverse real oil price is associated with real depreciation in 
Ghana and The Gambia. This is not surprising considering that these 
countries are oil-importing countries where world oil prices are 
denominated in foreign currencies. Hence, an increase in the real oil 
price will lead to a decrease in terms of trade and subsequently 
depreciate REER. On the other hand, an increase in real oil price is 
associated with a real appreciation in Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Guinea. 
The positive estimated coefficient for real oil price in Nigeria is expected, 
is a major oil-exporting economy, whereas the real oil price is found to 
have the unexpected positive sign for Sierra Leone, and Guinea. 
In a nutshell, the following observations can be made based on the above 
cointegrating results: First, overall, productivity differential, terms of trade, 
openness, government consumption, and the real oil price are found to be 
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important in the REER determination in the long run. However, the results show 
cross-country variations in the impacts of those variables on the REER, 
suggesting a lack of macroeconomic policy coordination. However, Beirne 
(2010) argues that given differing business cycles, trade, and consumption 
patterns across developing countries, it is not feasible that all the coefficients 
will move in the same direction. Nonetheless, this reiterates the need for further 
policy coordination within the group. Second, it is worth mentioning that 
although the BEER methodology defines the existence of a long-run 
relationship between the REER and its determinants, it is not always possible 
that the REER may be in equilibrium at every point in the long run. This is due 
to possible imperfections, rigidities or regulations; however, equilibrium may be 
achieved gradually in the long-run. For that reason, the short-run adjustment 
factor is estimated in Section 4.5.2.4 to complement the long-run equilibrium 
model in the empirical analysis. 
 
Table 4.6 Results of Cointegration Estimation 
  
Ghana ln(𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑡 ) = −7.102ln(𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑) + 0.709ln(𝑡𝑜𝑡) − 3.470ln(𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛) − 0.860ln(𝑔𝑜𝑣) − 3.195ln(𝑜𝑖𝑙) + 1.055𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 28.09  
                             [− 5.531]              [3.179]             [−10.967]                [−2.426]            [−11.674]            [10.923]    
The Gambia ln(𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑡 ) =  − 2.870𝑙n(𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑) + 0.065ln(𝑡𝑜𝑡) − 0.440ln(𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛) + 0.278ln(𝑔𝑜𝑣) − 0.195ln(𝑜𝑖𝑙) −  0.099𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 17.397   
                        [− 6.580]                    [4.694]             [−7.267]                    [5.668]                 [−4.604]             [− 5.827]                      
Guinea ln(𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑡 ) = 0.619ln(𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑) + 0.579ln(𝑡𝑜𝑡) + 0.353ln(𝑔𝑜𝑣) + 0.141ln(𝑜𝑖𝑙) − 0.0542  
                        [2.162]                    [4.714]               [5.271]                  [5.739]   
Nigeria ln(𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑡 ) =  −0.866ln(𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑) − 0.5ln(𝑡𝑜𝑡) + 0.726ln(𝑔𝑜𝑣) − 1.170ln(𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛) + 1.871ln(𝑜𝑖𝑙) − 0.462𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 9.76  
                          [−2.102]                   [−2.514]       [5.645]               [−7.804]                   [7.054]            [−7.322]      
Sierra 
Leone 
ln(𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑡 ) = 7.753ln(𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑) + 2.379ln(𝑡𝑜𝑡) + 2.342ln(𝑔𝑜𝑣) − 2.167ln(𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛) + 0.617ln(𝑜𝑖𝑙) − 12.944  
                         [9.836]                   [6.811]                [4.607]               [−8.715]                  [7.793]    
Note: [ ] t-statistics   
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4.5.2.4 Short-run adjustment factor 
Next, we turn to the short-run adjustment factors or speed of adjustment of the 
REERs and the fundamentals. Though we base most of our interpretation of the 
impulse response in the subsequent section, we comment on some of the short-
run adjustment coefficient estimates first. Our estimated equation, Eq. (3) 
suggests that when the estimated 𝜶 coefficient is negative and significant, then 
deviations from the cointegrating relationship74 can be corrected through the 
adjustment of the REER. Therefore, we further explore whether the REER in 
WAMZ countries responds significantly to past deviations. 
To ensure confidence in the VECM estimation, we examine whether the 
variables are weakly exogenous in the system since some of the variables in 
the cointegrating matrix are in differentials (differences between domestic and 
foreign variables) (Harris 1995; Hendry 1995). We conduct formal tests that the 
relative terms of trade, productivity differentials and real oil price are weakly 
exogenous. The null hypothesis of zero restrictions weakly exogenous cannot 
be rejected in most cases for these variables. See Appendix 4A.4 for the test 
results.  
Also, we can assume a priori that relative terms of trade and world oil price as 
weakly exogenous. The reason is that these countries are small open 
economies and can be accepted as price-takers in international trade, i.e., they 
have no or little influence on the price of their exports or imports (Harris 1995; 
Opoku-Afari et al. 2004). Further, the study conducted the VEC Residual Serial 
Correlation LM Tests; VEC Residual Normality Tests; VEC Residual 
Heteroscedasticity Tests; inverse AR root test to ensure the VECM is stable and 
do not suffer from autocorrelation, non-normality, heteroscedasticity, and non-
stationarity. The inverse AR root tests for all the countries suggest a stable 
(stationary) VECM. Diagnostic test results are provided in appendix 4A.5.  
The estimated short-run adjustment coefficients and the associated t-ratios are 
presented in Table 4.7. The adjustment coefficients shed light on the dynamics 
of the adjustment process towards equilibrium. In the event of any deviation 
                                                             
74 The Engle and Granger (1987) representation theorem asserts that the existence of an error-correction representation 
depends on the existence of cointegration. 
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from the long-run equilibrium, these variables jointly respond and adjust the 
system back to equilibrium. The REER adjustment factor Dln(reer), is negative 
and statistically significant, as expected from theory for all the countries, except 
The Gambia and Sierra Leone. Besides, a similar speed of adjustment across 
these countries would imply that the countries REER respond symmetrically to 
shocks. However, the speed of adjustment Dln(reer) or (α) slightly varies across 
the countries, with coefficients ranging from 0.94 in Guinea, 0.81 in Nigeria, to 
0.53 in Ghana. For instance, an adjustment coefficient of 0.94 suggests that 
about 94% of any misalignment between the actual and equilibrium REER is 
corrected within a year. This show less persistent adjustment dynamics in 
Guinea’s REER relative to the remaining countries. We deduce that the other 
countries with low REER adjustment speed, e.g., Ghana, could be due to 
limited nominal exchange rate flexibility. The above adjustment factors 
corresponding to a half-life of the REER of 0.7 years for Guinea, 0.9 years for 
Nigeria, and 1.3 years for Ghana. The implication is that the REER returns to 
equilibrium within the above listed period if it meanders from its equilibrium 
path. The adjustment speed for Ghana is comparable to that of Asongu (2014), 
who finds the half-life of 1 year for the REER, but the remaining countries 
coefficients were insignificant. On the other hand, the short-run effects of the 
fundamentals are generally insignificant across the various specifications apart 
from the real oil price equation in Ghana and Guinea; productivity differentials, 
openness and government consumption in The Gambia. These variables 
contribute to REER realignment.  
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Table 4.7 Estimated adjustment coefficients in VECM 
 Ghana The Gambia Guinea Nigeria Sierra Leone 
𝑫𝒍𝒏(𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒓) 
(𝜶) 
-0.529*** 
[-2.040] 
-0.245 
[-1.126] 
-0.941** 
[-1.758] 
-0.807*** 
[-3.418] 
-0.003 
[-0.043] 
𝑫𝒍𝒏(𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅) 
0.029 
[ 2.986] 
-0.256*** 
[-2.941] 
0.122 
[ 1.436] 
0.0160 
[ 0.300] 
0.138 
[ 3.962] 
𝑫𝒍𝒏(𝒕𝒐𝒕) 
0.076 
[ 0.474] 
3.075 
[ 1.587] 
0.590 
[ 1.232] 
-0.248 
[-1.082] 
-0.004 
[-0.080] 
𝑫𝒍𝒏(𝒐𝒊𝒍) 
-0.318*** 
[-2.349] 
1.292 
[ 1.602] 
-2.321*** 
[-1.790] 
-0.414 
[-1.318] 
-0.014 
[-0.094] 
𝑫𝒍𝒏(𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒏) 
-0.002 
[-0.040] 
-1.335*** 
[-2.932] 
- 
-0.201 
[-0.797] 
-0.029 
[-0.214] 
𝑫𝒍𝒏(𝒈𝒐𝒗) 
-0.050 
[-0.560] 
-1.216*** 
[-2.315] 
0.825 
[ 1.257] 
-0.278 
[-1.170] 
0.108 
[ 1.448] 
Half-life of 
deviation 
from ERER 
in years 
1.3 - 0.7 0.9 - 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. [ ] 
T-statistics   
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4.5.3 REER misalignment  
Figure 4.3 plots the observed REER misalignments of WAMZ countries. In this 
section, we investigate whether the REERs of WAMZ countries experienced an 
excessive deviation from their equilibrium path or whether there is a tendency of 
convergence towards the equilibrium path. For this purpose, we compute the 
equilibrium REER using the cointegrating parameters. One could assume that 
the actual values correspond to long-term values. However, Clark and 
MacDonald (1999) argue that actual values are subject to seasonal or cyclical 
fluctuations and hence economic series are unlikely to be in equilibrium always. 
Therefore, we smooth out each fundamental variable into its permanent and 
transitory components, excluding speculative and cyclical factors using the 
Hodrick and Prescott (1997) (H-P) filter.75 This helps us obtain the ‘permanent’ 
components of the fundamentals, taken to be measures of sustainable levels of 
the fundamentals. These values are substituted into the estimated cointegrating 
vector that links the REER and fundamentals and provides us with the 
estimated equilibrium REER. This would enable the computation of REER 
misalignment76 as the deviation of the actual REER (𝒒𝒕) from the equilibrium 
(?̃?𝒕) REER as stated by equation 4: 
 (𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑞𝑡 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔?̃?𝑡) ∗ 100         4 
where positive values indicate REER undervaluation and negative ones REER 
over-valuation (Clark and MacDonald 1998). 
A visual inspection indicates signs of possible substantial divergences of the 
REERs from their equilibrium path. This suggests that the REERs for most 
countries follow paths that are out of line with fundamentals or misaligned. The 
indication is that changes in the fundamentals may have differentiated impacts 
on the REER across the countries or perhaps indicating problems of exchange 
                                                             
75 The Hodrick and Prescott (HP) filter smoothing technique is chosen for this research due to the following advantages; 
it is the widely and efficiently used in the BEER literature, it is flexible and easier to implement and produces a more  
accurate approximation to the optimal filter (Egert et al., 2006). Although researchers have not agreed on the best 
procedure to filter out the permanent component of the fundamentals, a variety of smoothing techniques or trend-cycle 
decomposition methods have been used in the literature: moving averages or centered-moving averages; the trend-
cycle decomposition methods also include: Beveridge and Nelson (1981) decomposition method, Hodrick-Prescott (HP) 
filter by Hodrick and Prescott (1997, band-pass filter (Baxter and King 1999).  
76 Total REER misalignment at any point in time can be decomposed into the effects of transitory factors that have a 
short-run effect on the exchange rate, random disturbances and the extent of the deviations of the macroeconomic  
fundamentals from their long-run (or equilibrium) values (MacDonald 1998). 
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rate management. Figure 4.3 shows that before 2000- the base year- there is a 
clear episode of real overvaluation and undervaluation in all the countries’ 
REERs. Nevertheless, considering the influence of different historical, economic 
and political traditions such as the major exchange rate policy changes 
undertaken by these countries as part of the economic reforms supervised by 
the IMF and World Bank in the 1980s and political instability, the degree of 
misalignments could be argued ‘natural’ for the region. For instance, the sharp 
deviation between 1993-1998 in Nigeria is consistent with the political instability 
the country underwent during Abacha’s military regime. Moreover, Nigeria 
remained an outlier for most of the period before 2000, probably due to its 
influence as the biggest economy in GDP and population amongst the group.  
Interestingly, the relative misalignments appear to have declined since 2007 as 
the individual members’ REER trend towards the common equilibrium path. 
This somewhat concurs with Coulibaly and Gnimassoun (2013) report that the 
dispersion of misalignments in the WAMZ area has relatively diminished since 
2000, reflecting a convergence between competitiveness levels of its member 
countries. In other words, these countries have not gone through any excessive 
real devaluation since 2007. Perhaps, we can argue that they rely more on 
interest rate tools for a macroeconomic adjustment instead of nominal 
exchange rate adjustments.  
Notwithstanding, more attempts are required to eliminate total misalignments 
amongst members and bring the REER in all countries closer to equilibrium. 
The total misalignments are clear after redoing the graph for the period 2000-
2015, shown in figure 4.4. Though a few of WAMZ countries REER have 
deviated from their long-term path over the period, it is showed that most 
achieved some stability within -/+10% band after 2007. Moving forward, sound 
macroeconomic policies and stable external factors could bring the REER in 
line with its fundamentals (Edwards 1988a; Isard and Faruqee 1998; Gulde and 
Tsangarides 2008; Chowdhury 2012). Therefore, as indicated in previous 
studies (Debrun et al. 2005; Fielding and Shields 2005; Alagidede et al. 2008) a 
monetary union in WAMZ inevitably depends on how well the authorities 
achieve macroeconomic integration before upscaling to a full monetary union. 
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 Figure 4.3 REER Misalignment (1980-2015) 
 
Source: Author (2018) 
 
Figure 4.4 REER Misalignment (2000-2015) 
 
Source: Author (2018) 
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4.5.4 Measuring shock asymmetry: Shock identification strategy  
Building on the empirical model outlined in Section 4.3.1 our interest in this 
section is to examine the real effective exchange rate (REER) responses to 
shocks in exchange rate determinants across the WAMZ economies; and 
whether disturbances are distributed symmetrically across the countries. Based 
on the analysis in section 4.5.2, we consider three shocks representing both 
external and domestics - oil price (common external), supply (productivity) and 
demand preference shocks - that could be an important driver of REER 
fluctuations in the area.  
In this paper, a persistent change in world oil prices with a persistent effect on 
the WAMZ country's REER would be captured like a common external shock 
(Forbes et al. 2015). These economies are closely integrated into the broader 
global economy with their heavy reliance on export of primary commodities; 
global or external developments affect the economic fortune of these countries. 
Consequently, the prevalence of external shocks may justify common monetary 
policy for the countries (Zhao and Kim 2009). A rise in world oil price will worsen 
the balance of trade position of a net oil-importing country, subsequently lead to 
a real depreciation of the REER (Zhou 1995; Chen and Chen 2007). An 
increase in domestic productivity would be captured as a domestic supply shock 
or productivity shock. A supply disturbance is identified as a shock such as 
improvements in technology, that causes productivity shock in traded sectors 
relative to nontraded sectors. This type of productivity shock is central to the 
Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis. Productivity shocks in countries with higher 
productivity in the tradable sector typically result in permanent REER 
appreciation (Balassa 1964; Samuelson 1964; Edwards 1989).  
Furthermore, changes in the REER is referred to here as real aggregate 
demand shocks not related to money, such as preference or fiscal shocks 
(Rogers 1999; Craighead and Tien 2015). An increase in the real demand 
shocks such as the propensity to consume would result in higher prices and an 
appreciating REER in the long run (Alexius and Post 2008). The domestic or 
country-specific shocks are shocks that only affect a particular WAMZ member 
economy due to a change in domestic policy or a change in productivity. 
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To identify asymmetric macroeconomic shocks, we estimate a three-variable 
VAR in first differences and assume that 𝑋 = [ ∆(𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑡), ∆(𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑡), ∆(𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑡)]- 
change in the logarithm of the real oil price (𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑡), the logarithm of the 
productivity differential (𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑡) and changes in the logarithm of the real effective  
exchange rate (𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑡) - are related to three uncorrelated structural innovations 
to be determined, 𝜀𝑡 = [ 𝜀𝑡
𝑜 ,  𝜀𝑡
𝑠,  𝜀𝑡
𝑑].Where (𝜀𝑡
𝑜), (𝜀𝑡
𝑠) and (𝜀𝑡
𝑑) are defined 
as real oil price, supply (productivity) and demand shocks, respectively. The 
structural shocks are unobserved. Hence we estimate a reduced form 𝑉𝐴𝑅(𝑝) 
with a lag length (𝑝) chosen such that the residuals approximate white noise by 
imposing appropriate identifying restrictions on 𝐴 0
−1. Under the appropriate 
restrictions, structural shocks can be recovered from the estimated reduced 
form errors by using the following relationship: 
𝑒𝑡 = 𝐴 0
−1𝜀𝑡           5 
Where 𝑒𝑡 denotes the reduced-form errors. To derive three types of structural 
shocks: oil price (𝜀𝑡
𝑜), supply (𝜀𝑡
𝑠) and demand (𝜀𝑡
𝑑), we need nine constricted 
conditions for the model, including three endogenous variables. The 
orthogonality of the structural shocks (unit variance 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑡) = 𝐼) identifying 
assumption provides six restrictions to identify matrix 𝐴 0
−1. The other identifying 
assumptions are the long-run restrictions, which gives as the following recursive 
structure of the model:  
𝑒𝑡 ≡ [
∆(𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑡)
∆(𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑡)
∆(𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑡)
] = [
𝑎11𝑖 0 0
𝑎21𝑖 𝑎22𝑖 0
𝑎31𝑖 𝑎32𝑖 𝑎33𝑖
] [
𝜀𝑡
𝑜
 𝜀𝑡
𝑠
 𝜀𝑡
𝑑
]  
The lower triangularity of the model can be justified as follows: (1) WAMZ 
country-specific shocks do not have a contemporaneous effect on the world oil 
price. This restriction is necessary to identify domestic shocks and holds for 
small open economies, such as the countries under investigation. The 
assumption that small open economies cannot affect the rest of the world is 
commonly employed in the literature (Zhao and Kim 2009; Carrière-Swallow 
and Céspedes 2013; Forbes et al. 2015).77 (2) In the long run, productivity is 
                                                             
77 The key assumption for the purposes of estimation and inference is that global variables are weakly exogenous, 
compatible with a limited degree of weak dependence across idiosyncratic shocks. To satisfy this property, we assume 
118 
 
only affected by supply-side shocks (𝜀𝑡
𝑠), such as technology shock (Blanchard 
and Quah 1989), while the real exchange rate can be affected by both supply 
and demand-side factors (Craighead and Tien 2015).  
It is worth noting that whereas the three structural innovations may mix various 
underlying shocks, our focus is on whether commonalities exist in WAMZ 
country's REER after the three structural shocks and how significant they are 
proportional to each other.  
 
4.5.4.1 Impulse response analysis 
We compute impulse response functions to determine the behaviour of shocks 
to the exchange rate fundamentals across WAMZ countries. The same data 
used in the VECM analysis is used for the impulse responses. We mainly focus 
on the responses of the real effective exchange rate to three structural 
innovations- oil price, productivity and demand preference shocks. The 
prevalence of structural shocks may justify common monetary policy for the 
group; especially the oil price (external) shock. A shock is symmetric if the sign, 
magnitude, and persistence of the responses do not vary significantly across 
countries, otherwise, it is considered as asymmetric (Bayoumi and Eichengreen 
1992; Ballabriga et al. 1999). In estimating the three-VAR model, the number of 
lags is set to one, since the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) indicated that 
all the models had an optimal lag length of either one or two. We chose a 
uniform lag of one to preserve the symmetry of the specification across 
countries. 
Figure 4.4 reports the cumulative impulse responses of real exchange rate 
movements to the one-standard-deviation oil price, supply (productivity) and 
demand shocks over fifteen years in each country. The use of accumulated 
responses helps to aid interpretation. The dynamic effect of each structural 
innovation is reported with a standard deviation band around the point estimate. 
Recall that the exchange rate is defined so that an increase in the value of the 
real exchange rate appreciates the real value of the domestic currency. Initial 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
that all economies in the model are small to the world economy, which is reasonable given that our country group 
consists of developing countries (Dumrongrittikul and Anderson 2016). 
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observation of Figure 4.4 shows that the response of the REER to the three 
structural shocks differ across countries and the shock is felt immediately in all 
countries; it peaks about two to three years later. In The Gambia and Sierra 
Leone, an adverse oil price shock (increase in the real price of oil) depreciates 
the REER within the first two to three years, after which we observe a 
permanent depreciation of the REER. In contrast, an increase in the real price 
of oil permanently appreciates the REER in Guinea, Nigeria, and Ghana. The 
result is not surprising for Nigeria, being a major oil-exporting country.  
Furthermore, a supply shock (productivity improvement) permanently tends to 
lead to an appreciation of the REER in Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. This 
corresponds with the traditional Balassa-Samuelson view. In contrast, The 
Gambia REER depreciates permanently after a supply shock. In Ghana, supply 
shock has an initial depreciating effect on REER but after that dies out. Though 
the contrasting findings could reflect the different economic experience and 
structure of the WAMZ members, the impact of productivity shock also depends 
on the transmission mechanism. Thus, whether through the REER is based on 
tradable prices or through relative prices between tradable and nontradable 
(Wang et al. 2013). Besides, a demand shock has a permanent appreciating 
effect on the REER in all countries, though the immediate impact of a one-unit 
demand shock varies across countries.     
Overall, the impulse response analysis indicates that there are notable 
differences in the results. The response of the REER to the oil price, supply 
(productivity) and demand shocks across the five countries are asymmetric. 
These findings somewhat concur with Buigut and Valev (2005) for East African 
countries, and Houssa (2008) for WAEMU countries. The indication is that 
response to the common monetary policy after a shock would vary across the 
WAMZ countries; hence, the costs of WAMZ members losing monetary 
autonomy will be much higher in a world where a monetary response to a shock 
is immediate. 
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Figure 4.5 Cumulated impulse responses of real effective exchange rates to 
one standard deviation structural innovations. 
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4.5.4.2 Forecast error variance decomposition analysis 
The variance decomposition has been applied to identify the relative 
contribution of the three structural shocks on REER fluctuations across the 
countries. The aim is to investigate whether the sources of variation in the 
REER are shared across the countries. Table 4.8 reports results of the variance 
decomposition for each of the five sampled country’s REER at the one and ten-
year forecast horizons (Variance decompositions are reported only for the 
REER). One (ten) year responses are taken as short-term (long-term) effects. 
The principal contributors of the REER are different across economies, shown 
in Table 4.8. In the short run, REER fluctuations are driven mostly by country-
specific preference demand shocks; explaining over 80 percent of the variability 
the first year across The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, and Nigeria. The relative 
contribution of demand preference shocks declines gradually afterwards, but 
none less than 70 percent. However, the findings are different in Sierra Leone; 
demand shocks contribute to about 42 and 45 percent of REER fluctuations in 
the short and long run, respectively. The dominance of domestic demand 
shocks in REER fluctuations concurs with those found in Hoffmaister et al. 
(1998) for non-CFA countries.  
Also, we find significant differences in the relative importance of supply 
(productivity) shocks on REER fluctuations. In the short run, supply shock 
contribution is less than 8 percent across the five countries; and is almost 
irrelevant to the REER variability- less than 1 percent- in The Gambia and 
Guinea. The pattern is almost the same in the long run in The Gambia, Guinea, 
and Nigeria, where supply shocks explain no more than 3 percent of REER 
variability. In Ghana and Sierra Leone, the contribution of supply shock to 
REER movements rises to 13 and 12 percent in the long run, respectively. In 
contrast, Harvey and Cushing (2015) reported the dominance of supply shocks 
on the variability in output growth, explaining at least 99 percent for Gambia, 
Ghana, and Nigeria. 
Furthermore, the relative importance of oil price (external) shock to REER 
dynamics is 54, 12, 8, 5 and 3 percent in Sierra Leone, Ghana, Guinea, 
Gambia, and Nigeria in the short run, respectively. In the long run, the pattern is 
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almost the same in Ghana and The Gambia; marginally rises to 11 percent in 
Guinea; substantially rises to 20 percent in Nigeria; and declines to 44 percent 
in Sierra Leone. The result is not surprising, especially for Nigeria, because of 
the country’s heavy dependence on exports of crude oil; whereas the other 
countries are oil-importing, exposing these countries to trade and exchange rate 
fluctuations. Hoffmaister et al. (1998) on the other hand, reported the absence 
of the role of external shocks in explaining real exchange rate movements in the 
non-CFA countries; though the authors used world interest rate and terms of 
trade shocks as a proxy for external shocks. 
Overall, the sources of REER variability are idiosyncratic, and they vary 
significantly across countries. Appendix 4A.6 also show similar asymmetric 
shocks across WAMZ after we replaced oil price shock with terms of trade 
shock as a common external shock to these countries. The structure and the 
different economic experience of these economies could contribute to the 
contrasting importance of the structural shocks on the REER. This result 
somewhat reinforces the early findings that structural shocks are more 
asymmetric among WAMZ countries. Therefore, these countries will find it 
difficult to adjust to either common external, supply or demand shocks if they 
form a monetary union. 
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Table 4.8 Variance decomposition 
Horizon Demand 
shock 
Supply 
shock 
Oil 
price 
shock 
Demand 
shock 
Supply 
shock 
Oil price 
shock 
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
Ghana Gambia 
1 80.25 7.84 11.91 94.91 0.33 4.76 
2 75.60 12.43 11.98 93.20 1.53 5.27 
3 75.66 12.40 11.94 93.21 1.52 5.27 
4 75.58 12.48 11.94 93.20 1.53 5.27 
5 75.57 12.49 11.94 93.20 1.53 5.27 
10 75.57 12.49 11.94 93.20 1.53 5.27 
       
Guinea Nigeria 
1 92.11 0.01 7.89 95.00 2.33 2.67 
2 89.03 0.05 10.93 78.44 2.03 19.52 
3 88.93 0.15 10.92 77.90 2.39 19.72 
4 88.92 0.16 10.92 77.86 2.42 19.72 
5 88.92 0.16 10.92 77.86 2.42 19.72 
10 88.92 0.16 10.92 77.86 2.42 19.72 
       
Sierra Leone    
1 41.74 4.25 54.01    
2 44.61 11.71 43.69    
3 44.57 11.93 43.50    
4 44.57 11.93 43.50    
5 44.57 11.93 43.50    
10 44.57 11.93 43.50    
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4.6  Chapter summary  
One fundamental precondition that determines the ability to conduct monetary 
policy smoothly in a monetary union is the symmetry of response to common 
policy across different countries. This chapter focuses on one of the main 
issues in the debate on the monetary union in the WAMZ, whether shocks that 
contribute to macroeconomic fluctuations are symmetric or not across these 
countries. Consequently, we assess the behaviour of REERs across these 
countries to characterise macroeconomic asymmetry. The analysis is 
conducted  twofold:  
First, the chapter estimates the short-run and long-run effects of 
macroeconomic fundamentals on REERs to assess the behaviour of REERs 
across these countries using country-by-country VECM. Chapter 4 further 
derives the equilibrium REER and misalignments for these countries to examine 
whether they are converging over time towards the equilibrium. Overall, 
productivity differentials, terms of trade, real oil price, government consumption 
and trade openness are found to be important determinants of the REER in the 
long run in WAMZ. However, the significant impact of the common 
fundamentals on REER is different across economies. Also, the country-specific 
VECM results show that the existence of REER means reversion in 3 countries, 
but the speed of adjustment varies across candidate countries. Furthermore, 
the computed REER misalignments suggest that before 2007 the REER of 
WAMZ members experienced high divergence from equilibrium path. The 
degree of REER misalignments appears to diminish, converging towards 
equilibrium between 2007-2015. 
Second, the chapter identifies three types of shocks- oil price, productivity 
(supply) and demand preference shocks- from exchange rate determinants 
using the structural autoregressive model (SVAR) and assess how REERs 
respond to these shocks to characterise asymmetry across WAMZ. From the 
impulse response analysis, there appear to be marked differences in the effects 
of oil price (external) shock among the WAMZ countries REER. Whereas real 
oil price shock leads to a real permanent appreciation in Nigeria, Guinea and 
Ghana, the contrary is observed in The Gambia and Sierra Leone. The 
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response of REER to supply (productivity) shock across the five countries are 
also asymmetric. Though the response of REER to domestic aggregate 
demand shocks are positive for all countries, they differ in size and speed, 
indicating idiosyncratic aggregate demand shock. In the case of the variance 
decomposition, the sources of REER variability are idiosyncratic, and they vary 
significantly across countries.  
The overall evidence from the empirical investigation points to heterogeneous 
economies. The structure and the different economic experience of these 
economies could contribute to the structural differences. The findings imply that, 
in the absence of an alternative adjustment mechanism (such as fiscal transfer 
schemes), a move towards monetary union will be associated with a high cost 
to the countries in a world where a monetary response to a shock is immediate. 
Idiosyncratic shocks imply the need for different policy responses to adjust to 
macroeconomic shocks. This strengthens the case for policy autonomy in the 
region and is consistent with previous studies showing considerable economic 
divergences amongst WAMZ countries as the primary constraint to monetary 
union.  
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Chapter 5 Currency union and intraregional trade 
in ECOWAS: lessons for the future 
 
5.1 Introduction  
According to the classical OCA literature discussed in chapter 2, participating in 
a monetary union is associated with the loss of member’s autonomy over 
national monetary policy instruments to stabilise country-specific 
macroeconomic shocks (Mundell 1961). However, the new OCA literature 
argues that the degree of the cost depends importantly on the nature of shocks 
to which the participating countries in a currency area are subjected (Tavlas 
1994), thereby the focus should be on the potential benefits. These are: first, 
joining a monetary union is accompanied by the adoption of a more efficient and 
credible monetary practice78 (Barro and Gordon 1983; Giavazzi and Giovannini 
1989; Beetsma and Giuliodori 2010).  
Second, by eliminating exchange rate risks and transaction costs, a common 
currency can spur trade and business cycle synchronisation (Frankel and Rose 
1998; Rose 2000; Frankel and Rose 2002; Baldwin et al. 2008; Tavlas 2009).79 
ECOWAS sees the possibility of a broader monetary union as a logical way to 
boost intra-regional trade and growth in the sub-region, an objective stipulated 
in article 3 of the 1993 revised treaty.80 Such benefits could reasonably be 
expected to improve welfare (Fielding and Shields 2005; Clerc et al. 2011).  
In this chapter, we focus on the existing currency union, the CFA franc zone in 
ECOWAS, and estimate its effect on bilateral trade over the period 1980-2016. 
We assess whether the CFA franc zone trade effect provides a strong case for 
the WAMZ (ECOWAS) single currency arrangement. Unlike earlier studies 
                                                             
78 A country that suffers from an inflation bias and lacks credibility (Barro and Gordon 1983), can reach a low inflation 
reputation overnight by surrendering itself to the control of the low inflationary central (supranational central bank) 
(Giavazzi and Giovannini 1989). Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010) suggest that the incentive for the central bank to relax 
monetary policy is particularly strong when the central bank is under the influence of a government that wants to reduce 
unemployment. However, this is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
79 De Grauwe (2018) further indicates that a currency union instigates greater financial integration, which in turn reduces 
the cost of trading and therefore facilitates stronger trade. 
80 The fifth meeting of the Presidential Task Force on the ECOWAS Single Currency Programme was held on 21st 
February 2018 in Accra, Ghana. The Task Force comprises leaders of the 15 ECOWAS member countries reaffirmed 
their political will to meet the ECOWAS Single Currency Programme deadline by 2020 (Final communique-
http://www.wami-imao.org/). 
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(Anyanwu 2003; Carrère 2004; Nitsch 2004; Ajayi 2005; Fielding and Shields 
2005; Masson and Pattillo 2005; Hulej et al. 2006; Masson 2008; Zannou 2010; 
Adam and Chaudhry 2014), we estimate a panel gravity specification, allowing 
for country-pair and year-fixed effects on a comprehensive data set of bilateral 
trade flows of the 15 ECOWAS member countries. Our approach offers two 
main advantages: First, it allows country-pair fixed-effects to mitigate the risk of 
omitted-variable bias from any possible endogeneity issues.81 The country-pair 
dummies control for heterogeneity since they account for any unobserved or 
misspecified characteristics of each pair of countries that simultaneously explain 
trade volumes between them (Cheng and Wall 2005; Baldwin and Taglioni 
2007; Berger and Nitsch 2008; Head and Mayer 2014). Second, unlike the 
cross-sectional approach, the panel fixed effects estimator exploits the time-
series variation around country-pair averages to provide insight about the actual 
trade effects of a currency union (CFA franc in the current study) (Glick and 
Rose 2016; Glick 2017). We also estimate the gravity equation by controlling for 
zero-trade values by adding a constant of one to each trade value to utilise the 
full sample, including zero trade flows in a log-linear estimation. 
Furthermore, we consider not only whether the CFA franc trade effect is positive 
or not, but also, whether the increase was mainly a trade diversion or a trade 
creation. Finally, we check the robustness of our results using a Poisson 
pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML) technique. Silva and Tenreyro (2006) 
pointed out that in the presence of heteroscedasticity and zero trade values; the 
PPML delivers consistent estimates better than OLS log-linear specification.     
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 provides a literature review of 
the impact of monetary unions on trade. Section 5.3 discusses the methodology 
employed to assess the impact of a single currency on bilateral trade and the 
data. Section 5.4 discusses the empirical results of the effect of the CFA franc 
zone on bilateral trade. The final section 5.5 provides conclusion.  
 
 
                                                             
81 We assumed that endogeneity is less of a problem in the case CFA franc zone (for historical reasons) and monetary 
union membership is exogenous to economic characteristics. See section 3.1 for a detail discussion.  
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5.2 Review of the effects of monetary unions on trade 
This section is related to two strands of the literature. The first strand of 
research assesses the impact of exchange rate variability or fluctuations on 
trade (Frankel and Rose 2002; Auboin and Ruta 2013). In West Africa, the non-
WAEMU states have separate national currencies. The argument against 
floating currencies is that exchange rate changes create uncertainty that 
discourages trade flows (Mundell 1961). However, the empirical evidence in the 
literature is mixed (Frankel and Wei 1993). One reason that economists and 
policymakers give is the possibility for of hedging through derivatives against 
exchange rate risk (Frankel and Rose 2002; Chen and Novy 2017). It is worth 
noting that hedging instruments are limited in West Africa due to the 
underdeveloped financial sector. Besides, Frankel and Rose (2002) argue that 
most of the early studies estimate the relationship between exchange rate 
variability and trade employing time series data, making it challenging to 
generate the exact effect of exchange rate changes on trade. 
The second strand explores whether by eliminating exchange rate uncertainty, 
membership of currency unions promotes trade flows among members. In 
earlier work, Rose (2000) using a gravity equation on a data of bilateral trade 
among 186 countries reported that trade triples for two countries that use a 
common currency as compared with two countries using different currencies. 
The reasoning is that permanent commitment to a fixed exchange rate 
eliminates the uncertainty and transaction costs associated with exchange rate 
variability of trading across borders82 (Frankel and Rose 2002; Auboin and Ruta 
2013). In effect, lower transaction costs and increased competition (via a pro-
competitive effect) lowers the relative price of traded goods coming from the 
union (Baldwin et al. 2008).  
Other subsequent works (Rose and van Wincoop 2001; Frankel and Rose 
2002; Glick and Rose 2002) also found that a common currency doubles 
bilateral trade among members. After that, a significant research effort was 
                                                             
82 Uncertainty about future exchange rates directly translates into uncertainty about future receipts in domestic currency 
(Auboin and Ruta, 2013). However, the potential loss depends on the extent to which countries in the union face 
asymmetric shocks, and whether countries in the region are sufficiently flexible to absorb or mitigate such shocks, with 
factor mobility and transfers acting as shock absorbers (Hulej et al. 2006). 
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devoted using a counterfactual gravity model to assess the trade effect ex-ante 
and ex-post European Monetary Union (EMU). However, few papers have 
considered the trade impact of a common currency within ECOWAS, though the 
CFA franc zone has existed for over half a century. These sparse studies 
(Anyanwu 2003; Carrère 2004; Nitsch 2004; Ajayi 2005; Fielding and Shields 
2005; Masson and Pattillo 2005; Hulej et al. 2006; Masson 2008; Zannou 2010; 
Adam and Chaudhry 2014) differ in their empirical methodology, country of 
coverage, and time span, yet they report evidence that a common currency can 
increase bilateral trade in ECOWAS. 
There has been some criticism of earlier empirical studies utilising the often-
preferred lognormal gravity equation with OLS for providing implausibly large 
currency union effects due to treatment effects (Persson 2001).83 These include 
the potential endogeneity of monetary union membership, omitted policy 
(unobserved) variables, zero-valued trade flows, among others (Persson 2001; 
Melitz 2004; Baldwin 2006b; Burger et al. 2009). Potential endogeneity 
problems can hide the real effect of a currency union on trade (Alesina and 
Barro 2002; Tenreyro and Barro 2003). In ECOWAS, unofficial trade barriers 
such as numerous roadblocks, stringent unauthorised prerequisites on imports 
and exports are not accounted for, though they are important determinants of 
regional trade flow. Also, estimates for ECOWAS are strongly affected by the 
treatment of zero bilateral trade flows, even between countries sharing a 
common currency due to significant missing observations (Masson 2008).84 
Naturally, dropping out zero observations when using the usual log form of the 
gravity model has the potential of leaving out valuable information on the 
importance of low levels of trade within the region (Silva and Tenreyro 2006).  
Based on these criticisms, the catalyst of the recent methodological advances in 
the applied empirical trade concerns the proper handling of zero trade flows and 
unobservable factors or potential endogeneity problems in estimating the gravity 
equation parameters (Anderson and van Wincoop 2003; Cheng and Wall 2005; 
Linders and De Groot 2006; Silva and Tenreyro 2006; Helpman et al. 2008; 
                                                             
83 The Rose (2000) study was motivated by the coming of European Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999. However, the 
findings were critique because data on currency union were mainly from much smaller or developing countries who had 
adopted single currency in the past (e.g., CFA zone, etc.) (Frankel, 2010). 
84 Unrecorded data due to weak institutions, the prevalence of civil war, etc  
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Westerlund and Wilhelmsson 2011; Feenstra 2015). Current studies using 
sophisticated econometric procedures to address these econometric biases, 
generally find currency union trade-generating effects that are modest in size 
and even statistically insignificant (Micco et al. 2003; Baldwin 2006a; Baldwin 
and Taglioni 2007; Serlenga and Shin 2007; Baldwin et al. 2008; Berger and 
Nitsch 2008). Baldwin (2006b) and Baldwin et al. (2008) conclude that 
reasonable estimates for the euro trade effects should be in the range of a 5-15 
per cent which concurs with the estimates of Micco et al. (2003). Nitsch (2004) 
also demonstrates that innocuous changes in the gravity specification and data 
corrections reduce the estimated currency union effect. Thus, membership of 
the CFA franc zone at best, lead to about 55 per cent more trade with each 
other than with an otherwise similar non-union member in the region. In the 
same line, Frankel (2010) obtains trade creating the effect of around 50 per cent 
for the CFA franc zone after taking the conversion of the French Franc to the 
euro in 1999 as an exogenous shock hitting the countries that had the CFA 
Franc formerly linked to the French Franc. Whereas, Glick and Rose (2016) 
report a substantial trade effect of 105 per cent for the CFA franc zone using a 
panel approach with both time-varying country and dyadic fixed effects.  
It is worth mentioning that we cannot assume that the effect of a currency union 
is identical across all currency unions, over the country of coverage and period. 
We, therefore, focus on the experience of the West African CFA franc zone and 
argue that their experience would be more representative of the trade benefit of 
the future currency union in West Africa. We further address the argument of 
unobservable or omitted variables bias and zero trade flows in the analysis 
using recent developments in the econometric analysis of the gravity equation. 
Details follow in the next section.  
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5.3 Methodology and data 
This chapter aims to investigate the effect of the CFA franc zone on bilateral 
trade. We assume that this effect will be more representative of the trade 
benefits of the future WAMZ currency union and by extension ECOWAS. This 
section discusses the gravity model employed to assess the trade effect of the 
CFA franc on bilateral and address all key econometric issues raised in the 
literature. Finally, the data set, and variables are described.   
 
5.3.1 The Gravity Model and its theoretical development 
Over the last five decades, the gravity equation has emerged as the workhorse 
model for the analysis of international trade flows. General trade theories before 
1962 have been used to explain why trade occurs but fail to explain why the 
level of trade between countries tends to vary over time. Tinbergen (1962) using 
Newton’s theory of gravity found that bilateral trade for countries 𝑖 and 𝑗 is 
influenced by the economic size (measured by their respective national 
incomes, 𝑌𝑖 and 𝑌𝑗) of both countries and the trade barriers (measured by 
geographic distance, 𝐷𝑖𝑗) between them.  
Additionally, the economic size (measured by population size; national income; 
per capita income) is associated with potential demand and supply of trading 
pairs, whereas resistance to trade factors include tariff barriers and 
transportation costs (Linnemann 1966). The resulting equation, analogous to 
Newton's law of gravity, can is expressed mathematically as: 
𝑇𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0
𝑌𝑖
𝛽1𝑌𝑗
𝛽2
𝐷𝑖𝑗
𝛽3           6 
Where 𝑇𝑖𝑗 is the bilateral trade (exports or imports) from country 𝑖 to country 𝑗, 𝑌𝑖 
and 𝑌𝑗 are their respective economic sizes (such as GDP or GDP per capita or 
population), 𝐷𝑖𝑗 is a measure of the resistance factors to trade (such as 
geographic distance, shipping and transportation costs, language, the formation 
of a preferential trading area, etc.) between the countries, and 𝛽0 is a constant 
of proportionality.  
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Since Tinbergen (1962) pioneered the gravity equations to study bilateral trade 
flows, these have been expanded and continued to be widely used in the 
analysis of a variety of policies such as regional trade agreements, monetary 
and currency unions and border effects (McCallum 1995; Rose 2000; Wall 
2000; Rose and van Wincoop 2001; Glick and Rose 2002). In addition, the 
gravity equation has received sound theoretical underpinnings by Anderson 
(1979), Bergstrand (1985; 1989), Deardorff (1998), Eaton and Kortum (2002), 
Evenett and Keller (2002),  Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Chaney (2008) 
and Helpman et al. (2008). (A summary of key contributions of the gravity model 
is provided in Appendix 5A.1). 
 
I. Stochastic Function 
Taking natural logarithms of both sides of Eq. (6) and adding a random 
disturbance term, we derive a linear stochastic gravity equation as in Eq. (7): 
𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑗 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗         7
     
𝛽1, 𝛽2 > 0; 𝛽3 < 0 
Where 𝜀𝑖𝑗 is assumed to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). In the 
trade literature, Eq. (7) is known as the traditional gravity model (Eichengreen & 
Irwin, 1998; Burger et al. 2009). The log-linear gravity equation has been 
estimated using cross-section ordinary least squares (OLS) techniques by 
assuming that the variance of the error is constant (homoscedastic) across 
observations (see Tinbergen 1962).85    
However, as observed, the gravity specification in Eq. (7) is likely to be 
misspecified given that country pairs could have unobserved specific country 
characteristics not accounted. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) provide a 
theoretical basis for this literature on the omitted variable bias. Introducing the 
multilateral resistance terms (MRTs), the authors illustrate that bilateral trade 
                                                             
85 However, as pointed out by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), in the presence of heteroscedasticity and zero trade 
flows, the OLS estimation may not be consistent and are likely to suffer from substantial heterogeneity bias. 
Furthermore, when individual effects are omitted, OLS estimates will be biased if the individual effects are correlated 
with the regressors (Martínez-Zarzoso and Nowak-Lehmann 2003).  
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depends not only on countries mutual resistance (such as distance, tariffs, and 
common language) but also on their resistance to trade with other trading 
partners. These resistance terms are implicitly defined by a system of non‐linear 
equations involving all regions’ GDP shares and a global interdependence that 
is functionally related to trade costs. Therefore, Anderson and van Wincoop 
(2003) argue that traditional least‐squares estimates of the gravity equation are 
biased due to the omission of multilateral resistance terms. Thus, estimates 
may not be consistent and bias once researchers ignore unobserved 
characteristics (Alesina et al. 2003; Tenreyro and Barro 2003; Silva and 
Tenreyro 2006; Baldwin and Taglioni 2007). 
Eq. (8) shows the augmented gravity equation of Anderson and van Wincoop 
(2003).   
𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑗 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗     8 
 
𝛽3 = (1 − σ)ρ , 𝛽4 = (1 − σ),  𝛽5 = −(1 − σ) and 𝛽6 = −(1 − σ) 
Where 𝐷𝑖𝑗 is a measure of the bilateral distance between 𝑖 and 𝑗 (a proxy for 
transport costs), 𝑏𝑖𝑗  is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if two countries 
share a border (border effect). The variables 𝑃𝑖 and 𝑃𝑗 are the multilateral 
resistance terms for country 𝑖 and 𝑗. The problem with estimating Eq. (8) is that 
𝑃𝑖 and 𝑃𝑗 are not directly observable. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) used 
iterative methods to construct estimates of 𝑃𝑖 and 𝑃𝑗. However, this procedure is 
highly data consuming and difficult to obtain estimates. Other studies include a 
“remoteness” variable as a proxy for the MRTs, but this approach is not without 
challenges (Bacchetta et al. 2012; Gómez-Herrera 2013).  
A variety of approaches have been taken to estimating the gravity relationship 
in such a way as to avoid the omitted variables bias arising from ignoring 
multilateral resistance terms. The widely used approach in a cross-section 
framework involves incorporating country-specific effects for importing and 
exporting countries (Feenstra 2002; 2004; Gil-Pareja et al. 2014). The recent 
literature concludes that country fixed effects specification of the gravity 
equation is in line with the theoretical concerns regarding the correct 
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specification of the model and yields consistent parameter estimates for the 
variables of interest (Baldwin and Taglioni 2007; Baldwin et al. 2008; Eicher and 
Henn 2011).  
The log-normal country-specific effects specification of the gravity equation is 
shown by Eq. (9):  
𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑗 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑗 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗       9 
Where 𝜑i and 𝛾𝑗 are country-specific effects for the exporting and importing 
country, respectively. Eq. (9) is consistent with Mátyás (1997) “triple-way 
model”, as shown in Eq. (10): 
𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑗 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡      10 
Where the three dimensions include; the country-specific effects for the 
exporter, 𝜑i; the country-specific effects for the importer, 𝛾𝑗; and the time-
specific effects, 𝜆𝑡. The time fixed effect makes it possible to monitor common 
business cycles or globalisation trends over the whole sample.  
Later, Cheng and Wall (2005) suggested that a country-pair specific effects 
model is appropriate to country-specific effects model shown in Eq. (10). Thus, 
they suggested to allow each pair of countries to have a dummy variable that 
may be correlated with both the bilateral trade and explanatory variables shown 
below: 
𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼𝑖𝑗 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡       11 
Where 𝛼𝑖𝑗 is the “country-pair” specific effects between the trading countries, 
and 𝛼𝑖𝑗 = 𝜑i + 𝛾𝑗.  
It is worth mentioning that the country-pair specific effects could be either of the 
random or the fixed effects type, which depends on the interests of the analysis, 
the country sample, the data properties, and the theoretical model. Martínez-
Zarzoso and Nowak-Lehmann (2003) argue that from a priori, the random effect 
(RE) model would be more appropriate when estimating typical trade flows 
between randomly selected countries of trading partners from a larger 
population.  
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On the other hand, the fixed effects (FE) model would be a better choice when 
one is interested in estimating typical trade flows between an ex-ante 
predetermined selection of nations (Egger 2000; Martínez-Zarzoso and Nowak-
Lehmann 2003). For this study, the intuition would lead us to treat the fixed 
effect specification as more appropriate given that the selected countries are 
members of the ECOWAS regional bloc. One implication of the country-pair 
fixed effects is the impossibility to estimate time-invariant drivers of trade flow, 
such as distance, common language, and common border.86Therefore, the 
study employs the Hausman (1978) estimation technique to check whether the 
country-pair effects would be treated as fixed or random.  
 
5.3.2 Model 
To estimate the effects of the currency union - the CFA franc zone - on bilateral 
trade flows in ECOWAS, we rely on the empirical application of the gravity 
model discussed in 5.3.1. Our benchmark specification is the following 
augmented gravity equation which incorporates a currency union indicator 
variable given the main focus of this paper upon the trade implications of the 
CFA franc zone: 
𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛(𝑌𝑖𝑌𝑗)𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛(
𝑌𝑖𝑌𝑗
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑗
)𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑡 +
𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽8𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼𝑖𝑗 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡         12 
where 𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the volume of total bilateral trade between country 𝑖 and 𝑗 in year 𝑡, 
𝐶𝐹𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 ,  is a binary variable which is unity if 𝑖 and 𝑗 belong to the CFA franc zone 
in year 𝑡, otherwise 0. 𝑙𝑛(𝑌𝑖𝑌𝑗)𝑡 and 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑌𝑖𝑌𝑗
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑗
) 𝑡 are the logs of the product of 
country pair’s real GDP and real GDP per capita, respectively in each country;87 
𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a binary variable which is unity if country 𝑖 and 𝑗 belong to the same 
regional trade agreement in year 𝑡 and 0 otherwise; 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑡 is nominal exchange 
rate volatility of country 𝑖 and major trading partners 𝑝, measured as the five-
                                                             
86 Technically, time-invariant characteristics of the individual countries are perfectly collinear with the county-pair 
dummies. Moreover, fixed-effects models are designed to study the causes of changes within the region. However, the 
time-invariant characteristic cannot cause such a change, because it is assumed constant for each country (Kohler and 
Kreuter 2012). 
87 Glick and Rose (2002) combines the GDP income and population effect into a GDP per capita variable 
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year standard deviation of annual log differences in the nominal effective 
exchange rate (NEER). 𝐷𝑖𝑗  is a variable representing the geographic distance 
between country 𝑖 and 𝑗; 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑗 is a binary variable which is unity if country 𝑖 and 
𝑗 have a common official language (English or French), and 0 otherwise; 𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑗 is 
a binary variable which is unity if country 𝑖 and 𝑗 share a common border, and 0 
otherwise. We excluded the variable common colonial history because of 
perfect collinearity with the common language dummy. 𝛽𝑖 are nuisance 
coefficients, and 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡  represents the error term. Our specification is in line with 
Glick and Rose (2002) and Cheng and Wall (2005) double index gravity model 
and but with different dependent variables and a different data set. Our main 
interest is the sign of the coefficient 𝛽1, indicating the role of the CFA franc on 
intra-ECOWAS trade. 
As part of the chapter's contribution, we include country-pair fixed effects,  𝛼𝑖𝑗 ; 
year-specific effect λt; and an idiosyncratic effect 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡  to Eq. (12). The error 
component 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡  is assumed to be serially uncorrelated with zero mean and 
independently distributed across destinations. Eq. (12) controls 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖′𝑠 and 
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑗′𝑠 multilateral resistance terms and unobserved factors, including 
potential endogeneity bias through country-pair fixed effects, 𝛼𝑖𝑗. All other 
shocks common to all country pairs such as policy and institutional changes, 
technological progress, business cycles, among others, can be accounted for 
through year fixed effects, λt. Accordingly, the coefficients of each gravity-based 
estimate are thus identified within the country-pair, over-time variation in trade 
flows and the policy variable (Glick and Rose 2002; Gil-Pareja et al. 2014; Mika 
and Zymek 2018).88 Glick (2017) claims that since the within estimator relies 
only upon time-series variation around pair means; it enables researchers to 
answer the policy question of interest: what is the trade effect of a country 
joining a currency union?   
 
                                                             
88 The indication is that pair-dummies only work when there has been significant time variation in the policy whose 
impact one is trying to estimate (Baldwin and Taglioni 2007). In our case, the CFA has been in existence for the entire 
36 years of the research coverage. On the other hand, Glick and Rose (2012) demonstrated that controlling for 
unobserved factors, by inclusion of country-pair fixed effects has a significant impact on results.  
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5.3.3 Endogeneity issues  
One potential econometric concern in estimating the effect of a currency union 
on trade relates to the possibly endogenous nature of the currency union. Thus, 
there is a debate that countries are more likely to join a currency union with 
countries they already have close trade links with (Persson 2001). As a result, 
the decision is unlikely to be purely exogenous. Therefore, trade may have 
’reverse causality’ on currency union, leading to overestimation of the trade 
effect of common currencies.89  
In contrast, the general view is that countries join currency unions because of 
the expanded trade benefits. To avoid biased estimates, one needs to control 
for the endogeneity of the currency union, although there is not a natural 
remedy. The instrumental variables (IV) approach is often used to address this 
problem (Wooldridge 2002; Estevadeordal et al. 2003). However, the usual 
problem with IV techniques is finding an appropriate instrument for the currency 
union that is correlated with the currency union dummy, but not with trade 
(Barro and Tenreyro 2007; Yu 2010; Bacchetta et al. 2012). 
Other studies have applied panel data techniques which include fixed effects to 
control the endogeneity problem due to omitted variable bias (Micco et al. 2003; 
Baier and Bergstrand 2007; Baldwin and Taglioni 2007; Bun and Klaassen 
2007). Precisely, exporter and importer time effects or country-pair dummies 
are incorporated to capture any trade effect caused by reverse causality. 
However, Micco et al. (2003) and Tenreyro and Barro (2003) argue that the use 
of country-pair fixed effects does not eliminate the endogeneity problem, 
because a shift at some point in time in trade volumes may be related to a 
change in the propensity to use a common currency. In spite, the use of the 
fixed effects is considered good econometric practice and reasonable as a test 
for robustness in the recent literature (Frankel 2010).  
In this study, we propose that in the case of the 15 ECOWAS countries in our 
sample the endogeneity problem should be less severe, and so we treat CFA 
                                                             
89 Reverse causality could also arise if unobserved characteristics of trading pairs that facilitate trade are not captured or 
omitted in the regression. For example, compatibility in legal systems, greater cultural links, better infrastructure for 
bilateral transportation, may increase the propensity to share a common currency as well as encourage trade between 
two countries (Barro and Tenreyro 2007). 
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franc zone as an exogenous variable in our analysis for the following reasons. 
In the first place, the creation of the CFA franc zones in 1945 by France and its 
membership was purely for political reasons, and not motivated by extensive 
trade between the member countries.90Secondly, the subsequent conversion of 
the French Franc to the euro in 1999 was an exogenous shock to the countries 
using the CFA Franc (previously linked to the French Franc). The switch to a 
common currency with members of the Eurozone other than France is 
reasonably considered exogenous for this group of African countries (Frankel 
2010). Finally, none of the English-speaking countries in ECOWAS has ever 
joined the currency union even though most share common borders with the 
CFA countries. For instance, Nigeria (a non-CFA country) shares a border with 
two CFA countries (Benin and Niger), and despite the extensive trade between 
them, Nigeria has never joined the monetary union. The same applies to 
countries like Ghana and The Gambia, which are both engulfed by CFA 
member countries and have never joined the union.  
Therefore, we can assume that trade was not the main motivation for countries 
joining the CFA franc zone, and hence, the endogeneity problem should be less 
severe in our study. The argument is consistent with Tenreyro and Barro (2003) 
who found that the large trade effect found previously for currency unions is not 
accurate due to endogeneity bias, and Micco et al. (2003) found no substantial 
increase in trade among EMU countries before joining the monetary union. 
Additionally, the significance of country-pair fixed effects is that it controls for 
potential endogeneity problem due to the omitted variable bias (Micco et al. 
2003; Baier and Bergstrand 2007; Baldwin and Taglioni 2007; Bun and 
Klaassen 2007; Frankel 2010; Head and Mayer 2014). 
 
5.3.4 Data description 
We perform the empirical analysis on a comprehensive data set, constructed 
from several sources. The sample covers all the 15-member countries of the 
                                                             
90. For instance, after independence, Guinea (former French colony) left the CFA zone in 1960 due to a political fallout 
with France. Also, Mali (current WAEMU member) left the CFA zone in 1960 for a similar reason and re-joined in 1984. 
Guinea-Bissau being the only the non-French speaking country and one of the least trading countries within ECOWAS 
joined the CFA in 1997 for political reasons. 
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ECOWAS over the period 1980–2016. We chose the end year because it is the 
most recent one for which full data on trade and other relevant characteristics of 
the ECOWAS countries are available at the time of the analysis. The start date 
is determined by data availability.  
 
Dependent variable: Trade  (𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡) 
The study uses total trade (exports + imports) as a measure of bilateral trade 
(𝑇𝑖𝑗).
91 Total trade is defined as the exports by country 𝑖 to country 𝑗 and the 
imports into country 𝑖 from country 𝑗.  We sourced the trade data from the 
International Monetary Fund's Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTs). Trade data 
are in thousands of US dollars; bilateral exports recorded on FOB (free on 
board) and the imports on CIF (cost including insurance and freight). We deflate 
the nominal exports and imports by the US exports and import price index 
(1995=100), respectively, to obtain the real values following Baldwin and 
Taglioni (2007) and Serlenga and Shin (2007).92  
 
Independent Variables: 
Product of Real GDP (𝑌𝑖 𝑌𝑗)𝑡 and real GDP per Capita (
𝑌𝑖𝑌𝑗
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑗
) 𝑡 
The GDP and GDP per capita in constant US dollars come from the World 
Development Indicators (World Bank).93 We include the product of country 
pair’s real GDP and the real GDP per capita in the gravity equation as a proxy 
for the economic size of the country and potential market size of both exporting 
and importing countries, respectively. The intuition is that the bigger the 
economy; the higher the aggregate potential supply, and the wealthier the 
people, the higher the likely demand for foreign goods, all factors remaining 
constant. Hence, 𝛽2 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽3 in Eq. 12 are expected to be positive.  
                                                             
91 Various trade measures are used in the gravity literature; ranging from exports, imports, exports plus imports, an 
average of exports and imports, average of exports plus imports of i and exports and imports of j.  
92 Other studies have used the US CPI or individual countries GDP deflator to deflate nominal exports and imports 
(Glick and Rose 2002; Micco et al. 2003). Naturally, individual countries GDP deflator is preferred; however, data is not 
available for all the countries considered in the study. Also. we want to keep uniformity. 
93 It is widespread practice to use real GDP instead of nominal GDP as if the gravity equation is based on a demand 
equation instead of an expenditure equation (Baldwin and Taglioni 2006). 
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The product of real GDP at time t, is computed as follows:  
𝑙𝑛(𝑌𝑖 𝑌𝑗)𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑗𝑡  and real GDP per capita at time t, is as follows: 
𝑙𝑛(𝑦𝑖 𝑦𝑗)𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑗𝑡   
Distance (𝐷𝑖𝑗) 
Geographical distances between trading pairs is a measure of trade cost (i.e., 
transportation cost) or barriers to bilateral trade. Bilateral distances are 
computed based on the great circle distance between the capital cities of the 
trading countries. Geographical distance is expected to have a negative effect 
on trade flows. We obtained the data from the GeoDist CEPII distance 
database.94  
Common language (𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑗) and Common Border (𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑗)   
Common language and common border are idiosyncratic characteristics that 
are considered for each pair of countries, as they may represent essential 
enablers to bilateral trade. Countries with a common border are more likely to 
have higher trade volumes since there is a reduction of transaction cost; 
countries speaking the same language or had the same coloniser are 
hypothesised to trade more with each other (cultural similarity). In ECOWAS, 
countries that share a common language do so because of shared colonial links 
in the past. The three common official languages spoken within ECOWAS are: 
English, French and Portuguese. Data came from the GeoDist CEPII distance 
database.   
Regional Trade Agreement (𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡) 
The indicators of the regional trade agreement (RTA) have been built using the 
ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme (ETLS)95. There exist different trade 
agreements, but for this study, we focus on the revised ETLS of 1990, which is 
a component of the ECOWAS economic integration process. Though the impact 
                                                             
94 Available at http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm.  
95 The ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme (ETLS) is the main ECOWAS operational tool for promoting the West 
Africa region as a Free Trade Area. The first category came to existence in 1979 which covered only agricultural, 
artisanal handicrafts and unprocessed products. in 1990, a further agreement included industrial products in the scheme 
(see http://www.etls.ecowas.int/ ).  
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of RTAs on trade is ambiguous (Frankel and Rose 2002), a free trade 
agreement, in general, is expected to boost trade. From a theoretical point of 
view, removal of formal tariff barriers should lead to a significant increase in 
trade flows, and the trading partners could get a variety of benefits ranging from 
more rapid economic growth to increased welfare, at least in the long run 
(Cissokho et al. 2012).  
Exchange rate Volatility (𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖) 
We also consider the impact of nominal exchange rate volatility on regional 
trade. Due to the unavailability of bilateral exchange rate data for the group 
members, we use the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) sourced from 
the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the IMF. We follow Côté (1994) to 
compute exchange rate volatility as the five-year standard deviation of annual 
log differences in the NEER. However, the use of standard deviation (or 
variance) to measure volatility is also subject to criticism, for the skewed 
distribution of the exchange rate (heavy tails). Also, the exchange rate seems to 
be characterised by volatility clustering, which means that successive price 
changes do not seem to be independent (Côté, 1994).  
The standard deviation measure is expressed as: 
𝑉 = √
1
𝑛 − 1
(∑(∆𝑒 − ∆𝑒̅̅ ̅)2
𝑛
𝑖=1
) 
Where n is the number of sub-periods within the period under investigation, ∆𝑒 
is the logarithm of the nominal effective exchange rate change.  We define 
exchange rate volatility between countries 𝑖 and 𝑗 at time 𝑡, as the five-year 
standard deviation of annual log differences in the nominal effective exchange 
rate.  
The conventional view in the literature is that transaction costs and uncertainty 
associated with exchange rate volatility discourage trade flows. Therefore, the 
nominal exchange rate is expected to have a negative relationship with bilateral 
trade flows. However, the empirical evidence is mixed as discussed in Auboin 
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and Ruta (2013). Additionally, we include the real effective exchange rate 
(REER) misalignment for robustness.96 
Common Currency (𝐶𝐹𝐴𝑖𝑗  )   
Following Glick and Rose (2002), we construct our primary variable of interest, 
i.e., currency union indicated as CFA in Eq. (13) to reflect the fact that trading 
countries share a common currency and central bank. In ECOWAS, eight out of 
the fifteen-member countries are already in a currency union (WAEMU) with a 
common currency, the CFA while the remaining countries still have separate 
currencies. Having a single currency reduces the transaction costs of trade 
within member countries, so the impact of a single currency on the ECOWAS 
trade flows is expected to be positive. It is worth mentioning that the CFA is a 
time-variant variable because, for the period under study, two current WAEMU 
members at a point in time were not members of the monetary union. 
Specifically, Mali left the CFA in 1962 and re-joined in 1984, and Guinea Bissau 
joined the CFA, for the first time, in 1997. Table 5.1 present variables definition, 
sources and summary of their expected signs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
96 This was computed in chapter four as the deviation of the actual REER from its long-term or equilibrium value. 
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Table 5.1 Explanatory variables predictions 
Variables Definitions 
Source Expected 
signs 
𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑖 
Log of real total trade (imports + 
exports) 
IMF DOTs 
 
𝐶𝐹𝐴𝑖𝑗 Currency union dummy 
Glick and Rose 
(2002) construction 
of currency union 
+ 
ln (𝑌𝑖𝑌𝑗) 
log of the products of country pair’s 
real GDP 
WDI 
+ 
ln (
𝑌𝑖𝑌𝑗
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑗
) 
log of the products of the partner’s 
real GDP per capita  
WDI 
+/- 
𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗 Regional trade agreement dummy WTO/ETLS  + 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖 Nominal exchange rate volatility IMF IFS - 
 𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑗 Log of distance CEPII database - 
𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑗 Common language dummy CEPII database + 
𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑗 Common border dummy CEPII database + 
𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑗  
Real effective exchange rate 
misalignment 
IMF IFS 
- 
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑗 Trade diversion - + 
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5.4  Results and analysis 
5.4.1 Introduction.   
This section presents and discusses the results of alternative estimation 
procedures employed to estimate the gravity model. In section 5.4.2, we 
produce some preliminary analysis of the dataset and the gravity equation. 
These include summary statistics, unit root testing, dealing with the zero-trade 
flow issues and determining the appropriate model (FE or RE) for the study. 
Section 5.4.3 provides the baseline regression analysis. Besides, we check the 
robustness of our results using the PPML technique on the same explanatory 
variables as the initial gravity specification in section 5.4.4. 
  
5.4.2 Preliminary tests  
i. Summary statistics 
The panel consists of trade data for 15 ECOWAS countries over 37 years 
(1980-2016). Table 5.2 presents the summary statistics for each variable. Also, 
Table 5.3 describes the simple correlations of the variables. As observed, the 
variables are not highly correlated. All the correlation coefficients are below +/-
60%. This demonstrates that collinearity is not an issue here.  
Additionally, a variance inflation factor (vif) test is conducted to ensure that 
multicollinearity is not an issue in the gravity regression. The test results in 
Table 5.4 shows vif values that are less than 5. We can, therefore, conclude 
that collinearity or multicollinearity is not a problem since all the vif values are 
less than 5. Finally, we test for stationarity using Levin et al. (2002) and Im et al. 
(2003) panel unit root tests. The results are presented in Table 5.5. In both 
tests, real trade and nominal exchange rate are both stationary without trend, 
whereas country pair's real GDP and real GDP per capita are both stationary 
with a trend, giving confidence to our analysis.  
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Table 5.2 Summary Statistics 
Variables Obser Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑖 7770 7.654 5.211 0 17.594 
𝐶𝐹𝐴𝑖𝑗 7770 0.229 0.420 0 1 
ln (𝑌𝑖𝑌𝑗) 7770 44.258 2.175 38.697 51.446 
ln (
𝑌𝑖𝑌𝑗
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑗
) 
7770 
12.997 0.807 10.514 15.971 
𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗 7770 - - 0 1 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖 7770 0.063 0.155 0.002 1.646 
 𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑗 7770 6.961 0.724 4.655 8.036 
𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑗 7770 - - 0 1 
𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑗 7770 - - 0 1 
𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑗  7770 0.027 18.604 -85.096 144.855 
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑗 7770 - - 0 1 
Note: Number of observations 7770; Number of groups (pairs) 210; Number of countries 15                                                                                                    
 
Table 5.3 Simple correlation 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(1) 𝐶𝐹𝐴𝑖𝑗 1 
       
  
(2) ln (𝑌𝑖𝑌𝑗) 0.11 1 
      
  
(3) 
ln (
𝑌𝑖𝑌𝑗
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑗
) 
-0.07 0.54 1 
     
  
(4) 𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗 0.08 0.23 0.05 1 
    
  
(5) 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖 -0.16 -0.05 -0.08 -0.19 1 
   
  
(6)  𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑗 -0.04 -0.04 0.1 0.00 -0.03 1 
  
  
(7) 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑗  0.23 0.12 -0.11 0.00 0.02 -0.56 1 
 
  
(8) 𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑗 0.53 0.15 -0.11 0.00 -0.01 0 0.21 1   
(9) 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑗 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 1  
(10) 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑗 -0.56 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.03 -0.51 -0.09 -0.01 1 
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Table 5.4 Table VIF Test Results 
VIF Test 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
𝐶𝐹𝐴𝑖𝑗 1.49 0.670 
ln (𝑌𝑖𝑌𝑗) 1.69 0.591 
ln (
𝑌𝑖𝑌𝑗
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑗
) 
1.59 0.627 
𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗 1.12 0.890 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖 1.09 0.920 
 𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑗 1.5 0.666 
𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑗 1.52 0.659 
𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑗 1.64 0.611 
𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑗 1.00 0.999 
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑗 1.40 0.715 
  
Table 5.5 Panel Unit root tests  
Variables Levin-Lin-Chu Im-Pesaran-Shin Decision 
 Without 
Trend 
With trend Without 
Trend 
With trend  
𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑖 -3.488***        
(0.000) 
- -19.636***        
(0.000) 
- Stationary 
ln (𝑌𝑖𝑌𝑗) 18.076        
(1.000) 
-8.573***        
(0.000) 
43.030        
(1.000) 
-3.492***        
(0.000) 
Stationary 
ln (
𝑌𝑖𝑌𝑗
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑗
) 
5.850 
(1.000) 
-10.200***        
(0.000) 
14.238        
(1.000) 
-4.394***        
(0.000) 
Stationary 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖 -25.600***        
(0.000) 
- -42.009***        
(0.000) 
 Stationary 
Ho: Panels contain unit roots Ha: Panels are stationary. P-values in parentheses.                                                                                     
*, ** and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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ii. Treatment of zero and missing observations 
A descriptive analysis of the data set generated from the International Monetary 
Fund’s Direction of Trade Statistics DOTs indicates that about 25% (i.e., 1936 
out of 7770) of bilateral trade flows are recorded as zero or missing, which have 
the potential to distort results when taking logs, but this is far from unique 
(Linnemann 1966; Haveman and Hummels 2004; Helpman et al. 2008). The 
possible source of zero trade values includes systematic rounding errors 
associated with minimal trade flows, missing observations or actual lack of 
exchange. The empirical trade literature has emphasised the importance of 
dealing with zero trade values, since neglecting the matter may contribute 
misleading inference using the often-preferred log-linearised gravity 
specification.  
One procedure of handling the zero trade is truncating down the observations 
with zero flows and using a log-linear estimation (Linnemann 1966; Frankel et 
al. 1997; Haveman and Hummels 2004; Baier and Bergstrand 2007; Helpman 
et al. 2008). The intuition for this is that these zeros are not informative; 
therefore, they can be dropped (Bacchetta et al. 2012). However, by deleting all 
zero-valued trade flows, valuable information on low levels of trade is left out of 
the model. This may lead to biased results, particularly when these zero-valued 
flows are non-randomly distributed.  
Alternatively, a constant factor - usually positive integer - is added to the zero 
trade values to ensure that the logarithm is well defined (Linders and De Groot 
2006; Silva and Tenreyro 2006; Burger et al. 2009). Though this strand of 
studies has found no significant difference between dropping the zeros and 
including a constant factor, the strategy is regarded as inadequate because the 
constant number added is usually selected arbitrarily with no theoretical 
(Linnemann 1966; Baier and Bergstrand 2007).  
Finally, Silva and Tenreyro (2006) pointed out that even non-linear estimators 
perform weakly in the presence of heteroscedasticity and zero trade flows. The 
authors introduced the PPML estimation technique and highlight that, in the 
presence of heteroscedasticity and zero trade values, the PPML is a robust 
approach and performs better than OLS log-linearised specification. This 
148 
 
approach has been used in several estimations of gravity equations (Silva and 
Tenreyro 2006; Silva and Tenreyro 2010; Westerlund and Wilhelmsson 2011).  
We estimate Eq. (12) – without αij and λt - using various estimation methods, 
such as pooled OLS, fixed effects, and random effects and assess whether a 
significant difference exists in the gravity estimates when we truncate zero trade 
values and when the full sample including zeros are used. The results are 
shown in Table 5.6. In columns 1, 3 and 5, we consider the logarithm of total 
trade between country 𝑖 and 𝑗 using 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑇𝑖𝑗 (i.e., pairs of countries with truncated 
zero trade values). Whereas in columns 2, 4 and 6, the dependent variable is 
the logarithm of total trade between country 𝑖 and 𝑗, 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑇𝑖𝑗 + 1) (where we add 
1 to each trade value).  
According to the results, the estimated coefficients are highly sensitive to the 
treatment of the zeros. For instance, in column 1, the pooled OLS estimated 
coefficient for the currency union is 1.41 when we truncate the zero bilateral 
trade flows and 1.99 when we use the full sample in column 2. The fixed effects 
and random effects estimations also report differences in coefficients between 
the model without zeros and the ones incorporating zero trade values. This 
concurs with Helpman et al. (2008) that the differences in the estimated 
coefficients indicate the existence of bias and inconsistency when we disregard 
zero trade flows. 
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Table 5.6 Gravity regressions with and without zero trade values 
 Pooled OLS  Fixed Effects Random Effects 
 
Dependent variable: 
1              
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑇𝑖𝑗  
2           
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑇𝑖𝑗 + 1) 
3       
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑇𝑖𝑗  
4            
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑇𝑖𝑗 + 1) 
5          
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑇𝑖𝑗  
6      
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑇𝑖𝑗 + 1) 
𝐶𝐹𝐴𝑖𝑗  1.413***       
(.076) 
1.992***      
(.107) 
-.045   
(.162) 
.346*      
(.204) 
.292**   
(.143) 
.765***    
(.184) 
ln (𝑌𝑖𝑌𝑗)  
.818***         
(.017) 
1.085***      
(.022) 
1.257***   
(.066) 
1.545***        
(.096) 
1.072***   
(.046) 
1.288***   
(.062) 
ln (
𝑌𝑖𝑌𝑗
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑗
)  
.405***         
(.045) 
.537***         
(.057) 
-.497***   
(.108) 
-1.178***      
(.146) 
-.196**   
(.083) 
-.670***   
(.108) 
𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗  
-.029          
(.064) 
.713***         
(.082) 
-.120   
(.079) 
.553***          
(.111) 
.0303    
(.064) 
.745***    
(.087) 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖  
-.563**      
(.218) 
-1.414***     
(.248) 
-.024    
(.174) 
-.490**       
(.218) 
-.078      
(.174) 
-.614***   
(.218) 
 𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑗  
-1.074***     
(.045) 
-1.780***    
(.062) 
- - -1.173***   
(.180) 
-1.663***    
(.230) 
𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑗  
.658***         
(.070) 
1.646***      
(.094) 
- - 1.224***   
(.239) 
1.854***   
(.307) 
𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑗  
1.052***       
(.077) 
1.100***      
(.110) 
- - 1.155***   
(.314) 
1.025**   
(.403) 
Intercept -26.028***   
(.677) 
-37.204***   
(.901) 
-40.199***   
(1.826) 
-46.371***   
(2.707) 
-29.065***   
(1.849) 
-31.135***   
(2.465) 
Observations 5834 7770 5834 7770 5834 7770 
Number of groups 
(pairs) 
  210 210 210 210 
𝐴𝑑𝑗 − 𝑅2  
𝑅2: within 
      between 
      overall 
0.56 0.57  
0.20 
0.44 
0.35 
 
0.18 
0.47 
0.38 
 
0.22 
0.68 
0.52 
 
0.18 
0.70 
0.53 
F-Test 914.33*** 1277.66*** 317.64*** 332.58***   
Wald 𝝌𝟐 test (p-value)      2089.11*** 2259.85*** 
MSE 
Rho 
2.123 3.258    
0.496 
 
0.355 
Hausman test (p-
value) 
  0.00 0.00   
Notes: *, ** and *** denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level. Standard errors 
in parenthesis 
 
The above analysis shows how important it is to control zero trade flows in the 
gravity regression. We follow the conventional method (Felbermayr and Kohler 
2006) of adding 1 to all the trade values 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑇𝑖𝑗 + 1). A drawback of this 
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specification is that different results can be generated depending on the 
constant added to actual trade values. 
Moreover, techniques that incorporate zeros may produce biased estimates if 
some trade flows are incorrectly reported as zeros (Head et al. 2010). However, 
ignoring zero trade values could leave out valuable information on low levels of 
trade in practice. Likewise, our sample is a predetermined selection of countries 
instead of a random choice.  
We also estimate the PPML in our sensitivity analysis to verify that our results 
are robust to this specification, whereby in the presence of zero trade values, 
the PPML incorporates the zeros and delivers consistent estimates better than 
OLS log-linearised specification (Silva and Tenreyro 2006; Burger et al. 2009; 
Head et al. 2010; Gómez-Herrera 2013).  
 
iii. Determining the appropriate model (FE or RE)  
The next estimation issue to be addressed is choosing the appropriate 
estimation method for the analysis. As discussed in section 5.3.1, it is essential 
to determine if the country-pair effects in Eq. (12) would be treated as fixed or 
random. As a result, the Hausman (1978) test is performed to test between a 
fixed effect estimator (FE) and random effects estimator (RE) using Eq. (12) 
without αijand λt.  
The null hypothesis of the Hausman specification test is that the regressors and 
unobserved heterogeneity are uncorrelated. When they are not correlated, both 
the RE and FE estimators are consistent, but the RE estimator is efficient. 
However, if they are correlated, the FE estimator is consistent, but the RE 
estimator is not. The Hausman test results strongly reject the null hypothesis of 
no correlation between the individual effects and the explanatory variables 
(𝜒2(8) = 85.59∗). This suggests that the fixed effect is the appropriate model for 
gravity regression.  
Furthermore, we conduct some specification tests for potential problems with 
the panel model before estimating the baseline FE regression.  
151 
 
The modified Wald test for group-wise heteroscedasticity is used to assess the 
potential problems of heteroscedasticity in a simple FE regression. The null 
hypothesis is homoscedasticity (or constant variance). The test results in Box 1 
(see appendix 5A.2) shows that the null is strongly rejected, and we can 
conclude the presence of heteroscedasticity. Also, the Breusch-Pagan / Cook-
Weisberg heteroscedasticity test results (see Box 2. appendix 5A.2)97 suggests 
that the residuals are heteroskedastic.  
As a result, we employ robust standard errors for the fixed effects estimates to 
address the problem of heteroscedasticity. When heteroscedasticity is present, 
robust standard errors tend to be more trustworthy. Also, as mentioned in 
section 5.3.2, the model incorporates country-pair fixed and time effects. The 
significance of fixed effects is that the country-pair dummies are used to control 
for heterogeneity which captures time-invariant (bilateral distance, common 
language and the like), and unobserved country-pair effects. Time dummies 
also control the effect of the business cycle and globalisation. An F-test for the 
inclusion of both time and country-pair fixed effects strongly indicate they are 
jointly significant. F-test results, given by (244, 7520) = 32.53, p value=0.00 
shows that both dummies are jointly significant at the 1% significance level. 
Therefore, the fixed effects regression will include country-pair and time fixed.98 
 
5.4.3 Baseline regression  
This sub-section presents and discuss the baseline results of estimating the 
augmented gravity equation (12). First, the section provides an estimate of the 
CFA franc zone effect on intra-ECOWAS trade for the period 1980-2016 using 
ordinary least squares (OLS) with country-pair and year fixed effects. Although 
the preferred method is the FE, we extend the analysis using pooled OLS 
without country-pair effects in order to estimate time-invariant variables and to 
have a more profound assurance of resilient results under different estimation 
method. 
                                                             
97 Heteroscedasticity causes standard errors to be biased because OLS assumes that errors are both independent and 
identically distributed.  
98 Besides, Baldwin and Taglioni (2007) argue that the time dummies eliminate the bronze mistake (incorrect deflation of 
bilateral trade), and the pair dummies reduce the severity of the gold-medal error by removing the cross-section 
correlation between the omitted and P terms and the included variables.    
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i. Fixed effects 
Table 5.7 presents the benchmark estimation outcomes of Eq. (12) using 
ordinary least squares and employing country-pair or/and year fixed effects, 
identified in the within-dimension. The country-pair fixed effects to control for 
each trading partner's multilateral resistance factor or unobserved bilateral 
heterogeneity as suggested in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), and year 
fixed effects added to correct for common shocks and trends. Observations in 
the sample are clustered across different periods by the trading countries’ pairs, 
and thereby all time-invariant pair specific variables such as geographical 
factors are now absorbed into the pair fixed effects. Standard errors of 
estimates are robust to heteroscedasticity and correlation of error terms within 
country-pairs. The gravity equation fits the data well based on the 𝑅2  values 
reported in Table 5.7. In column 1, the regression model accounts for 79% of 
the variance in bilateral trade flows in ECOWAS. Likewise, in columns 2-4, the 
regression models explain 74% of the variations in bilateral trade flows, 
respectively. 
The first column of Table 5.7 reports regression estimates using the logarithm of 
the total bilateral trade (where we truncate pairs of countries with zero bilateral 
trade flows) as the dependent variable. Regarding the variable of interest, the 
CFA franc zone, we find an estimated coefficient that is positive (0.12) but 
statistically insignificant at conventional levels. The coefficients of real GDP and 
real GDP per capita are statistically significant, with elasticities of 1.71 and -
1.103, respectively. The estimated coefficient of RTA is negative (-1.71) and 
statistically significant, whereas nominal exchange rate volatility is statistically 
insignificant. This outcome is not unexpected due to omitting zero trade values. 
The estimation uses the sample of countries with real trade volumes between 
them for the sake of log-linear estimations. As noted in section 5.4.2, about a 
quarter of bilateral trade flows are recorded as zero or missing in our data set. 
Therefore, disregarding or deleting all the zero trade values may produce 
biased estimates as reiterated in Helpman et al. (2008). In particular, this could 
leave out valuable information on the low levels of trade within the ECOWAS.  
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Consequently, we proceed by employing the conventional method of adding a 
constant (here we use 1) to all the trade values to utilise the full sample 
including zero trade flows in a log-linear estimation (see section 5.4.2 for a 
detailed discussion). Column 2 of Table 5.7 contains the regression results with 
country-pair fixed effects (but no year effects) and using the logarithm of 
bilateral trade, including zero trade flows as the dependent variable. The results 
show that the estimated coefficients, overall, are economically and statistically 
significant. The estimated coefficient of the CFA is positive, with the elasticity of 
(0.35) and statistically significant. The coefficient implies that CFA franc zone 
(WAEMU) members on average trade about 42%  (𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑏𝑦 (𝑒0.35 − 1) ∗ 100) 
more with each other than non-members with independent currencies within 
ECOWAS, holding other factors constant. This modest coefficient is somewhat 
consistent with the recent literature position of a modest trade effect of single 
currencies when country fixed effects are taken into consideration (Baldwin and 
Taglioni 2007; Baldwin et al. 2008; Silva and Tenreyro 2010; Chen and Novy 
2017). 
Concerning the estimates of the other gravity variables; first, the results show 
that the joint real GDP of country 𝑖 and country 𝑗 significantly increase bilateral 
trade. Consistent with the gravity equation assumption that economically larger 
countries trade proportionately more among themselves. Moreover, this is 
coherent with the trade pattern in ECOWAS discussed in chapter 3, where the 
four largest (per GDP) members account for more than 70% of the total regional 
trade in most period under study. Ajayi (2005) suggests that the dominance of 
these countries means that trade activities within the region rely heavily on their 
economic performance. As a result, development in the core countries will 
deliver more of an impact on intraregional trade than policies adopted by the 
smaller member countries.  
In contrast, an increase in joint real GDP per capita reduces bilateral trade 
against intuition. The estimated coefficient of regional trade agreements (RTA) 
is positive (0.55) and statistically significant. The suggestion is that the 
ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme (ETLS), which was revised in 1990 to 
include manufacturing products in the free trade agreement scheme, has 
promoted regional trade flows, suggesting that the ETLS has contributed to the 
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removal of some trade barriers in ECOWAS. Finally, the estimated coefficient of 
nominal exchange rate volatility is negative (-0.49) and statistically significant. 
The indication is that exchange rate volatility reduces bilateral trade in 
ECOWAS, supporting the conventional view that uncertainty and transaction 
costs associated with the floating exchange rate discourage trade flows.  
We now introduce year fixed effects in our regression to account for all other 
shocks and trends common to all country pairs in addition to country-pair fixed 
effects in column 3. Mátyás (1997) suggests that shocks common to trading 
pairs such as policy and institutional changes, technological progress or 
business cycles can affect the pattern of trade flows. In comparison to column 
2, the estimated coefficients increase marginally but remain statistically 
significant except for the regional trade agreements and nominal exchange rate 
volatility. The point estimate of the CFA franc effect rises to 0.47 (60%), but still 
lower than the 0.72 found in Glick and Rose (2016) using a similar method, but 
somewhat different CFA member countries.99 On the other hand, the effect is 
somewhat bigger than Nitsch (2004) and Carrère (2004) comparable estimate 
of 55% and 51% trade increase for the CFA franc member in West Africa, 
respectively using different specifications.  
Other noteworthy findings in column 3 show that an increase in real GDP 
promotes bilateral trade, whereas an increase in real GDP per capita reduces 
bilateral trade flows. This is counterintuitive. However, as explained in section 
5.3.4, the real GDP per capita in the gravity equation is a proxy that measures a 
country’s standard of living, or it tells how prosperous citizens of a country are. 
The negative coefficient suggests that the wealthier the citizens of these 
countries are, the higher the demand for foreign goods, all factors remaining 
constant. Most of these foreign goods are frequently imported from the 
developed countries such as European countries and U.S. than within the bloc. 
This typifies the stylised facts presented in chapter three where trade within 
ECOWAS is very low. Awa (2015) termed such an adverse effect on trade flows 
are trade resisting.  
                                                             
99 Glick and Rose (2016) estimate trade elasticity of 0.72, for the CFA Franc zone when they dis-aggregated the 
currency unions’ effect of various currency unions in dyadic fixed-effects estimation.  
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Interestingly, the estimated coefficient of regional trade agreements (RTA) is 
statistically insignificant. This result is unexpected because the ETLS has partly 
contributed to the removal of some trade barriers in ECOWAS; however, as 
remarked in the literature the impact of RTAs on trade is ambiguous (Frankel 
and Rose 2002). Finally, the estimated coefficient of nominal exchange rate 
volatility is also statistically insignificant, but this finding is not unique given 
there is no consensus regarding exchange rate volatility on trade (Auboin and 
Ruta 2013).  
Consequently, in column 4 we consider a specification that replaces nominal 
exchange rate volatility  𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖   with REER misalignment, 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑖. 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑖 is the 
deviation of the actual REER from the equilibrium REER. As observed, the 
estimated coefficient of CFA remains almost the same (0.466) after including 
𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑖 and dropping 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖, which provides a pragmatic justification for our 
estimates. Moreover, the estimated coefficients of the remaining gravity 
variables do not change substantially in sign and significance. We find a 
positive (0.004) and statistically significant coefficient for 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑖, suggesting that 
periods of REER undervaluation contributed positively to intra-ECOWAS trade, 
though the effect is moderate.  
Finally, comparing the coefficient of CFA in column 1 with columns 2, 3 and 4 of 
Table 5.7, we can conclude that using the CFA franc as a common currency 
has furthered bilateral trade among members. Specifically, based on our 
preferred specification – including country-pair fixed effects, time fixed effects 
and controlling for zero trade flows -, we find that on average CFA franc 
members’ trade approximately 60% within the union relative to the non-member 
countries with independent currencies in ECOWAS, holding other factors 
constant. These findings demonstrate that common currency has the potential 
to improve ECOWAS intra-regional trade such that its ability to form a regional 
monetary union in the future could in part increase trade among the member 
countries.   
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Table 5.7 Baseline gravity results 
Estimation Country-pair fixed effects  Pooled OLS 
 1 (0’s) 2 3 4 5 6 
𝐶𝐹𝐴𝑖𝑗  .121    
(.166) 
.346* 
(.208) 
.471**   
(.211) 
.466**   
(.210) 
2.026***   
(.106) 
2.343***   
(.118) 
ln (𝑌𝑖𝑌𝑗)  
1.706***    
(.336) 
1.545*** 
(.096) 
2.193***   
(.413) 
2.165***   
(.413) 
1.090***   
(.021) 
1.063***   
(.022) 
ln (
𝑌𝑖𝑌𝑗
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑗
)  
-1.103***   
(.358) 
-1.178*** 
(.158) 
-1.854***  
(.416) 
-1.828***   
(.416) 
.588***    
(.060) 
.653***   
(.061) 
𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗  
-1.711**    
(.708) 
.553*** 
(.099) 
-.100  
(.875) 
-.116   
(.873) 
1.431***   
(.350) 
1.423***   
(.349) 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖  
.172   
(.193) 
-.490* 
(.275) 
-.177   
(.277) 
- -1.331***   
(.284) 
-1.146***   
(.288) 
 𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑗  
- - - - -1.785***   
(.061) 
-1.819***    
(.062) 
𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑗  
- - - - 1.637***   
(.098) 
1.837***   
(.107) 
𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑗  
- - - - 1.097***   
(.109) 
1.035***   
(.109) 
𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑗  
- - - .004**   
(.001) 
- - 
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑗  
- - - - - .579***   
(.106) 
Intercept -52.214***   
(10.245) 
-45.776*** 
(2.694) 
-65.890*** 
(12.969) 
-64.927***   
(12.955) 
-38.753***   
(1.024) 
-38.603***   
(1.019) 
Observations 5834 7770 7770 7770 7770 7770 
Number of groups (pairs)  210 210 210   
Time Effect YES NO YES YES YES YES 
Country-pair fixed effects YES YES YES YES NO NO 
𝑅2  0.79 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.57 0.57 
F-Test 
RMSE 
256.02* 
1.508 
299.85* 
2.584 
250.82* 
2.569 
252.62* 
2.568 
365.08* 
3.245 
360.45* 
3.238 
Notes: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. The dependent variable is the log of real 
trade 𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝑖𝑗 ) in column 1 and 𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝑖𝑗 + 1) in columns 2-6.   
 
5.4.4 Pooled OLS  
As we observed in columns 1-4 of Table 5.7, the country-pair fixed effects 
automatically drop all the time-invariant variables in the estimation because of 
perfect multi-collinearity. However, time-invariant variables such as distance, 
common language, are hypothesised to be important in understanding the trade 
pattern within ECOWAS. To ameliorate this problem, we extend the analysis 
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using pooled OLS without country pair effects to incorporate all the time-
invariant variables. Before, explaining the pooled OLS regression output, it is 
worthy to note that the regression model accounts for 57% of the variance in 
bilateral trade flow in ECOWAS in columns 5 and 6. The fall in the 𝑅2 value 
relative to those reported in columns 1-4 could be explained by the exclusion of 
country-pair effects in the pooled OLS estimation. Now, we explain the pooled 
OLS regression results reported in columns 5-6 of Table 5.7.    
In column 5, we estimate the gravity equation, including year effects and find a 
positive and statistically significant coefficient of 2.03 for the CFA. As expected, 
most of the traditional gravity variables have the expected sign and are 
statistically significant and yield plausible elasticities broadly in line with those 
obtained in the gravity literature. Both the joint real GDP and real GDP per 
capita of countries 𝑖 and 𝑗 significantly increase bilateral trade, belonging to a 
regional trade agreement or free trade area has a positive effect on regional 
trade, while exchange rate volatility of country 𝑖 against a trading partner lowers 
bilateral trade. The estimated coefficient of distance is negative and statistically 
significant, consistent with our a priori expectations. The indication is that long-
distance reduces market preference because they are increasingly costly to 
serve. The other variables - shared border and common language - increase 
bilateral trade, and all estimates are statistically significant. The result agrees 
with Hulej et al. (2006) argument that neighbouring countries tend to trade more 
with each other due to the weak transportation links between many West 
African countries. Likewise, the common language shows an apparent 
concentration of intra-language-zone trade, proving the significant impact of the 
two widely spoken official languages (English and French) in the region.  
Finally, in column 6, we investigate the possibility that the stimulus to trade 
among WAEMU members comes at the expense of trade with non-members as 
a form of trade diversion (Balassa 1967), whereby currency unions are trade 
creating if trade increases among members without reducing trade with non-
members. Likewise, they are trade diverting if increased intra-union trade 
decreases trade with the non-members. To test this conjecture empirically, we 
define a dummy variable trade diversion that takes the value of 1 if either, 
country 𝑖 or country 𝑗 (but not both) belongs to WAEMU, otherwise 0 if both 𝑖 
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and 𝑗 are in a currency union or both are not in a currency union with any other 
country.  
The estimated coefficient of trade diversion is positive and statistically 
significant; suggesting that overall, there is a considerable trade creating effect 
in WAEMU. Thus, on average the WAEMU appear facilitating trade creation 
since its formation in 1994. This finding is consistent with Carrère (2004) 
arguing that the convertibility regime of the CFA franc lowers the risk of trade 
diversion since it makes a transaction with the rest of the world more accessible 
and safer as France guarantees convertibility.100 Similarly, Musila (2005) 
reported that the intensity of trade creation is higher in the ECOWAS region 
than other regional blocs in Africa. The estimated coefficients for each of the 
remaining explanatory variables carry the expected sign and are statistically 
significant, with magnitudes almost the same as in column 5. The point estimate 
on currency union, however, is 2.34, higher than that of column 5. The 
suggestion is that membership of Franc zone trade about six times greater than 
that of other pairs in West Africa.  
In summary, membership of the CFA franc zone increases bilateral trade 
among the members with elasticities that vary between 2.03 and 2.34. These 
estimates are economically large and are therefore consistent with the 
hypothesis that the OLS estimates suffer from an upward ability bias (Persson 
2001). Conversely, we observed that controlling for unobserved factors affecting 
trade between country pairs through country-pair and year fixed effects in 
column 3 (see Table 5.7) generally reduces the estimated impacts of CFA franc 
zone on bilateral trade. Therefore, based on the best specification – including 
country-pair and time fixed effects and controlling for zero trade flows -, we 
conclude that on average the CFA franc members’ trade approximately 60% 
within the union relative to the non-member countries with independent 
currencies in ECOWAS, holding other factors constant.   
 
                                                             
100 Through the establishment, by the central bank in CFA franc zone, of an operating account with an –in principle-
unlimited overdraft facility for each central bank. 
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5.4.5 Sensitivity analysis 
Recent studies (Silva and Tenreyro 2006; Helpman et al. 2008; Siliverstovs and 
Schumacher 2009; Silva and Tenreyro 2010; Westerlund and Wilhelmsson 
2011) have indicated that OLS estimates can cause severe bias due to zero 
trade flows across trading partners. Consequently, Silva and Tenreyro (2006) 
proposed the PPML estimation as consistent and unbiased in the presence of 
heteroscedasticity while allowing observations with zero-valued trade flows. 
Hence, we determine whether our main finding of the CFA franc effect is robust 
using the PPML technique on the same explanatory variables in the gravity 
specification. The results are reported in Table 5.8. First, to assess the impact 
of zero trade flows on our estimates, we provide PPML estimates of our 
coefficients with zero-valued trade flow excluded in column 1, we then report 
PPML estimates based on all available observations in columns 2-3. The 
dependent variable is the total bilateral trade in levels. One significant feature of 
the PPML method is that it allows for easy incorporation of variables with zeros. 
Further, the estimated models in columns 1-2 and 3 explain about 69% and 
70% of the variance in the bilateral trade. The high Pseudo 𝑅2 values give 
confidence to the results reported in Table 5.8.  
As shown in Table 5.8, the magnitude of the PPML estimates tends to be lower 
compared to the OLS estimates in Table 5.7 - this is in line with Silva and 
Tenreyro (2006) and Siliverstovs and Schumacher (2009) - with most of the 
basic gravity model variables being statistically significant with expected signs. 
Crucially, the estimated coefficient of the CFA franc effect on trade remains 
significant and positive; however, the magnitude of the PPML estimation is 
larger than the fixed effects estimates found in Table 5.7. The indication is that 
CFA Franc member countries on average trade about 226% more among 
themselves than the non-WAEMU countries in ECOWAS. This estimate is 
implausibly high. This could be associated with not using fixed-effect Poisson 
estimation. Going forward, this would be considered in future research to 
determine if the size of the coefficient will reduce. 
On the other hand, the coefficients of real GDP and real GDP per capita are 
positive and statistically significant; however, the estimated coefficients are less 
160 
 
than 1 and relatively less than the coefficients of the POLS and fixed effects. 
Silva and Tenreyro (2006) noted that the PPML estimation reduces the 
coefficients of the real GDP and real GDP per capita, and are not always close 
to 1 as seen in most traditional estimates. The RTA shows a moderately 
positive effect on bilateral trade flows, while exchange rate volatility negatively 
impacts trade flows. Furthermore, the results suggest a significantly negative, 
though moderate effect, of distance on bilateral trade. Trading partners sharing 
a common land border have a positive and significant effect on bilateral trade. 
On this occasion, however, the effect of speaking a common language on trade 
is not statistically significant. This contrasts with the conventional view in the 
literature that countries speaking the same language tend to trade more 
Column 2 of Table 5.8 reports the PPML estimation for the sample with zero 
trade values. Except for the estimated coefficient of the common language 
(which is statistically insignificant), all the estimated coefficients show the 
expected sign and are statistically significant at conventional levels. Consistent 
with Silva and Tenreyro (2006), the PPML estimation shows the lowest 
disparities in the magnitudes of the coefficients from the observations with 
positive trade values (column 1) and using full observations including zeros in 
column 2. We observed a similar pattern for our variable of interest, CFA franc, 
and the other control variables, where the estimated coefficients marginally 
increase. We also experimented by using PPML with year effects, and the 
results remained virtually unchanged in column 3. We checked the adequacy of 
the estimated models by performing a heteroscedasticity-robust RESET test 
(Ramsey 1969) following Silva and Tenreyro (2006). The models estimated 
using the Poisson regressions pass the RESET test, indicating no evidence of 
misspecification of the gravity equations estimated using the PPML. 
Furthermore, the Pseudo 𝑅2 in column 1, 2 and 3 are 0.66, 0.69 and 0.7, 
respectively.  
In conclusion, consistent with the estimates in Table 5.7 and 5.8, CFA franc is 
found to increase bilateral trade among the WAEMU members. However, 
controlling for zero trade flows and unobserved factors affecting trade between 
country pairs through country-pair and year fixed effects in column 3 of Table 
5.7, the estimated impacts of CFA franc on bilateral trade is not unusually high 
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relative to estimates in columns 5-6 in Table 5.7 and columns 1-3 in Table 5.8. 
This corresponds with Persson (2001) argument that estimates suffer an 
upward ability bias if unobserved factors affecting trade between country pairs 
are not considered. Therefore, based on the best specification – including 
country-pair and time fixed effects and controlling for zero trade flows – in Table 
5.7, we conclude that on average the CFA franc raised bilateral trade among 
members by 60% relative to the non-members within ECOWAS, holding other 
factors constant.   
Table 5.8 Sensitivity analysis  
Estimation PPML 
Variable 1 (no 0s) 2 3 
𝐶𝐹𝐴𝑖𝑗  1.116***   
(.105) 
1.225***   
(.106) 
1.295*** 
(.112) 
ln (𝑌𝑖𝑌𝑗)  .645***   
(.028) 
.673***    
(.028) 
.682*** 
(.031) 
ln (
𝑌𝑖𝑌𝑗
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑗
)  .443***   
(.048) 
.430***  
(.048) 
.499*** 
(.049) 
𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗  .163**   
(.068) 
.1666**     
(.070) 
.003 
(.266) 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖  -.885**   
(.453) 
-.944**   
(.458) 
-.748*   
(.399) 
 ln (𝐷𝑖𝑗)  -.092**   
(.043) 
-.126***   
(.044) 
-.113**   
(.045) 
𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑗  .073    
(.095) 
.082    
(.096) 
-.076 
(.089) 
𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑗  .678***   
(.066) 
.681***  
(.067) 
.728*** 
(.065) 
Intercept -23.513***     
(1.390) 
-24.566***   
(1.374) 
-26.395***   
(1.698) 
Observations 5834 7770 7770 
Time Effects NO NO YES 
Pseudo 𝑅2 0.66 0.69 0.70 
Wald 𝜒2 test (p-vlue) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
RESET test p-values 0.5329 0.6444 0.257 
Notes: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.                                                                                              
The dependent variable is real bilateral trade (𝑇𝑖𝑗) in levels  
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5.5  Chapter Summary   
This chapter evaluates the effect of the CFA franc zone on bilateral trade in 
ECOWAS. Within ECOWAS, there are two currency arrangements; the CFA 
franc- having a shared central bank and a common currency pegged to the 
French franc (now euro) since the members attained independence in the 
1960s- and the WAMZ with separate national currencies but in the process of 
establishing a common currency. The aim was to investigate whether sharing a 
common currency augments bilateral trade for the West Africa CFA zone 
members to support the quest for a broader ECOWAS currency union. 
The chapter, therefore, estimates the effect of the CFA franc on bilateral trade 
in ECOWAS using recent developments in the econometric analysis of the 
gravity equations and a panel of annual data that covers the 15-member 
countries of ECOWAS for the period 1980-2016. While different econometric 
methodologies deliver different results, after controlling for unobserved factors 
using country-pair fixed effects and year fixed effects, and taking account of 
zero trade values, we find that membership of the CFA franc has promoted 
bilateral trade among members by 60%. This result is somewhat consistent with 
recent literature that generally finds modest currency union trade generating 
effects, in contrast to Rose (2000). The reason is that the estimate is for a 
monetary union where for historical reasons, membership is exogenous, and in 
which we controlled for treatment effects. These contributions might explain 
differences in the CFA franc effect on bilateral trade in previous studies.  
Furthermore, the PPML estimation, produced consistent and unbiased 
estimates in the presence of heteroscedasticity reinforcing the positive CFA 
franc trade effect. Not only has there been a positive CFA franc effect on 
bilateral trade in ECOWAS, but we also find a significant trade creating effect 
instead of trade diverting in the zone. The findings help to evaluate the potential 
trade benefits of a full ECOWAS currency union. There may be a host of 
political and economic reasons why the ECOWAS authorities wish to introduce 
a common currency. However, based on our evidence, we can argue that there 
is a potential acceleration of intra-regional trade with a common currency. In 
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effect, the potential trade creation associated with a common currency is a 
helpful guide for the ECOWAS deep integration agenda. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusions, policy implications, and 
future work 
6.1 Conclusions 
This thesis provided an assessment of monetary integration in the West African 
Monetary Zone (WAMZ) to inform policy about the feasibility and economic 
implications of this arrangement. The motivation of the thesis emanated from 
the assertion in some papers that monetary union could spur macroeconomic 
integration and economic growth amongst these countries (Cobham and 
Robson 1997; Debrun et al. 2005; Fielding and Shields 2005; Tsangarides and 
Qureshi 2008; Ekpo and Udoh 2014). Specifically, currency unification provides 
a possible solution in generating opportunities to exploit economies of scale in 
production and trade, promote regional stability and guarantee the groups 
influence in international negotiations (Fielding and Shields 2005; Masson and 
Pattillo 2005; Masson 2008; Oshikoya 2010; Robson 2010).  
Nonetheless, monetary integration is a long-standing facet of policy and 
development strategy in West Africa. The reasons include: (1) most of the 
economies in West Africa have been characterised by exchange rate instability, 
financial fragility, high inflation and low intra-regional trade since the countries 
gained independence in the 1950s and 1970s (2) The economically small size 
and respective small national markets of most of the countries represent severe 
constraints on their autonomous development. 
The WAMZ was formed in 2000 by the Heads of State of five West African 
countries (The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone) - all former 
British colonies except Guinea - in Accra, Ghana. Liberia later acceded to the 
WAMZ Agreement in 2010 and became the sixth member of the WAMZ. The 
intention is for WAMZ to integrate with the existing monetary union, the 
Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU); and establish a common currency for 
the 15 ECOWAS members in 2020. Consequently, a prospective ECOWAS 
monetary union is decisive on the success or not of WAMZ.  
The OCA literature stipulates that participating in monetary union invariably 
entail the loss of members’ autonomy over national monetary policy instruments 
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to stabilise the country-specific macroeconomic shocks (Mundell 1961). 
However, the new OCA literature focuses on the potential benefits. First, joining 
a monetary union is accompanied by the adoption of a more efficient and 
credible monetary practice (Barro and Gordon 1983; Giavazzi and Giovannini 
1989; Beetsma and Giuliodori 2010). Second, by eliminating exchange rate 
risks and transaction costs, a common currency can spur trade and business 
cycle synchronisation (Frankel and Rose 1998; Rose 2000; Frankel and Rose 
2002; Baldwin et al. 2008; Tavlas 2009). The thesis provides a comprehensive 
review of the OCA literature in Chapter 2.  
Therefore, the main goal of the thesis is to contribute to the key issues of the 
cost and benefit of monetary integration in WAMZ that has not been sufficiently 
done in the existing literature. Specifically, drawing on the extant literature on 
monetary integration, as well as on the Eurozone experiences, this thesis 
examines the economic conditions for monetary integration and the potential 
trade beneﬁt associated with a common currency, since the issue has not been 
sufficiently considered. The findings could inform policy about the implications 
of currency unification in the region.  
The thesis is divided into three research themes and addresses the two main 
research questions. Chapter 3 argues that an evaluation of West African history 
and its relations with the development of monetary integration from the pre-
colonial era to the present day is useful to offer an understanding of the present 
monetary integration arrangements in West Africa. A review of the West 
African’s past suggests that, before European contact, common currencies such 
as the cowries and gold existed, although their use was frequently limited to 
certain types of transactions or specific groups of people. The economic 
structure was sustained by the kingdoms and cultures of West Africans that 
were relatively well integrated in precolonial times. The establishment of 
European rule during the colonial era transformed the monetary systems, 
resulting in the pace and intensity of commercial activity in West Africa. Thus, 
the authorities took steps to standardised currencies within the sub-region by 
promoting (or imposing) single currency. The two main currencies were the 
West African Shilling for the British colonies and the CFA Franc for the French 
colonies. Accordingly, these common currencies enabled deep international 
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trade between the West African colonies and the West, at the expense of intra-
West African trade.  
After independence, most of the Francophone countries continued to keep the 
single currency while the Anglophone countries abandoned the West African 
Currency Board (WACB), creating unstable and non-convertible national 
currencies. Whereas the action of the Anglophone countries has contributed to 
the low intra West African trade, the chapter argues that a common currency 
would not adequately address the recurrent low intra-West African trade 
because of the direction of trade amongst these countries; continental focused. 
The discussion in chapter 3 adds weight to the argument supporting structural 
transformation and export diversification as critical for improving intra-regional 
trade. 
Chapter four focuses on one of the main issues in the debate of the monetary 
union in the WAMZ, the degree of asymmetry in macroeconomic shocks; 
whether they differ across these countries. The analysis is vital to evaluate the 
suitability of these countries for a monetary union. Furthermore, to avoid 
asymmetric response from common monetary policy, WAMZ countries must 
achieve symmetric macroeconomic shocks with the rest of the union before 
upscaling to a full monetary union. Therefore, this chapter provides a 
contemporary examination of the degree of asymmetry by assessing the 
behaviour of the real effective exchange rates (REER) across WAMZ countries. 
Providing evidence on REER behaviour among prospective monetary union 
candidates would suggest the degree of the potential costs of giving up 
monetary policy autonomy.  
First, the findings show that the long-run behaviour of the REERs can be 
explained by changes in productivity differentials, terms of trade, the real price 
of oil, government consumption and trade openness across WAMZ countries. 
However, the Johansen cointegration analysis shows significant cross-country 
differences in the reaction of the members REER to changes in the common set 
of fundamentals. Also, the country-specific VECM results show that the 
existence of REER means reversion in 3 countries, but the speed of adjustment 
varies across candidate countries, suggesting differences in the persistence of 
167 
 
shocks to REER. The derived REER misalignments suggest that before 2007 
the REERs of WAMZ members experienced high divergence from equilibrium, 
but the degree of an individual country’s misalignment and between countries 
appears to be diminishing; in other words, there is a convergence towards the 
equilibrium since 2007.  
Second, the chapter examines REER responses to shocks in exchange rate 
determinants for the group. Oil price, supply and demand shocks are identified 
using long-run restrictions in a structural VAR model. In the case of the OCA 
theory, the prevalence of external shocks (such as the price of oil) may justify 
common monetary policy within the region. The chapter reports significant 
differences in the response of REER to real oil price, productivity (supply) and 
demands preference shocks across these economies using the impulse 
response analysis. Besides the relative contribution of these shocks to REER 
movements in the short and long run appears to be different across economies 
from the variance decomposition analysis.  
In summary, the key evidence reported from VECM, impulse response, and 
variance decomposition analysis points to heterogeneous economies; the five 
economies are structurally different or asymmetric. The findings imply that a 
common monetary policy for the group would yield asymmetric responses. The 
presence of large idiosyncratic shocks implies the need for different policy 
responses to adjust to macroeconomic shocks. The evidence provided 
strengthens the case for policy autonomy in the region and is consistent with 
previous studies showing considerable economic divergences amongst WAMZ 
countries as the main constraint to monetary union. This is consistent with 
previous studies that have suggested considerable economic divergences 
amongst WAMZ countries as a constraint to the proposed monetary union.  
Chapter 5 evaluates the effect of the CFA franc zone on bilateral trade in 
ECOWAS. Within ECOWAS, there are two monetary arrangements; the CFA 
franc- having a shared central bank and a common currency pegged to the 
French franc (now euro) since the members attained independence in the 
1960s- and the WAMZ with separate national currencies but in the process of 
establishing a common currency. The main aim of the chapter is to demonstrate 
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whether sharing a common currency augments bilateral trade to underpin the 
quest for a broader currency union in West Africa. 
Therefore, the chapter estimates the effect of the CFA franc on bilateral trade 
using recent developments in the econometric analysis of the gravity equations 
and a panel of annual data that covers the 15-member countries of ECOWAS 
for the period 1980-2016. While different econometric methodologies deliver 
different results, after controlling for unobserved factors using country-pair fixed 
effects and year fixed effects, and taking account of zero trade values, we find 
that membership of the CFA franc has promoted bilateral trade among 
members by 60%. Furthermore, Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) 
estimation, producing consistent and unbiased estimates in the presence of 
heteroscedasticity reinforced the positive CFA franc trade effect. Not only has 
there been a positive CFA franc effect on bilateral trade, but we also find a 
significant trade creating effect instead of trade diverting in the zone.  
The overarching conclusion from the extensive analyses carried out in this 
thesis can be summarised in two main themes: asymmetric shocks are 
inevitable because of structural economic differences, but this could be 
compensated with the potential trade increase. 
 
6.2  Policy implications 
The findings of this thesis have important policy implications. These can be 
categorised into two main themes: the cost and benefits of monetary integration 
in WAMZ. Whereas chapter 4 provides the relative costs associated with 
surrendering sovereign monetary policy autonomy to a supranational 
organisation, chapter 5 highlights the potential trade benefit from a common 
currency.  
Before, chapter 3 demonstrates that WAMZ authorities could reflect on good 
historical practices for the current currency union arrangement. This would 
require political commitment to give up sovereignty for a regional administration 
system akin to what existed in the pre-independence era. Furthermore, some 
current ECOWAS institutions could be used to facilitate the harmonisation of 
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institutions in order to strengthen the integration process. On the other hand, 
the thesis argues, based on the historical and contemporaneous accounts that 
a common currency would not adequately address the recurrent low intra-West 
African trade unless other simultaneous policies are acted out to alter the focal 
point of the trade from continental to regional concentration.  
Chapter 4 infers essential policy implications about whether membership of the 
monetary union is feasible for the WAMZ countries. Precisely, whether the 
potential cost of giving up independent monetary policy autonomy is minimised 
with symmetric macroeconomic shocks. The chapter reports that the relative 
significant impact of common fundamentals on REER is different across 
economies suggesting lack of macroeconomic policy coordination in WAMZ.  
Also, the chapter highlights that oil price, productivity and demand shocks are 
asymmetric across the countries. The suggestion is that in the presence of 
asymmetric shocks, a common monetary response would not be adequate, 
constraining the monetary union bind. Countries will be tempted to react by 
implementing structural adjustments designed to improve competitiveness. In 
these economies, exports have been the principal source of economic growth in 
WAMZ and the sector is hardly diversified, making these countries particularly 
vulnerable to increased competition. It would appear based on the findings that 
a common policy would not suffice across these countries; strengthening the 
case for policy autonomy in the region. 
Notwithstanding, there is a case for a monetary union, but it is indispensable 
that authorities appreciate the potential asymmetries from common policies and 
shocks. To avoid asymmetric responses from policy changes the following 
policy recommendations can be made:  
• WAMZ members with similar structural shocks with some WAEMU 
countries could join the existing monetary union.  
• Structural transformation and economic diversification are crucial to 
achieving convergence among these countries. This requires scaling up 
toward activities with higher technology (at least small-scale 
manufacturing), which can transform the raw materials and primary 
commodities efficiently into manufactured goods would yield significant 
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dividends regionally (Rodrik 2008; Stiglitz and Greenwald 2014; Guzman 
et al. 2018). This concurs with Kenen (1969) that the more diversified an 
economy is, the less vulnerable it is to sector-specific shocks, and the 
smaller is the stabilisation cost of joining a monetary union.  
• Moving forward, a political commitment by members to establish 
adequate adjustment mechanisms, for instance, a unified budget, which 
automatically redistributes from countries or regions experiencing a 
strong economy to those suffering from a recession would be an 
appropriate shock absorber. The fiscal transfer system can be an 
important tool to redistribute funds to cushion individual countries or 
regions affected by an adverse asymmetric shock (Baimbridge and 
Whyman 2015). This is against the backdrop that the absence of nominal 
exchange rate adjustments, labour mobility is unlikely to facilitate the 
adjustment process. Fiscal transfers are part of a non-market based 
adjustment process (Tavlas 1993). Consequently, fiscal harmonisation 
would require an advanced degree of political integration and willingness 
to undertake such risk-sharing. This calls for the need for political or 
fiscal unions. The importance of fiscal adjustment mechanisms is 
demonstrated by the US economy, which has a highly federal fiscal 
system that contributes to regional stabilisation in the case of asymmetric 
shocks  
• Finally, member countries ought to increase both political and economic 
commitments towards the project and by incorporating regional 
integration objectives into national development programmes. By so 
doing, there will be a harmonised development policy aimed at fostering 
greater compatibility and subsequently achieve convergence between 
national and regional plans. Thus, the linkage between national 
economic development policies and regional policy needs to be 
strengthened. This will reduce the conflict of goals, harmonise 
development policies aimed at fostering greater compatibility and 
achieve convergence between national and regional plans and strategies 
(Oshikoya 2010).  
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The finding in chapter 5 helps to evaluate the potential trade benefits of a full 
monetary union in West Africa (ECOWAS). All other things being equal, the 
thesis argue based on the evidence offered that there is a possible acceleration 
of regional trade with a common currency. This confirms the hypothesis that 
single currency (CFA Franc) augments bilateral trade among member countries. 
The extent to which currencies promote trade requires convertibility. 
Consequently, the potential trade creation associated with a common currency 
is a helpful guide for the WAMZ (ECOWAS) deep integration agenda. There are 
significant hurdles before WAMZ single currency could become a reality and the 
dream of realising increase trade benefits. The realisation requires robust 
political and economic will to achieve the set convergences aimed at fostering 
cooperation and coordination among member states. Also, this would require 
political commitment to give up sovereignty for a regional administration like 
those belonging to the CFA zone. Indeed, there is a consensus among some 
economists that deeper economic integration could not be sustained without a 
political union (Krugman and Obstfeld 2009). 
Finally, to gauge what potentiality there is in West Africa currency union such as 
boosting intra-community trade requires scaling up toward industrialisation to 
transform primary commodities efficiently into manufactured goods. The East 
Asian experiences, and most recently, China, are underscored as success 
stories of such diversification (Guzman et al. 2018). Otherwise, these countries 
may continue to be vulnerable to frequent fluctuations in external terms of trade. 
 
6.3  Limitations 
The findings of this study should not be regarded as the sole basis for 
evaluating the pros and cons of monetary integration in WAMZ. First, it is 
important to clarify that while this study is entirely an economic analysis, it is 
vital to acknowledge that monetary cooperation and integration are eminently a 
political process.  However, this study did not consider the political process 
involved in monetary integration in WAMZ as the scope was limited to the 
economic process. Second, in chapter four, the study focused on the level of 
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macroeconomic shock symmetry among the WAMZ countries to assess the 
cost of abandoning national monetary policies. However, focusing only on one 
OCA criteria in this study may not capture all the potential costs. Therefore, for 
a meaningful application of findings of this study, more OCA criteria should be 
jointly considered for the robustness of the costs involved in the proposed 
monetary integration in the region.  
The other limitation of this study relates to data availability for all the observed 
countries.  In chapter four, five countries out of the six WAMZ members were 
used in the analysis. WAMZ member country, Liberia was not included due to 
data limitations. Besides, there were no adequate data for Guinea to use as a 
proxy for the openness variable. The difficulty of accessing data somewhat 
limits a certain extent the generalisability of the findings as a representative of 
WAMZ. 
Moreover, having access to quarterly or monthly data may give the actual 
behaviour of macroeconomic variables among WAMZ economies relative to the 
low-frequency annual data used in the analysis. However, such series are not 
available for these countries. For instance, GDP data is only available for 
WAMZ countries on an annual basis.  
 
6.4  Future work 
The work that I have completed as part of this thesis has led to some research 
avenues: 
• Firstly, the empirical work undertaken in chapters 4 focuses on 
characterising macroeconomic shock asymmetry to assess the cost of 
WAMZ economies losing monetary policy autonomy. This analysis still 
provides springboards for assessing the effectiveness of monetary policy 
in these countries and its effect on the economy, especially its 
transmission mechanisms.  
• Second, assessing the possibility of increased business cycle correlation 
synchronisation with a common currency through increased trade among 
the countries (Frankel and Rose 1998).  
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• Third, the analysis of REER misalignments provides future research, 
examining whether the deviation of the REER from its equilibrium is 
determined by monetary arrangements or from real sector rigidities, or 
investigating the impact of misalignment on the economic growth and the 
trade balance.  
• Fourth, the study examined extensively the economic performance of the 
countries that belong in the CFA franc zone. Those countries have a 
common currency pegged to the exchange rate of the French Franc 
(initially) and now with the Euro. In the wake of the introduction of the 
euro, some economists argued that the change massively affected many 
economies, particularly the countries involved in the CFA zone. Though 
this has not been considered in this study, I believe that future research 
could reflect on the consequences of this transition on economic 
development or trade and financial flows between Europe and the Franc 
zone.  
• Finally, the findings from the analyses carried out in Chapter 6 provides 
further research avenue to refine the nation-specific and sector-specific 
(or firm-level) effects of a common currency, but this depends on the 
availability of more accurate data. 
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Appendices  
Appendix 4A.1 Trade Weight Used in Construction of REER and Fundamentals 
Country Main trade partners Total 
Ghana EU 
(Germany) 
China S/A US UK  
A 28.30% 11.58% 10.74% 5.98% 3.87% 60.74 
B 0.47 0.20 0.18 0.10 0.06 1 
Nigeria US China India EU 
(Germany) 
UK  
A 14.06% 10.42% 8.50% 13.89% 4.08% 50.95% 
B 0.28 0.2 0.17 0.27 0.08 1 
Gambia China CFA 
(Senegal) 
EU 
(Germany) 
UK India  
A 25.40% 19.17% 5.32% 2.30% 10.75% 62.94 
B 0.4 0.3 0.08 0.04 0.17 1 
Liberia South Korea China EU 
(Germany) 
US Japan  
A 25.65% 15.63% 20.26% 7.91% 3.28% 72.73% 
B 0.35 0.21 0.28 0.11 0.05 1 
Guinea EU 
(Germany) 
China India US Chile  
A 26.99% 11.31% 11.50% 4.76% 6.30% 60.86% 
B 0.44 0.19 0.19 0.08 0.10 1 
Sierra 
Leone 
China EU 
(Germany) 
UK US S/A  
A 28.32% 19.52% 5.32% 4.81% 3.53% 61.50 
B 0.46 0.32 0.09 0.08 0.06 1 
Source: Author’s (2017). A: Trade weight (% of total trade) B: Normalized Trade weight 
The following procedure was followed in the construction of REER indexes: 
1. The trade weights (𝑤𝑡𝑖 ) were constructed using Zanello and Desruelle 
(1997) methodology and data gathered from the International Monetary 
Fund Directions of Trade (DOTs). The method defined to allow for time 
variation in the weights:    
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𝑊𝑖𝑡 =
𝑀𝑖𝑡+𝑋𝑡𝑖
∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 +∑ 𝑀𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1
 ∑ 𝑊𝑖 = 1
𝑛
𝑖=1   
Where ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 , ∑ 𝑀𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1  and ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝑀𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1  are total exports from the 
domestic country to all the trading partners, total imports of the domestic 
country from all the trading partners and total trade between the 
domestic country and all the trading partners respectively. Similarly, 𝑋𝑡𝑖, 
𝑀𝑖𝑡 and 𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋𝑡𝑖  represent exports to trading partners by the domestic 
country, imports from trading partners by the domestic country and total 
trade between trading partners and domestic country respectively. The 
subscript t and i represent the time in all definitions and the 5 major 
trading partners for each WAMZ country. The weight (𝑊𝑖𝑡) is the total 
share of country j for country i, computed as a five-year average to 
reduce the impact of individual yearly movements on the trade weights 
The computed weights are in table 1. 
2. The trading partners chosen were the 5 major trading countries whose 
trade level accounted for over 50% out of total trade averaged for the 
period 2010-2014.  
3. In all cases the NEER between these countries and their trading partners 
were obtained from IMF IFS; CPI for trading partners were obtained from 
IFS and WDI. The CPI and NEER are all re-based so that they all equal 
100 in 2000.   
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Appendix 4A.2 A Lag Order Selection Criteria 
Ghana 
     
 Lag LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 NA   3.35e-09 -2.488592 -2.2165 -2.397041 
1   297.2065*  3.35e-13 -11.73779  -9.833146* -11.09694 
2  41.72119  4.64e-13 -11.64203 -8.104834 -10.45187 
3  48.26502   2.62e-13*  -12.90772* -7.737964  -11.16825* 
The Gambia 
     
 Lag LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 NA   6.47e-07  5.613867  5.931308  5.720676 
1  242.6635  8.22e-10 -1.122974   1.416554* -0.2685 
2   71.80030*  4.58e-10 -2.142183  2.619432 -0.540045 
3  49.58177   4.11e-10*  -3.679920*  3.303782  -1.330117* 
Nigeria 
     
 Lag LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 NA   1.42e-06  0.725579  0.952322  0.801871 
1   163.1228*   1.57e-08* -3.800853  -2.440392*  -3.343099* 
2  34.73983  1.65e-08 -3.864785 -1.370606 -3.02557 
3  25.93966  2.23e-08  -3.875496* -0.247599 -2.654819 
Sierra Leone 
     
 Lag LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 NA   1.23e-05  8.559163  8.876604  8.665972 
1  224.9587  3.17e-08  2.530512   5.070040*  3.384986 
2  54.98388  4.50e-08  2.445549  7.207164  4.047688 
3   76.30621*   3.56e-09*  -1.521682*  5.462020   0.828122* 
Guinea 
     
 Lag LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 NA   1.73e-09 -5.983545 -5.756801 -5.907252 
1   144.1525*   3.87e-11*  -9.807374*  -8.446913*  -9.349620* 
2  27.15919  5.72e-11 -9.526731 -7.032552 -8.687516 
3  29.47254  6.29e-11 -9.745259 -6.117362 -8.524582 
* Indicates the optimal lag order selected according to the associated criterion 
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Appendix 4A.3 Pantula Principle Test Results for Joint Hypothesis (Trace Test) 
 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Trace Stat Critical Value Trace Stat Critical Value Trace Stat Critical Value 
 Ghana 
0 104.7308 83.93712 128.7880 103.8473 107.1784* 95.75366 
1 71.94923 60.06141 86.70601 76.97277 65.65496 69.81889 
2 47.98238* 40.17493 55.41602* 54.07904 37.24352 47.85613 
 The Gambia 
0 84.90512* 83.93712 114.0611* 103.8473 103.0772* 95.75366 
1 50.98178 60.06141 73.28463 76.97277 62.53821 69.81889 
2 30.60502 40.17493 40.62661 54.07904 34.06654 47.85613 
 Nigeria 
0 99.09999* 83.93712 119.0225* 103.8473 98.20322* 95.75366 
1 52.82749 60.06141 72.75000 76.97277 55.52418 69.81889 
2 30.40266 40.17493 47.07254 54.07904 31.85319 47.85613 
 Sierra Leone 
 
0 108.1824 83.93712 131.7523* 103.8473 118.8650 95.75366 
1 70.87535 60.06141 78.55027 76.97277 73.68037* 69.81889 
2 41.52539* 40.17493 48.40356 54.07904 45.95597 47.85613 
 Guinea 
0 73.31415 60.06141 82.26850* 76.97277 67.41007 69.81889 
1 33.15516 40.17493 41.74709 54.07904 35.68672 47.85613 
2 13.55856 24.27596 20.92214 35.19275 19.83118 29.79707 
Notes: * denotes rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration. Model 2 assumes no deterministic trend in data; 
Model 3 allows intercept but no trend in the CE; and Model 4 allows for an intercept and trend in the CE. 
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Appendix 4A.4 LR statistics for testing weak exogeneity of the foreign and 
external (oil price) variables 
  Ghana Gambia Nigeria Sierra 
Leone 
Guinea 
Dln(pro) 𝜒2 (1) 8.494 8.514 0.065 10.143 1.320 
p-value 0.003 0.003 0.798 0.001 0.250 
Dln(tot) 𝜒2 (1) 0.328 3.221 0.898 0.006 1.710 
p-value 0.566 0.072 0.343 0.935 0.190 
Dln(oil) 𝜒2 (1) 7.449 3.633 1.206 0.008 2.854 
p-value 0.006 0.056 0.271 0.926 0.091 
Dln(open) 𝜒2 (1) 0.002 0.145 0.467 0.048 - 
p-value 0.966 0.702 0.494 0.826 - 
Dln(gov) 𝜒2 (1) 0.487 3.422 1.219 1.997 1.230 
p-value 0.485 0.064 0.269 0.157 0.267 
Notes: The weak exogeneity test is performed by imposing zero restrictions on the 𝜶𝒊 matrix in the error correction 
equations 
 
Appendix 4A.5 A VECM Diagnostic Tests 
Ghana                              
VEC Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests 
   
   Lags LM-Stat Prob 
   
   1  38.50902  0.3567 
2  21.10155  0.9772 
3  31.52425  0.6814 
4  37.12863  0.4168 
5  23.24965  0.9503 
6  32.25747  0.6473 
7  30.38132  0.7325 
8  30.59874  0.7230 
9  29.90889  0.7527 
10  30.95215  0.7073 
   
   Probs from chi-square with 36 df. Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag 
order h 
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VEC Residual Normality Tests: Cholesky (Lutkepohl)    
     
     
     
Component Skewness Chi-sq df Prob. 
     
     
1  0.105641  0.063240 1  0.8014 
2 -0.100333  0.057045 1  0.8112 
3  0.143959  0.117437 1  0.7318 
4 -0.045674  0.011821 1  0.9134 
5  0.196429  0.218645 1  0.6401 
6  1.313268  9.773143 1  0.0018 
     
     
Joint   10.24133 6  0.1149 
     
     
     
Component Kurtosis Chi-sq df Prob. 
     
     
1  2.034103  1.321689 1  0.2503 
2  3.455035  0.293331 1  0.5881 
3  2.771128  0.074208 1  0.7853 
4  2.572006  0.259504 1  0.6105 
5  2.308748  0.676925 1  0.4106 
6  6.103033  13.64082 1  0.0002 
     
     
Joint   16.26648 6  0.0124 
     
     
     
Component Jarque-Bera df Prob.  
     
     
1  1.384930 2  0.5003  
2  0.350376 2  0.8393  
3  0.191645 2  0.9086  
4  0.271325 2  0.8731  
5  0.895570 2  0.6390  
6  23.41396 2  0.0000  
     
     
Joint  26.50781 12  0.0091  
     
     
Null Hypothesis: residuals are multivariate normal 
 
VEC Residual Heteroskedasticity Tests: No Cross Terms (only levels and squares) 
   
     
          
   Joint test:    
     
     Chi-sq df Prob.   
     
      310.3272 294  0.2455   
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6 The Gambia 
VEC Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests 
   
   Lags LM-Stat Prob 
   
   1  26.91213  0.8636 
2  32.07848  0.6557 
3  23.58904  0.9446 
4  28.58861  0.8056 
5  26.26241  0.8831 
6  45.52357  0.1328 
7  46.95706  0.1045 
8  38.14791  0.3720 
9  31.82827  0.6673 
10  32.31112  0.6448 
   
   
Probs from chi-square with 36 df. Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at 
lag order h   
VEC Residual Normality Tests: Cholesky (Lutkepohl)   
     
     
     
Component Skewness Chi-sq df Prob. 
     
     
1 -0.678147  2.606007 1  0.1065 
2 -0.012912  0.000945 1  0.9755 
3 -0.684503  2.655083 1  0.1032 
4 -0.191097  0.206935 1  0.6492 
5  0.288157  0.470530 1  0.4927 
6 -1.619803  14.86798 1  0.0001 
     
     
Joint   20.80747 6  0.0020 
     
     
     
Component Kurtosis Chi-sq df Prob. 
     
     
1  3.654088  0.606094 1  0.4363 
2  2.968682  0.001390 1  0.9703 
3  4.048374  1.557041 1  0.2121 
4  2.740341  0.095516 1  0.7573 
5  3.155519  0.034264 1  0.8531 
6  8.455021  42.15611 1  0.0000 
     
     
Joint   44.45041 6  0.0000 
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Component Jarque-Bera df Prob.  
     
     
1  3.212101 2  0.2007  
2  0.002334 2  0.9988  
3  4.212124 2  0.1217  
4  0.302451 2  0.8597  
5  0.504794 2  0.7769  
6  57.02409 2  0.0000  
     
     
Joint  65.25789 12  0.0000  
     
Null Hypothesis: residuals are multivariate normal  
   
     
 
VEC Residual Heteroskedasticity Tests: No Cross Terms (only levels and squares) 
      
            
   Joint test:     
      
      Chi-sq df Prob.    
      
       312.4108 294  0.2203    
      
       
7 Nigeria 
 
 
VEC Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests 
   
   Lags LM-Stat Prob 
   
   1  16.03633  0.9137 
2  22.54346  0.6042 
3  24.63620  0.4829 
4  16.37322  0.9033 
5  20.22628  0.7349 
6  29.47684  0.2445 
7  20.64594  0.7122 
8  25.41341  0.4394 
9  29.86582  0.2294 
10  22.53757  0.6045 
   
   Probs from chi-square with 25 df. Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag 
order h   
 
VEC Residual Normality Tests: Cholesky 
(Lutkepohl)    
     
          
Component Skewness Chi-sq df Prob. 
     
     1 -0.436451  1.047695 1  0.3060 
2  0.853225  4.003960 1  0.0454 
3 -0.943302  4.894002 1  0.0270 
4  0.012660  0.000881 1  0.9763 
5 -0.443857  1.083549 1  0.2979 
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Joint   11.03009 5  0.0508 
     
          
Component Kurtosis Chi-sq df Prob. 
     
     1  2.918946  0.009033 1  0.9243 
2  4.854629  4.729515 1  0.0296 
3  3.870803  1.042659 1  0.3072 
4  2.397679  0.498837 1  0.4800 
5  3.330354  0.150059 1  0.6985 
     
     Joint   6.430103 5  0.2666 
     
          
Component Jarque-Bera df Prob.  
     
     1  1.056728 2  0.5896  
2  8.733475 2  0.0127  
3  5.936661 2  0.0514  
4  0.499718 2  0.7789  
5  1.233608 2  0.5397  
     
     Joint  17.46019 10  0.0648  
     
     Null Hypothesis: residuals are multivariate normal  
 
VEC Residual Heteroskedasticity Tests: No Cross Terms (only levels and squares) 
   
     
          
   Joint test:    
     
     Chi-sq df Prob.   
     
      327.2746 330  0.5320   
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8 Sierra Leone 
VEC Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests 
   
   Lags LM-Stat Prob 
   
   1  20.74361  0.7068 
2  41.72677  0.0192 
3  26.92602  0.3596 
4  16.10532  0.9117 
5  31.95659  0.1593 
6  29.86316  0.2295 
7  18.63817  0.8141 
8  14.41703  0.9540 
9  30.42304  0.2088 
10  24.79804  0.4737 
   
   Probs from chi-square with 25 df. Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag order h 
 
VEC Residual Heteroskedasticity Tests: No Cross Terms (only levels and squares)- Joint test: 
      
Chi-sq               df                        Prob. 
   
   
   
   
      
      
 333.2235 330  0.4400    
      
      
 
VEC Residual Normality Tests (Cholesky (Lutkepohl)   
     
     Component Skewness Chi-sq df Prob. 
     
     1 -0.295401  0.479941 1  0.4884 
2 -0.269433  0.399269 1  0.5275 
3 -0.942244  4.883028 1  0.0271 
4 -0.151752  0.126657 1  0.7219 
5 -0.092542  0.047102 1  0.8282 
     
     Joint   5.935997 5  0.3125 
     
          
Component Kurtosis Chi-sq df Prob. 
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     1  3.341289  0.160157 1  0.6890 
2  2.131016  1.038308 1  0.3082 
3  4.546555  3.288771 1  0.0698 
4  2.627023  0.191279 1  0.6619 
5  2.368932  0.547590 1  0.4593 
     
     Joint   5.226105 5  0.3889 
     
      
 
 
     
Component Jarque-Bera df Prob.  
     
     1  0.640098 2  0.7261  
2  1.437577 2  0.4873  
3  8.171799 2  0.0168  
4  0.317936 2  0.8530  
5  0.594692 2  0.7428  
     
     Joint  11.16210 10  0.3450  
     
     Null Hypothesis: residuals are multivariate normal  
 
9 Guinea 
VEC Residual Serial Correlation LM 
Tests 
   
   Lags LM-Stat Prob 
   
   1  16.08169  0.9124 
2  17.12945  0.8770 
3  12.52978  0.9818 
4  23.41956  0.5531 
5  22.33903  0.6161 
6  23.10842  0.5712 
7  18.72115  0.8103 
8  42.42376  0.0162 
9  14.23038  0.9576 
10  32.07482  0.1559 
   
   Probs from chi-square with 25 df. 
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VEC Residual Normality Tests   
     
          
Component Skewness Chi-sq df Prob. 
     
     1 -1.389718  10.62224 1  0.0011 
2  0.215675  0.255835 1  0.6130 
3  0.690072  2.619099 1  0.1056 
4  0.432928  1.030847 1  0.3100 
5  0.517109  1.470709 1  0.2252 
     
     Joint   15.99873 5  0.0068 
     
          
Component Kurtosis Chi-sq df Prob. 
     
     1  8.231716  37.63492 1  0.0000 
2  2.668803  0.150826 1  0.6977 
3  3.349925  0.168365 1  0.6816 
4  2.443203  0.426282 1  0.5138 
5  3.004013  2.21E-05 1  0.9962 
     
     Joint   38.38041 5  0.0000 
     
          
Component Jarque-Bera df Prob.  
     
     1  48.25715 2  0.0000  
2  0.406662 2  0.8160  
3  2.787464 2  0.2481  
4  1.457129 2  0.4826  
5  1.470731 2  0.4793  
     
     Joint  54.37914 10  0.0000  
 
 
VEC Residual Heteroskedasticity Tests: No Cross Terms (only levels and squares) 
      
   Joint test:     
      
      Chi-sq df Prob.    
      
       334.3953 330  0.4222    
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Inverse Roots Tests 
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Appendix 4A.6 Variance decomposition 
Horizon Demand 
Shock 
Supply 
shock 
Terms 
of trade 
shock 
Demand 
Shock 
Supply 
shock 
Terms of 
trade 
shock 
 (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
Ghana    The 
Gambia 
  
1 81.56 13.02 5.42 98.71 1.01 0.28 
2 76.50 15.59 7.91 94.91 1.17 3.92 
3 76.34 15.72 7.94 94.03 1.38 4.60 
4 76.20 15.79 8.01 93.78 1.44 4.78 
5 76.18 15.81 8.01 93.71 1.46 4.83 
6 76.18 15.81 8.01 93.70 1.47 4.84 
10 76.17 15.82 8.01 93.69 1.47 4.84 
       
Guinea    Nigeria   
1 86.00 0.30 13.70 81.77 5.35 12.88 
2 84.62 0.81 14.57 79.69 6.54 13.77 
3 83.72 1.87 14.41 79.76 6.52 13.72 
4 83.72 1.88 14.41 79.76 6.52 13.72 
5 83.72 1.88 14.41 79.76 6.52 13.72 
6 83.72 1.88 14.41 79.76 6.52 13.72 
10 83.72 1.88 14.41 79.76 6.52 13.72 
       
Sierra 
Leone 
      
1 99.14 0.53 0.33    
2 92.48 4.47 3.05    
3 92.19 4.74 3.07    
4 92.15 4.77 3.08    
5 92.15 4.77 3.08    
6 92.15 4.77 3.08    
10 92.15 4.77 3.08    
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Appendix 5A.1 Theoretical development of gravity model 
Since Tinbergen (1962) the application of the gravity equation was not without 
shortcomings. It has appeared that the model lacks solid and coherent 
theoretical foundations with criticisms ranging from: the lingering perception that 
gravity equations can better be applied to examine phenomena related to 
physics rather than economics, the model do not incorporate structural 
differences that would affect the determinants of trade such as (Deardorff 
1984). 
In relation to the above criticisms and limitations, the earliest attempt to provide 
a theoretical foundation dates to Linnemann (1966), however Anderson (1979) 
is mostly cited as the first to set forth a conventional economic explanation for 
deriving the gravity equation. Anderson (1979) theoretical motivation was based 
on the Cobb-Douglas Theorem and the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
preference. In addition, the paper applied the Armington assumption that goods 
are nationally differentiated (differentiated products by country of origin)101 and 
consumers have preferences defined over all the differentiated products. In 
other words, countries consume at least some of every good from every 
country, no matter what the costs are. Hence, all goods are traded, all countries 
participate in international trade, and in equilibrium national income is the sum 
of home and foreign demand for the commodity that each nation produces. For 
this reason, larger countries tend to export and import more (Seid 2013). The 
major drawback of this model is the assumption that all prices are constant, 
considering the asymmetric trade costs argument that prices differ across 
producers in theory (Bacchetta et al. 2012).  
Subsequently, other scholars have tried to demonstrate that the gravity model 
can arise out of a range of trade theories. (Bergstrand 1985; Bergstrand 1989) 
extended Anderson derivation with monopolistic competition developed by 
(Krugman 1980) but retained the CES preference structure to derive an 
abridged gravity equation. In contrast to the Armington assumption Bergstrand 
suggested product differentiation amongst firms instead of the location of 
                                                             
101 The assumption that international trade flows are distinguished by their origin was originally put forward in 
(Armington, 1969). 
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production (Bacchetta et al. 2012). Firm location is endogenously determined, 
and countries are specialized in the production of different sets of goods. 
Furthermore, the model argued that price effects should be included in the 
model, thereby approaching the debate from the supply side. On the other 
hand, Helpman and Krugman (1985) from the new trade theories applied a 
differentiated product framework with increasing returns to scale to validate the 
gravity model. Deardorff (1998) also explained that gravity model can arise from 
a factor endowments explanation of trade in a Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O). Eaton 
and Kortum (2002) also considered a gravity-type equation from a Ricardian 
type of model, and Helpman et al. (2008) and Chaney (2008) developed a 
gravity model from a theoretical model of international trade in differentiated 
goods with firm heterogeneity (Bacchetta et al. 2012). 
Finally, with the publication of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), the 
conventional wisdom that gravity equations lacked micro-foundations was finally 
dismissed. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) derived an operational gravity 
model based on the manipulation of the CES system and introduced multilateral 
resistance terms. They argue that the traditional gravity equation with bilateral 
frictions (trade costs affected by spatial distance, language difference, trade 
restrictions, etc.) appear to be inadequate to fully explain the trade flow between 
countries. They show that when predicting trade flows between any pair of 
countries, the effect of third countries should be considered. The multilateral 
resistance factors introduced in the standard gravity equation was decomposed 
into three components: bilateral trade barriers between region 𝑖 and region 𝑗; 
region 𝑖′𝑠 resistance to trade with all regions, and region 𝑗′𝑠 resistance to trade 
with all regions (Novy 2013). Basically, these multilateral resistance factors 
capture the fact that bilateral trade flows do not only depend on bilateral trade 
barriers but also on trade barriers across all trading partners. These 
developments provided a strong theoretical foundation and subsequently 
facilitated augmentation of the gravity model with various specifications.  
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Appendix 5A.2 Heteroscedasticity tests 
 
A. The modified Wald test for group-wise heteroscedasticity 
The modified Wald test for group-wise heteroscedasticity is used to assess the 
potential problems of heteroscedasticity in a simple fixed effect model. The null 
hypothesis is homoscedasticity (or constant variance). It is clear from BOX 1 
below that the null is strongly rejected, and we can conclude the presence of 
heteroscedasticity. 
Box 1. 
. xttest3 
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity 
in fixed effect regression model  
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i 
chi2 (210) = 1.8e+05  
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000  
 
Furthermore, the model is tested for heteroskedasticity using the Breusch-
Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test. The 𝜒2(1) = 67.12 is significant at the 1% level of 
significance, hence the residuals are heteroskedastic, See Box 2.  
Box 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000
         chi2(1)      =    67.12
         Variables: fitted values of lnrtrade1
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
. hettest
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Appendix 5A.4 GDP of ECOWAS members (Share in 2013) 
 
Source: Authors Compilation: Data from World Development Indicators  
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